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Abstract
This doctoral research focuses on sentencing, and more specifically, disparity in sen-
tencing in the courts of England and Wales. Previous research in this area has intro-
duced bias into the samples by focusing solely on custodial sentences and therefore
failing to consider the more common non-custodial sentences. This thesis overcomes
this methodological problem.
There are two parts to this research: the first part develops a sentence severity
scale based on the principle of proportionality, and includes the full range of sentences
meted out by the courts in England and Wales. The second part of this research then
uses the new scale to assess disparity based on the extra-legal factors of the case. Data
from the Offender Assessment System (OASys) was merged with data from the Police
National Computer (PNC), which provided information on the offence and resultant
sentence, as well as information relating to the socio-demographic characteristics of
the offender.
Goodman Row Column Association analysis was used to model the association
between the offences and sentence categories. This model was then extended to control
for three legal factors - offence plea, previous history of offending, and the number of
offences the offender was sentenced for - which must all be taken into consideration
when sentencing offenders. This analysis provided a series of scores for each of the
sentence categories allowing them to be arranged by magnitude, ranging from the least
to most severe sentence. To anchor the scale and make the scores less arbitrary, linear
III
interpolation was used. This estimated the equivalent number of days in custody for
the non-custodial sentences using the modal days in custody for each of the custodial
sentence categories.
The new sentence severity scale was treated as the dependent variable in which
to model sentencing disparity using multilevel modelling. Here a number of legal and
extra-legal variables were considered to try and explain the large amount of sentencing
variation between offenders.
After controlling for the legal factors of the offence this research found there to be
significant sentencing disparity. Consistent with previous research, female offenders
were sentenced less severely than male offenders, and White British and Irish offend-
ers were also sentenced less severely than ‘like-situated’ Black offenders. However,
offenders in the White other category were sentenced less severely than the White
British and Irish group. This research also found that unemployed offenders were
sentenced more severely than those in employment prior to sentencing, although the
research did find that those on benefits were sentenced less severely. Finally, offenders
who do not live in permanent accommodation were also sentenced more severely.
The results of this research suggest significant disparities in the sentencing of
offenders in England and Wales.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction - Setting the scene
One of the basic precepts of justice is to ‘treat like cases alike and treat different cases
differently’ (Ashworth, 2010b). This can be said to be based on a model of parity
which is founded on the underlying notions of equality and fairness. Treating like
cases differently may result in disparity which, can be argued, leads to discrimina-
tion, inequality, and injustice (Nagel and Johnson, 1994). Disparity can undermine a
criminal justice system, as well as lead to unpredictable sentences (Tak, 1995). Some
would then argue that the increase in the severity of sentencing is partly responsible
for the rising prison population (Hough and Jacobson, 2008).
However, this basic precept of justice is widely debated, and so too is this pathway
to achieving justice. For example, what resonates as equality and parity is widely
debated, especially by some feminist criminologists who argue that treating men and
women the same does not ensue equality or justice (Hudson, 1998). Additionally,
different sentences can affect offenders differently (Tonry, 1996). Therefore what is
required is a better understanding of these terms (Hudson, 1998), such as taking
parity in sentencing to mean an equivalent sentence rather than the same sentence
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for example.
For some, disparity can result in discrimination because legally irrelevant charac-
teristics of the offender affect the sentence imposed after the legally relevant charac-
teristics of the offence(s) are taken into consideration (Spohn, 2009). I would argue
that disparity occurs when, after controlling for the legal factors of the case, offenders
receive sentences which are not of equivalent severity. I argue that certain sentences
overlap in terms of their severity and are therefore equivalent sentences, even though
they possess different punitive elements. Therefore I would argue that disparity occurs
when legally irrelevant characteristics of the offender affect the severity of sentences
differently. For example, when an offender is sentenced more severely on the basis of
being Black, compared to an offender that is White, having controlled for the legal
characteristics of the case. These legally irrelevant factors (or extra-legal factors as
they are generally referred to) are at the centre of a vast array of literature and re-
search, and can be grouped into four main areas; gender, ethnicity, characteristics of
the presiding judge, and the geographic location of the court. However, there is a lack
of research which looks at the effects of additional extra-legal characteristics of the
offender, such as the effects of employment and accommodation status on sentencing
decisions.
A number of studies have looked at disparity with regards to the sentencing of
male and female offenders, such as Carlen (1988), Hedderman and Gelsthorpe (1997),
and Spohn (2009). There is evidence to suggest that, on the whole, men are sen-
tenced more severely than women (Ministry of Justice, 2010): men are more likely to
be incarcerated and face longer custodial sentences than like-situated female offenders
(Dowds and Hedderman, 1997), (Albonetti, 1997). There is also evidence to suggest
that judges are reluctant to give women offenders a fine due to their inability to pay
and therefore more likely to give a discharge or community sentence (Hedderman and
Gelsthorpe, 1997). This is an area of great contention among those interested in sen-
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tencing and equality, as the Equality Act (2010) states no-one should be discriminated
against because of their gender. However, many feminist academics such as Barbara
Hudson (1998) have argued that this disparity between the sentencing of men and
women is fair. Her argument is that equality in sentencing does not mean sameness,
she views fairness and equality as treating men and women differently to reflect their
existence within society.
Race and ethnicity is also a focus in the literature on sentencing disparity. How-
ever, this literature is less contentious as there is a general consensus that peo-
ple should not be treated differently based on their race or ethnicity. The over-
representation of ethnic minority offenders in prison is the first ‘warning signal’ of
sentencing disparity. However sentencing is just one stage of the criminal justice
system in which Black offenders are discriminated against (Ashworth, 2010b). Addi-
tional research has shown that ethnic minority offenders are sentenced more severely
e.g. Hood (1992) in England and Wales and Bushway and Piehl (2001) in the US.
In addition, research also finds that the characteristics of the judge, specifically
their age and ethnicity, leads to sentencing disparity. Johnson (2006) found older
judges and judges from ethnic minorities tend to be more lenient towards offenders.
Judges can also vary in their philosophical approaches to sentencing, which is likely
to impact on the sentencing of offenders, especially when discretion is still an integral
part of the English justice system.
The final area in which there is ample research is the geographic location of the
court. Studies in England and Wales have shown disparity based on the geographic
location of the court in which the offender is sentenced. Mason et al. (2007) reported
large variation in custody rates and average custodial sentence lengths across the 42
Criminal Justice Areas in England and Wales. For example, the average custodial
sentence length in the magistrates’ court was 3 months and this varied between 2.4
and 3.6 months, and in the Crown Court the average custodial sentence length was
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24.1 months and this varied between 19.5 and 28.3 months (Mason et al., 2007).
Research from the U.S. also suggests sentencing variation, based on the location of
the court as well as the available jail capacity (Johnson, 2006).
All these studies provide empirical evidence of disparity in sentencing and are
described in detail in Chapter 3. However, there are methodological problems with
these studies, which this research seeks to rectify in order to more accurately measure
the amount of disparity occurring in the courts in England and Wales.
1.2 Problems with measuring severity
To quantitatively assess disparity in sentencing some form of measurement or scale
is required, but up to now there has been no widely accepted standard measure of
sentence severity (Sweeten, 2012). A number of methodologies have been employed
- the most common measures being; either the ‘in-out decision’ to incarcerate or the
length of the custodial sentence. These methods introduce bias into the samples: for
the first measure by excluding the detail of sentences, which is the result of using
a binary outcome of receiving a custodial sentence (in) or not receiving a custodial
sentence (out), and the second measure by using just the length of that custodial
sentence, in which case all the detail is lost. This results in using only a very small
proportion of the available data. For example, according to the 2009 sentencing
statistics, only 7% of sentences resulted in a custodial sentence (Ministry of Justice,
2010). By employing either method just mentioned, a vast amount of detail in the
data is excluded. The presence of such detail (non-custodial sentences) is essential in
looking at measuring sentence severity and disparity, as these sentences are just as
important (von Hirsch et al., 1989).
A third way that sentence severity has been measured in the past is through the
use of scales. On the whole these scales generally incorporate all types of disposals
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available to the courts. However, these scales have often been developed on the basis
of a vignette approach - presenting survey participants with hypothetical sentences or
scenarios and asking them to attach scores relating to their perceived severity. This
makes these types of scales highly subjective. The scales used in this area will be
discussed fully in Chapter 4.
This research adopts von Hirsch’s (1992) concept of ordinal proportionality, and
becomes the basis of creating a scale to measure sentence severity and facilitate an
assessment of sentencing disparity. This assumes that the range of sentencing out-
comes can be placed on a unidimensional scale which measures sentence severity. The
different types of sentences are therefore aligned on one continuum to allow differences
in the severity of sentences to be measured. Marinos (2005) opposes this unidimen-
sional approach, arguing that a more multidimensional approach is needed to capture
the multifaceted nature of sentencing, and which incorporates the many qualitative,
as well as, quantitative factors that are taken into consideration when sentencing of-
fenders, such as the age and the “appropriate level of denunciation”(Marinos, 2005,
p. 451). However, using a unidimensional scale does not to deny the multifaceted
nature of sentencing - sentence severity is just one aspect or dimension of sentencing
which allows measurement to occur.
1.3 Thesis aims and objectives
Issues with previous ways of measuring sentence severity and assessing sentencing
disparity have partly fuelled the motivation to conduct this research. This research
fills this methodological gap by using sentencing information on all types of sentences
to reduce sample bias in the data used to measure sentence severity. In contrast to
the majority of the literature and research, a scale of sentence severity is constructed
for all of the disposals currently in use in the England and Wales justice system,
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and thus provides a better measure of sentence severity. This scale then enables the
investigation into sentencing disparity.
This research investigates the sentencing practice of judges by analysing real sen-
tencing data on offenders sentenced at the magistrates’ and Crown Courts in England
and Wales between March 2008 and April 2010. Data from the Offending Assessment
System (OASys) merged with downloads from Police National Computer (PNC) fa-
cilitate this work.
OASys data comes in the form of pre-sentence reports requested by the courts and
produced by the Probation Service to aid decision-making. OASys is described as an
actuarial tool for assessing the risks and needs of the offender and records information
relating to the social and economic characteristics of the offender. The PNC data then
provides information on the offence, disposal and criminal histories of the offender.
Both datasets will be explained fully in Chapter 5.
1.3.1 Aims
There are two aims of this thesis. The first aim of this research is concerned with
the distribution of sentences and whether the distribution of these sentences can be
arranged on a single scale which measures sentence severity. In doing so it is also
possible to assess the interchangeability of sentences: to identify sentences that carry
the same penal bite or equivalence in terms of their severity. For example, an onerous
community order and a short custodial sentence may be equivalent in terms of their
severity.
The unidimensional scale is constructed using a form of log-linear model which
models the association between the two categorical variables; offence and sentence.
This is an extension of the Goodman Row Column Association Model which allows
covariates to be added to the association parameters, therefore controlling for legal
variables of the case. The outcome is a series of scores which form a unidimensional
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scale of sentence severity.
The second aim of this thesis then uses this unidimensional scale as a tool which
robustly measures sentence severity to identify disparity in sentencing. It provides
evidence of disparity through the use of a multilevel model with a range of legal and
extra-legal covariates.
These aims set out to answer a number of research questions:
1. Can sentences be arranged into a unidimensional scale of sentence severity?
(a) Is it possible to assess the equivalence/interchangeability of sentences?
2. Do extra-legal characteristics of the offender affect sentence severity? And more
specifically;
(a) Are men sentenced more severely than women?
(b) Does ethnicity impact on sentence severity?
(c) What other extra-legal factors are affecting sentencing disparity?
3. If certain types of offenders are discriminated against, what are the implications
of this?
1.3.2 Objectives
This thesis sets out to achieve a number of research objectives. The first research
objective is methodological, and sets out to develop a methodology which allows for
the construction of a severity scale which incorporates the full range of sentencing
outcomes. It will specifically investigate the Goodman Row Column Association
model and whether it is possible to create a unidimensional scale of sentence severity
which also controls for legal covariates in constructing this scale, to begin to answer
the first research question. The final objective will be to utilise the scale developed in
the first stage of this research and use real sentencing data to identify disparity, and
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thus answer the second research question. All of this will then facilitate discussion on
the last research question.
1.4 Thesis structure
There are ten chapters in this thesis. The following chapter (Chapter 2) provides a
brief overview of the theoretical approaches to sentencing which influence the cur-
rent sentencing framework and its principles underpinning sentencing practice. It
will provide an account of sentencing practices as described in the legislative statues
and provisions, as well as provide a contextual account of sentencing - including the
decision-making process and the types of disposals available to the courts. This infor-
mation is used later on in the thesis to justify the decisions made during the modelling
stages and also to assess if extra-legal factors are influencing sentencing decisions.
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on disparity in sentencing, drawing from literature
and research from England and Wales, as well as, the U.S. Disparity can be seen to
go against the notion of justice, and therefore it is essential that this is investigated.
Research to date reveals a great deal of disparity in sentencing, identifying the socio-
demographics of the offenders (particularly gender and ethnicity), characteristics of
the judge, and location of the court as most associated with disparity.
I then go on to discuss the problems with the ways in which these studies measure
severity and how severity is often measured; namely that bias is introduced into
the sample by excluding masses of important information relating to non-custodial
sentences. Chapter 4 then reviews the literature surrounding measuring severity and
goes on to discuss how disparity is measured and why this needs to be made a focus.
The fifth chapter describes the data used to conduct the research. It explains this
research uses data from the Offending and Assessment System (OASys), recorded
by the Probation Service. Specifically, the data comes from pre-sentence reports
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carried out by the Probation Service prior to sentencing, and by request of the court.
The information included in this data includes the specifics about the offence, for
example whether the offender used a weapon, and information relating to the offender,
including socio-demographic information.
The OASys data was then merged with data from the Police National Computer
(PNC) post-sentencing. The courts upload information about the outcome of cases
- i.e. the sentences - to their court’s computer systems and this information is then
fed into the PNC. Therefore, the data used for this research uses the combined data
from OASys and the PNC. The remainder of Chapter 5 provides a description of the
data and the sample.
Chapter 6 discusses the methodology employed to create the unidimensional scale.
It discusses the concept of log-linear modelling, followed by the various other meth-
ods that could have been used to create the scale. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the
Goodman Row Column Association analysis employed to create the scale. This mod-
els the association between the offence and sentence categories. I go on to explain
how I extended the model to allow for the inclusion of legal covariates relating to
the offender’s plea, their prior offending history and the number of offences they were
sentenced for at the time of sentencing. I then explain the use of linear interpolation
on the scores which then serves as the scale in which to measure sentence severity.
Chapter 7 is the first results chapter, which discusses the results from the extended
Goodman Row Column Association analysis. It reports the scores for the sentence
categories.
Chapter 8 is the second methodology chapter which discusses multilevel modelling,
and how it is used to identify disparity in sentence severity. The linear interpolated
scores from the extended Goodman RC analysis are treated as continuous and this
becomes the dependent variable within the random intercept multilevel model. The
models included a three-level model with offences at level one, offenders at level two
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and police force area at the third level, and a two-level model with police force area
excluded. The second model is preferred to the first.
The results from the multilevel modelling are reported in Chapter 9. The final
model found disparity in sentencing relating to the following legal factors; plea, con-
viction history, the number of offences they were sentenced for, and the type of court
they were sentenced in, as well as the following extra-legal factors relating to the
offenders sex, ethnicity, age, accommodation status, employment status and income.
Chapter 10 provides the discussion which relates the findings from this research
with previous research. It then also re-addresses the research questions and draws the
main conclusions from this work.
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Chapter 2
Sentencing in England and Wales
2.1 Introduction
The core of this doctoral thesis is to assess the disparity in sentencing in the Criminal
Courts of England and Wales. In order to do this, is it necessary to clearly set-out
what the correct course of action should be (Ashworth, 1987). This chapter therefore
provides the background and context of sentencing in England and Wales. However, it
will become clear that the legislation and guidelines are somewhat less than clear and
at times ambiguous, which may contribute towards disparity (ibid). The following
chapter will return to the literature on disparity.
In recent years, great emphasis has been placed on consistency in sentencing as a
means of achieving justice and fairness. Consistency can be viewed as optimal and
is a central feature of sentencing made apparent within the statutory provisions and
Sentencing Council objectives. The main focus being on consistency in the approach to
sentencing as opposed to consistency in the outcomes (Hutton, 2013). By establishing
a consistent approach to sentencing this should in turn reduce any disparity and
subsequent discrimination (ibid). Often there is confusion between these two forms
of consistency, as well as a lack of definition as to what is meant by consistency.
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In the following chapter I will explain that although the term consistency is used
repeatedly in the literature and by, for example the Sentencing Council, they are
essentially referring to parity. However, I will return to these notions of consistency
and parity in terms of what this means for assessing disparity in the next chapter.
This chapter will first provide the legislative context for sentencing and how it should
be undertaken.
2.1.1 The role of sentencing
Today punishment is described as “the legal process whereby violators of criminal
law are condemned and sanctioned in accordance with specified legal categories and
procedures” (Garland, 1990, 17). This is administered by professional and lay judges
in a court of law, by way of sentencing. However, the ways in which offenders are
sentenced has changed. The opening scene from Foucault’s (1977) book “Discipline
and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison” describes the brutal mutilation of Robert-
Franois Damiens in 1757, the last man to be publicly executed in France by drawing
and quartering. From here on, Hudson (1996) explains we have seen the “transition
from penalties inflicted on the body (execution, torture and mutilation, as well as
less drastic physical punishments such as the stocks) to those directed at the mind
and the character (labour and penance in the eighteenth - and nineteenth-century
prisons, education and therapy in twentieth-century prisons), punishments which are
designed to produce not the physically incapacitated citizen but the right thinking
citizen” (Hudson, 1996, p. 7). This highlights the shift in the types of punishment
that are deemed acceptable within society, and also how sentencing has moved away
from the spectacle that it once was to become an almost hidden part of the penal
system, taking place behind the closed doors of the courts (Ashworth, 2010b).
It is generally assumed that the right to punish is one aspect of the modern
sovereign state (Ashworth, 2010b), and this is now extended to international bodies,
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such as the International Court of Justice. Ashworth (2010b) notes, the justifications
for assigning the central role to the state is generally derived from social contract
theories. The crux of such theories involve a contractual agreement between the state
and its citizens: citizens give up their right to use force against those who attack their
interests, and give it over to the state. In return, the state will protect its citizens by
maintaining law and order (ibid). The role of the state is to respond to wrongs in the
form of crimes and offences.
Sentencing is also a form of public censure, whereby the sentences imposed should
convey the relative censure for a particular offence(s) (Ashworth, 2010b).
2.2 Sentencing framework
There are a number of rationales for sentencing which can be adopted as an approach
and generally these rationales will underpin the sentencing framework of a particular
jurisdiction. I will briefly illustrate a general theoretical sentencing schema which
demonstrates how these rationales can shape sentencing frameworks. I will then go
on to discuss the current sentencing framework in England and Wales. The following
section will then give a brief background of the sentencing legislation which led to the
current framework being implemented.
2.2.1 Sentencing schema
The diagram in Figure 2.1 displays what I have called a ‘sentencing schema’ because it
outlines the various aims and objectives of sentencing, which once adopted, provides
a sentencing model or framework that can be utilised in sentencing.
At the centre of this schema are two distinct approaches to sentencing. The first
approach goes by the umbrella term of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism encompasses a
number of sentencing concepts and objectives, such as rehabilitative ideal - popular
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in the 1960’s - and restorative justice. The second is a retributivist approach, often
referred to as the ‘just-deserts’ model or approach.
Each approach has a different sentencing focus and guiding principle. The utilitar-
ian approach is concerned with preventing future crimes and so has a consequentialist,
forward-looking sentencing focus (Francis et al., 2001). In this approach the guiding
principle is the individual offender - or victim in the case of restorative justice - and
therefore, these approaches argue that, sentences should be tailored towards the indi-
vidual offender to prevent them from future offending (von Hirsch et al., 2009). Con-
versely, the retributivist approach is backward-looking - non-consequentialist (Francis
et al., 2001). Proponents of these approaches believe that offenders should be punished
proportionally for the offences they have already committed, and therefore, offenders
should receive their ‘just-deserts’. This approach argues that sentencing should be
based on the seriousness of the offence, and not on the individual offender and what
they may do in the future. Proportionality requires crimes to be ranked by their
seriousness - determined by the harm caused by the offence and degree of culpability.
I will say more about this later in the chapter.
These various approaches also have different views on the purposes of sentencing
and the methods in which to achieve these purposes. As I have already explained, one
of the fundamental principles of the utilitarian approach is crime prevention. Sentenc-
ing should therefore reform and rehabilitate the offender, and act as a deterrent from
future offending. This approach argues that this can be achieved through, for exam-
ple, rehabilitation and reparation. On the other hand, retributivists view sentencing
as a form of retribution. Sentencing is also a way to convey censure for a particular
offence, as well as a way of proportioning blame. To achieve justice, offenders must
be punished proportionately for the offence they committed.
Most sentencing frameworks will be based on this sentencing schema, although
generally, they will use a combination of these two approaches as I will explain for
15
England and Wales.
2.2.2 Sentencing in England and Wales
In 1974 a sub-committee of the Council of Europe, which had long been concerned
with sentencing policy - namely inequalities and disparity in sentencing - produced an
influential report on sentencing (Ashworth, 1994). Work on sentencing continued and
this eventually led to the creation of a working group which comprised of a number of
sentencing experts from around Europe. In 1989 the working group produced a report
’Consistency in Sentencing’ and this became the basis of Recommendation No. R
(92) 17, which was later adopted by the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers
in 1992 (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 1993).
The report produced a number of recommendations (see Council of Europe Com-
mittee of Ministers (1993)). One of the recommendations stated that a primary
sentencing rationale should be declared and that whatever rationale was adopted, it
should avoid offenders being sentenced disproportionately. Thereby the seriousness
of the offence should be the most important factor in determining the severity of a
sentence (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 1993).
Furthermore it recommended that no discrimination should be made on the basis
of the offender or victim’s race, colour, gender, nationality, religion social status or
political belief (Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 1993). Additionally, fac-
tors such as unemployment, cultural or social conditions of the offender should not
influence the sentence as to discriminate against the offender (ibid).
These recommendations have influenced sentencing in England and Wales, as well
as the rest of Europe, and are somewhat responsible for the sentencing reforms which
took place in a number of jurisdictions around the early 1990s. In England and
Wales the recommendations have filtered into the sentencing framework by way of
the sentencing statutes of 1991 and 2003 (von Hirsch et al., 2009).
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The 1991 Criminal Justice Act laid down a sentencing framework which made
proportionality the main principle of sentencing. From this point on, proportionality
was deemed to be the main criterion of sentencing: putting emphasis on retribution
as opposed to rehabilitation. However, Rex and von Hirsch (1997) highlighted that
there was a lack of legislation or guidance on ‘seriousness’ - a key concept in the 1991
Act - and how this was to be implemented in practice.
In May 2000, the then Home Secretary - Jack Straw, announced a review of the
sentencing framework which had been established in the Criminal Justice Act 1991.
John Halliday led the review and identified some limitations of the 1991 framework
(Halliday, 2001). The main problem identified was the erosion of the basic principle
of proportionality: namely that the severity of a sentence should only reflect the
seriousness of the offence. His review also noted the importance of improving public
confidence in sentencing, which he argued could be achieved through a principled
sentencing framework.
Following the Halliday review, an updated sentencing framework was introduced
by the Criminal Justice Act 2003: part of the Act set out a new principled sentencing
regime. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 reinforced the sentencing framework set out
by the previous Act (Criminal Justice Act 1991), again placing emphasis on offence
seriousness and proportionality, and for the first time, it laid down the principles of
sentencing. However, heed was also given to the notion of risk, and in situations
where an offender was believed to be dangerous it became mandatory to sentence
out-with the realms of proportionate sentencing. I will come back to this point in a
later section.
Sentencing principles
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 states sentencers must have regard for each of the five
principles when deciding on the sentence to be passed down to the offender. The five
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principles of sentencing according the Act are to:
• punish offenders
• reduce crime (reduction through deterrence)
• reform and rehabilitate the offender
• protect the public (by segregating offenders from the rest of the law abiding
society)
• provide reparation to the persons affected by the offenders
The Act states all five principles are to be given equal weight: one principle should
not be given precedence over another. This reinforces a more ’hybrid’ sentencing
approach, essentially covering all bases. However, this is met with some scepticism,
for example Ashworth (2010b) views this as inviting inconsistency into the sentencing
process and I will say more about this in the next chapter.
Offence seriousness
The Act also reinforced the principle of proportionality. In considering the appropriate
sentence for the offender the sentencer must begin by considering the seriousness of
the offence in respect to the culpability of the offender and the harm caused or risked
being caused by the offence (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004).
Four levels of culpability are identified; intention, recklessness, knowledge and
negligence (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004). The most serious form of culpability
is where the offender had intention to cause harm, whereas the least serious form of
culpability is harm that has been caused by negligence on the part of the offender.
Along with the culpability, the actual harm caused by the offence must also be taken
into consideration. This extends from individual victims to the community, and other
types of harm which are difficult to categorise, such as cruelty to animals (ibid).
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2.3 Sentencing guidelines
For most of the 20th century, the sentencing framework in England and Wales barely
changed: other than setting maximum penalties and introducing and abolishing dif-
ferent forms of sentences, discretion over that time had been left largely to the judges
and magistrates (Ashworth and Roberts, 2013). However, recognition of the impor-
tance of consistency and ensuring fairness in sentencing led to the implementation
of sentencing guidelines in a bid to structure judicial discretion and provide greater
accuracy in projecting the prison population (Ashworth and Roberts, 2013). Thus
guidelines are viewed as one way of achieving greater consistency and predictability
in sentencing (ibid).
Sentencing guidelines are not new to the criminal justice system in England and
Wales: they have been used in practice for the last 25 years or so. Sentencing guide-
lines were initially used by the Court of Appeal in the form of judgements before they
were incorporated into everyday sentencing. The Court of Appeal initially drew up
some guidelines but were limited as to what they could achieve due to the lack of
staff.
As a result, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 created the Sentence Advisory Panel
(SAP)1 The Panel was established to draft and consult on proposals for guidelines
and refer them back to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal was not obliged
to accept the Panel’s recommendations but in most cases it did with some minor
modifications.
An additional feature of the 2003 Act was the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines
Council (SGC)2. The Sentencing Guidelines Council was responsible for setting up
1The Sentence Advisory Panel was constituted in July 1999. The panel consisted of sentencers,
academics, people involved in the criminal justice system (prisons, prosecutions, police and proba-
tion) and lay people who had no connection to the criminal justice system (Ashworth, 2010b).
2The SAP still continued to draft and consult on guidelines as before, but the SGC, rather than
Court of Appeal took responsibility for the creation and form of the guidelines. The SGC essentially
filled the gap between the Court of Appeal and the SAP.
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guidelines for the sentencing of a full range of offences, which Ashworth and Roberts
(2013) acknowledge accelerated the development of definitive sentencing guidelines.
Guidelines were produced for a number of offences, such as offences relating to the
Sexual Offending Act 2003 and Robbery.
The Carter review in 2007 proposed that a permanent sentencing commission
should be set up in England and Wales, and this was also the conclusion drawn by
Hough and Jacobson (2008). It was felt that in a bid to address the “prison crisis” of
a growing prison population, sentencing disparity and the increased politicisation of
sentencing it was necessary to set up a commission to oversee sentencing in England
and Wales (Hough and Jacobson, 2008). The overall objective of the commission was
to achieve greater consistency and stability in sentencing practice thereby preventing
any further upward drift in sentencing severity3.
Following these recommendations the Sentencing Council (SC) was set up under
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The SC replaced the SAP and SGC, and came
into force on the 6th April 2010. The Sentencing Council4 is responsible for issuing
sentencing guidelines, as well as assessing the impact of the guidelines and promoting
awareness amongst the public. The previous guidelines remain in force until they are
replaced by the SC guidelines.
2.3.1 Sentencing guidelines in practice
For each type of offence the sentencing guidelines provide three categories which will
reflect the varying degrees of offence seriousness together with the range of sentences
for that offence. Consideration is given to the offender’s culpability in committing
the offence, the harm caused or intended to be caused by committing the offence, and
other factors the Council considers to be relevant to the seriousness of the offence.
3Between 1993 and 2002, the prison population in England and Wales increased by around 36,000.
This was due to increases in both the number of cases going before the courts and the proportion of
those cases receiving a custodial sentence (Ministry of Justice, 2013b)
4The SC is an independent non-departmental body of the Ministry of Justice
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The guidelines list a number of aggravating and mitigating factors that the court are
required to take into account when considering the seriousness of the offence.
By virtue of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, every court in England and Wales
“must” follow the relevant sentencing guidelines unless the court is satisfied that it is
not in the interests of justice to do so. This wording replaced the previous legislation
which stated that the courts “should have regard” for the guidelines. Therefore the
most recent provision now makes it obligatory to follow the guidelines in a bid to
ensure consistency. However, judges are still allowed to depart from the guidelines
where they feel they are justified to do so in which case they are required to state the
reasons for sentencing out-with the guideline recommendations.
This wording has been criticised for being rather ambiguous. For example, Ash-
worth (2010a) has referred to the wording of the Act as being “pitifully loose”. Not
being explicit in these guidelines leaves room for not only differences in interpretation
but also disparity. Although others have argued that it can also be seen as a way of
maintaining some judicial discretion (Roberts, 2011b).
Aggravating and mitigating factors
The guidelines also produce a list of aggravating and mitigating factors that the court
should take into consideration when considering the seriousness of a given offence. Ag-
gravating factors are seen to increase the seriousness of the offence, whereas mitigating
factors reduce the seriousness of the offence.
There are a number of aggravating factors and one mitigating factor that must
be considered according to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Ashworth, 2010b). The
aggravating factors are;
• previous convictions for relevant and recent convictions
• offence committed while on bail
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• racial or religious aggravation
• aggravation related to disability or sexual orientation
• offences with a terrorist connection
The 2003 Act states that previous convictions must be treated as an aggravating
factor in determining offence seriousness. Sentences are therefore cumulative in that
as the numbers of previous convictions increase, so too does the seriousness of the
current offence. This is partly due to the belief that the offender is not learning
from their past experiences and therefore should be treated more severely in order
to deter them from future reoffending. Judges should also consider the nature of the
previous offence(s) in relation to the current offence to establish if there is a pattern of
offending or whether this current offence is an escalation of prior offending. Also the
time elapsed since the previous offence should be considered: a ten year old offence
will be less relevant than an offence committed within the last six weeks.
However, this is met with some antagonism from some retributive theorists. Roberts
(2009) explains that with regard to the use of prior convictions, retributive theorists
form two distinct groups. The first group is the ‘Exclusionary’ group who believe
previous convictions should not impact on sentence severity. The other group are
those who adhere to the Progressive Loss of Mitigation (PLM) doctrine. They are of
the view that first-time offenders should receive a discounted sentence. This mitiga-
tion should continue until they reach approximately five convictions. Roberts (2009)
endorses a different model with regard to prior convictions; arguing for ‘enhanced cul-
pability’, whereby previous convictions do indeed add to the culpability of an offender.
However, the biggest increase is between a first-time offender and an individual with
two previous convictions (Roberts, 2008). Therefore greater leniency should be shown
to a first-time offender (ibid).
The second statutory requirement relates to being out on bail at the time of com-
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mitting another offence. If the offender was out on bail at the time of committing the
offence, it should be used as an aggravating factor therefore increasing the seriousness
of the offence.
The 2003 Act explicitly makes reference to offences which target specific groups
within society: this is viewed as an aggravating factor when assessing offence serious-
ness. These include where the offence was racially or religiously aggravated or where
the offence related to a disability5 or the sexual orientation of the victim. Finally, the
Counter Terrorism Act 2008 states that if an offence has a terrorist connection that
that should be treated as an aggravating factor (Ashworth, 2010b).
There is only one statutory mitigating factor - a guilty plea. The Sentencing
Guidelines Council (2007) state the reduction for a guilty plea is appropriate because
it avoids the need for the case to go to trial, shortens the gaps between charge and
sentence, reduces costs, and in the case of an early plea, saves victims and witnesses
from having to appear in court to give evidence. The amount of reduction is gauged
on a sliding scale ranging from a recommended one third where the plea was entered
at the earliest possible opportunity (i.e. during police interview), reducing to one
quarter (where trial date is set), and reducing to one tenth (for a guilty plea entered
at the ’door of the court’ or once trial has begun). The court should also take into
consideration the circumstances in which the indication was given. These recommen-
dations are fairly ambiguous and require the judge to use discretion in determining
the amount of reduction.
Additional aggravating and mitigating factors
The Sentencing Guidelines Council (2004) produced a definitive guideline - ’Overar-
ching Principles: Seriousness - which provides a non-exhaustive list of the aggravating
factors which indicate higher culpability and harm which in turn, increase the serious
5‘Disability’ refers to any physical or mental impairment.
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of the offence (see appendix A). This list applies to all cases sentenced on or after
4 August 2008. It also lists mitigating factors which indicate lower culpability, such
as a greater deal of provocation than normally expected; mental illness or disability;
youth or age, where it affects the responsibility of the offender; and the fact the of-
fender played a minor role in the offence. Other offender mitigation is also mentioned
including where the offender shows genuine remorse; made admissions to the police
in interviews; and readily co-operated with the authorities (Sentencing Guidelines
Council, 2008).
Youth or age (being under the age of 21) is viewed as a mitigating factor indicating
lower culpability (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2009). The guidelines state “a court
sentencing a young offender must be aware of the obligations under a range of inter-
national conventions which emphasise the importance of avoiding ‘criminalisation’ of
young people...” (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2009, p. 3). Over the age of 21, age
should not be considered as a factor relevant to sentencing.
The guidelines have also come under criticism by Roberts (2011a) for example,
because they do not specify how much weight should be given to these aggravating and
mitigating factors and also for not differentiating between the statutory requirements
and the additional factors which are to be taken into consideration. I will say more
about this is the following chapter.
Personal mitigation
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 makes provision for sentencers to also take into account
any matter which they deem as relevant in the mitigation of a sentence, referred to
as personal mitigation. The Sentencing Guidelines Council (2004) lists remorse and
admissions to the police as personal mitigation, and any other factors that contribute
to the smooth running of the criminal justice system (Ashworth, 2010b). Jacobson and
Hough (2007) refer to personal mitigation as any factors which relate to the offender
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as opposed to the offence, such as the offender’s past or current circumstances, the
response to the offence by way of showing remorse, and the offender’s prospects. I will
return to the discussion on the use of personal mitigation in the following chapter.
2.4 Risk and the New Penology
Around the same period that the new sentencing framework was being implemented
in England and Wales, there was also a fundamental shift in crime control strategies
particularly in England and Wales (Feeley and Simon, 1992). They refer to this
shift as the ‘New Penology’ based on actuarialism and managing risk rather than
trying to treat and reform offenders (the ‘Old Penology’). The focus moved away
from the individual offender, to priority being given to managing groups of offenders.
This period marked the move away from clinical assessments based on professional
judgements towards actuarial assessments based on calculated predictions of future
risk. The actuarial approach aims to manage risk and therefore fits in with the future-
orientated theories of sentencing. This in essence reaffirms the hybrid sentencing
framework underpinning the current sentencing practice in England and Wales. Given
that emphasis is given to both past and predicted/future behaviour.
Jacobson and Hough (2007) explain that Criminal Justice Act 2003 introduced new
risk-based sentencing measures for those deemed as “dangerous” and these measures
attempt to both manage risk and predict future criminality. Under the Criminal
Justice Act 2003, if an offender was over the age of 21 and is convicted of a ‘specified
offence’ (violent or sexual) after April 4th 2005, and the court considers the offender
to be a risk to the public due to the likelihood of them committing a further specified
offence, the court must impose a sentence of life imprisonment, imprisonment for
public protection (IPP) or an extended sentence of imprisonment (Thomas, 2008).
These mandatory sentences received mixed reactions from judges, but many felt that
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their discretion had been curtailed (Jacobson and Hough, 2007). However, following
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008) it became no longer mandatory to
impose one of the sentences (Ashworth, 2010b). This gave some discretion back to
the judiciary.
Another effect of the ‘New Penology’ was the introduction of the Offender Assess-
ment System (OASys). In England and Wales, the Probation and Prison Services use
the Offender Assessment System as an actuarial tool to assess the risk of recidivism
and the potential harm the offender poses to others, as well as, themselves. The infor-
mation recorded in OASys is provided to the court in the form of pre-sentence reports,
which are discussed in section 2.5.1. The assessment records information on a number
of static6 (criminal history and demographics) and dynamic7 (social and personal)
risk factors to produce the OASys General reoffending Predictor (OGP) score of their
potential risk of reoffending. Risk, as measured by OASys, can therefore be viewed as
a product of the interaction between individuals and their environments (Grimshaw,
2002). A more detailed discussion of the OASys data is provided in section 5.2.1.
However, it would seem that the sentencing guiding principle of proportionality
underpinning the current sentencing framework which is based on a retributivist or
desert-orientated approach, and the actuarial approach used to predict future reoffend-
ing are somewhat conflicting (Jacobson and Hough, 2007). As previously discussed,
the current sentencing framework places proportionality at the forefront of sentencing:
offenders should be sentenced based on the seriousness of their offence and prior be-
haviour. Judges’ can use their discretion using the aggravating and mitigating factors
which will increase or decrease the seriousness of the offence. However, OASys then
provides the court with information relating to the offender, and a recommended sen-
6The static risk factors are fixed (e.g. age at first offence and previous offending histories), and
are said to assess potential long-term recidivism.
7The dynamic risk factors are included because research has found these factors to be closely
associated with reoffending, whether directly or indirectly. These factors can change and therefore
can have a positive or negative effect on the likelihood of reoffending.
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tence that is based on predicted future behaviour. Ashworth (2010b) comments that
this focus on risk and on ‘non-legal’ variables, such as upbringing, family size, income
and housing, will lead to discrimination. This discussion is continued in Chapter 3.
2.5 The decision-making process
This section provides an overview of the process of sentencing decision-making in
England and Wales.
2.5.1 Pre-sentence reports
Prior to sentencing, the court can request a pre-sentence report (PSR) to be provided
by the Probation Service. This report can assist with the decision-making process in
determining the most suitable sentence for an offender. PSR’s are conducted by the
Probation Service using the Offending Assessment System (OASys) (see Section 5.2.1)
to record information about the offender and the nature and seriousness of the offence.
Every report will also contain basic information about the offender and analysis of
the offence, assessment of the offender and their risk of recidivism, assessment of the
risk of harm they pose to themselves and the public, as well as a sentencing proposal,
which will contain a recommendation of the type of sentence the Probation Service
deems appropriate.
The court would generally request a report before deciding:
• if the custody thresholds8 have been passed
• what is the shortest term of custody that is commensurate with the seriousness
of the offence
8A court must not pass a custodial sentence unless the offence was serious enough to warrant
such an offence (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004)
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• what restrictions on liberty within a community order are commensurate with
the seriousness of the offence
• whether requirements attached to a community order are suitable for the of-
fender
Pre-sentence reports are a form of risk assessment of the offender and therefore
relate back to the control strategy as discussed above in the New Penology.
2.5.2 Sentencing guidelines - user guide
The Sentencing Guidelines Council (2008) produced a user-guide for judges to follow,
outlining the step-by-step instructions on the decision-making process. This user-
guide has subsequently been updated by the Sentencing Council (2011), who have
produced a nine-step guideline on sentencing assault cases and for all new guidelines
produced. It is argued that compliance with the guidelines and therefore adopting
consistency in the approach should reduce any unwarranted disparity, and any differ-
ences in sentences should be based on the legally-relevant factors of the case (Hutton,
2013). These steps will be briefly outlined.
Step one - Defining the offence category
The first step involves considering the offence seriousness and identifying an appropri-
ate offence category. Judges are required to match the characteristics of the offence
with those in the guidelines to identify the correct level of seriousness. Category 1
is the most serious and category 3 is the least serious. The court should determine
the offenders culpability and harm using the list of factors provided in the relevant
guideline.
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Step two - Starting point and category range
Attached to each of the three offence seriousness categories is an appropriate sentence
starting point as well as a sentencing range which is acceptable for that particular
level of seriousness. Having determined the relevant offence seriousness category the
court should use the corresponding starting point to decide on a sentence that falls
within the given sentence category range. It then provides the additional list of
aggravating and mitigating factors which the court should take into consideration,
including previous convictions, whether the offence was committed whilst on bail and
other non-statutory aggravating and mitigating factors. Hutton (2013) explains that
consideration of factors at stage 2 may mean that it is appropriate for the court to
move out of the category range having re-assessed the seriousness of the offence. The
judge should now have an idea of the type of sentence they are going to give the
offender before moving on to step 3.
However, as discussed in the previous section (Section 2.3.1), a lack of adequate
guidance or weight to be applied to the different aggravating and mitigating factors
(Roberts, 2011a) may result in judges reaching different decisions. This may then
detract from the consistency in approach.
Step three - Consider any other factors which indicate a reduction, such
as assistance to the prosecution
The court should consider if the offender should receive a discounted sentence if the
offender provided any assistance while in custody.
Step four - Reduction for guilty pleas
As explained previously in Section 2.3.1, the court can reduce an offender’s sentence
if they plead guilty. The amount of the reduction in sentence will very depending on
when the plea was entered. To receive the most discount, the offender would need to
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have entered their guilty plea very early on in the proceeding, for example during their
Police interview. This will mean the sentence can be less severe than is commensurate
with the seriousness of the offence.
Step five - Dangerousness
Where the court deems the offender as ‘dangerous’ having committed a ‘specified of-
fence’ as stipulated by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (see Section 2.4), the court can
award a more severe sentence, such as a life sentence or imprisonment for public pro-
tection. Where the offender meets the ’dangerous’ criteria a minimum term sentence
can also be set.
Step six - Totality principle
After the 11th June 2012, where an offender is being sentenced for more than one
offence, the court must impose a sentence which reflects the overall behaviour of the
offender (Sentencing Council, 2012a). All courts in England and Wales are required to
apply the principle of totality (Sentencing Council, 2012b). The sentencing guidelines
explain that when sentencing an offender for multiple offences, the court should pass a
total sentence which reflects all the offending behaviour and is just and proportionate.
This is to avoid some of the extreme sentences that we have seen given in the U.S., for
example in the case of the United States of America versus Quartavious Davis. In this
specific case, the defendant - Quartavious Davis, a 20 year-old man was sentenced to
1,941 months (162 years) in prison by a court in Florida for several counts of robbery,
conspiracy, and possession of a firearm. The case is now under appeal (U.S. Appeal
Court, 2014).
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Step seven - Compensation and ancillary order
The court should decide whether the offender should give any compensation and/or
receive any ancillary orders9 .
Step eight - Reasons
The court has a duty to provide an explanation for any given sentence where it is
outside the recommended range provided by the guidelines.
Step nine - Defining the offence category
Finally, consideration should be given for any time the offender has already spend on
remand.
This last section should have provided the reader with a general understanding of
the sentencing decision-making process and how it should be in principle according
to the guidelines provided by the Sentencing Council.
2.6 Courts in England and Wales
In England and Wales there are two levels of court which deal with criminal cases,
and there are substantial differences between them. The magistrates’ court handles
the least serious cases involving summary offences (e.g. most motor offences, minor
criminal damage offences) and some triable-either-way offences which can be tried at
the magistrates’ or Crown Court depending on the seriousness of the offence (offences
such as burglary or drugs offences). In 2009 the magistrates’ court dealt with 93%
of criminal cases (Ministry of Justice, 2010). The Crown Court then deals with the
most serious cases involving indictable offences (e.g. rape and robbery offences) and
9Ancillary orders encompass a wide range of sentences, including; punitive orders, such as de-
privation orders and disqualification from driving; reparation orders, such as restitution order; and
preventative orders, such as anti-social behaviour orders and binding over orders (Ashworth, 2010b)
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some triable-either-way offences. There is currently around 330 magistrates’ courts
and 77 Crown Courts throughout England and Wales.
All criminal cases will initially be heard in the magistrates’ court and some will
remain there for sentencing. There are generally four reasons why a case will go to
Crown Court. Firstly, if an offender has committed an indictable offence the case will
automatically be sentenced at the Crown Court - offenders will register their initial
plea at the magistrates’ court and then a date will be set for trial at the Crown Court.
Secondly, the Powers of the Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000 states that if the
court is of the opinion that an offence(s) is so serious that greater punishment is
necessary, that is out-with the punishment range of the magistrates’ court, the court
may commit the offender to be sentenced at the Crown Court. In the third instance
for triable either-way offences, where the offender pleads not guilty and elects to be
sentenced by trial by jury, the trial will be held at the Crown Court. The fourth
reason a case will be held in the Crown Court is when an offender appeals against
decisions made in the magistrates’ court which will automatically be heard in the
Crown Court.
2.6.1 Judges
The other distinction between the two courts is the type of judge which presides
over them. Crown Courts have professional judges that sit with a jury, compared to
magistrates’ courts who have lay judges called magistrates’ (usually three sit on the
bench), or a District judge sitting alone (Ashworth and Redmayne, 2010).
Magistrates’ have no formal legal training and will therefore be assisted in court by
a legally qualified clerk. Upon becoming a magistrate, they will receive a compulsory
programme of practical training preparing them for court (Courts and Tribunals Ju-
dicary, 2014). They will also be equipped with copies of sentencing guidelines which
will aid their decision-making. Most magistrates’ are unpaid members of the commu-
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nity who have been appointed by the Lord Chancellor on the advice of local advisory
committees. They work part-time, sitting in court a half day every fortnight but usu-
ally they will do more to meet the demands of cases going before the courts. There
are approximately 21,500 magistrates’ in England and Wales (Courts and Tribunals
Judicary, 2014).
District Judges are paid members of the judiciary who usually sit alone on the
bench. They deal with the longer and more complicated cases in the magistrates’
court. District judges are also known as Justices of the Peace, formerly known as
Stipendiary judges. They have had training in law and are usually practising barristers
and solicitors.
Crown Court judges are professional judges who have not only trained in law but
have also spent most of their working lives as practising barristers. The most serious
offences are heard by a High Court Judges for ‘Class 1’ offences like murder; ‘Class
2’ offences including rape will be heard by a circuit judge, under the authority of the
Presiding Judge; and ‘Class 3’ offences will be tried by a Circuit judge or Recorder
(Courts and Tribunals Judicary, 2014).
A High Court judge will usually sit in London but can travel to other major court
centres. They are trained lawyers who have held a ‘right of audience’ (the right to
appear in court as an advocate) and have served as a recorder or district judge before
they can be appointed (ibid).
Circuit judges sit in the Crown Courts. As with High Court judges, Circuit judges
are trained lawyers who have held a ‘right of audience’ and have served as a recorder
or district judge.
Recorders are fully qualified barristers or solicitors with at least ten years practice.
The post is fully paid and is often the first step in the judicial path to the circuit
bench. Recorders are similar to circuit judges but generally handle less serious cases.
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2.7 Types of disposal
There are a number of disposals that the judge can choose to impose on an offender.
As mentioned previously, the severity of the sentence should reflect the seriousness
of the offence. These disposals will be summarised in turn along with how they were
used in 2009 and the years running up to 2009. I focus specifically on 2009 because
the data used in the subsequent research relates to offences between March 2008 to
April 2010, and therefore 2009 is the full year.
2.7.1 Discharges
The Powers of Criminal Courts Sentencing Act 2000 states that in instances where an
offender is convicted of an offence and there is no sentence fixed by the law or the court
is of the opinion that the circumstances and nature of the offence and character of
the offender does not warrant a punishment, the court can choose to either discharge
the offender completely resulting in an absolute discharge, or the judge can place
conditions on the discharge, in which case they will receive a conditional discharge
(Richardson, 2011). Conditional discharges are subject to the offender not committing
any further offences within the time period specified in the order, which cannot exceed
three years from the date of the order (ibid). A conditional discharge thus carries the
threat of future punishment (Ashworth, 2005). If an offender commits another offence
within the time period specified, the offender can be re-tried for the original offence
as well as the new offence (Richardson, 2011).
A sentence of discharge will cease to apply to the conviction (Richardson, 2011),
therefore, a conviction resulting in a discharge does not count as such for most future
purposes (Ashworth, 2005). Where a discharge has been given, it is not necessary to
report the conviction when asked in the future (Richardson, 2011) but the same does
not apply if they are asked if they have been found guilty in a court of law (ibid).
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A discharge may not be combined with a fine for the same offence or a confiscation
order but can be combined with a compensation order, a restitution order, an order
to pay the costs of the prosecution, an order depriving the offender of their rights in
property, or a recommendation for deportation (Richardson, 2011) . It can also be
combined with a disqualification from driving order, a banning order or an anti-social
behaviour order made under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Thomas, 2008).
In 2009 1% of all sentences given in England and Wales were absolute discharges
and a further 6% were conditional discharges (Ministry of Justice, 2010). The use of
absolute discharges has remained stable over the ten year period between 1999 and
2009 (ibid). The same can be said for conditional discharges which also remained
stable between 6-7% over the same period (ibid).
2.7.2 Fines
When an offender has been found guilty of an offence the judge can impose a financial
circumstances order (Thomas, 2008). This order requires the offender to give the court
information on their financial circumstances, which will then be taken into account
when deciding an appropriate fine amount. The amount of the fine should reflect the
seriousness of the offence and the circumstances of the case, which also includes the
financial circumstances of the offender.
The Crown Court can impose any fine amount and they must fix a term of im-
prisonment to be served in default of the whole payment (Thomas, 2008). The mag-
istrates’ court can also impose a fine but there is a limit of £5000 for any one triable
either-way offence unless special provisions are made for a larger fine. However there
is no limit on the amount of the aggregate fines imposed for more than one offence
(Thomas, 2008). Magistrates’ courts can also impose fines for summary offences. Al-
though there is again no aggregate limit for more numerous offences, there is a limit
for any one summary offence which is £5000 (Thomas, 2008).
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Fines can be combined with other sentences (not discharges) including custodial
sentences. Where an offender has been on remand, this time should be taken into
consideration when issuing them with a fine (Richardson, 2011).
Fines make up the majority of disposals issued by the courts in England and
Wales. Between the years of 1999 and 2007, fines accounted for between 74-76% of
all disposals given to adult offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2010). After 2007 the use
of fines have fallen slightly to 71% in 2008 and 72% in 2009 (ibid).
2.7.3 Community orders
Community orders came into force on April 4th 2005 under the Criminal Justice Act
2003 but must not be passed where there is a sentence fixed by law, or a custodial
sentence is required by the Firearms Act 1968, the Powers of Criminal Courts Sentence
Act 2000, or the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Thomas, 2008). This new order was
viewed as an improvement on the previous community penalties, such as; curfew
orders, community punishment orders, community rehabilitation orders, community
punishment and rehabilitation orders, supervision orders, drug treatment and testing
orders (DTTOs), as well as, order encompassing all or some these previous orders.
Although the community order was introduced in 2005, the previous orders are still
being used by judges although they are starting to be used less frequently now. In
this research we only include community orders.
Where the offender is aged over 18 and is convicted of an offence the court may
make them accountable to a community order imposing one or more requirements:
a. unpaid work requirement
b. activity requirement
c. programme requirement
d. prohibited activity requirement
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e. curfew requirement
f. exclusion requirement
g. residence requirement
h. mental health treatment requirement
i. drug rehabilitation requirement
j. alcohol treatment requirement
k. supervision requirement
l. attendance centre requirement
A full explanation of the requirements is provided in Appendix B.
The court must make sure the restrictions on liberty are commensurate with the
seriousness of the offences, the combinations of requirements are compatible and they
are the most suitable for the offender. Community orders cannot last more than
three years after the start of the order and time spent in remand should to be taken
into consideration when passing the sentence (ibid). Additionally, community orders
can only run concurrently so offenders who receive a community order for more than
one offence will only actually serve one community order although the number of
requirements will likely reflect the totality of offences. Consequently the severity of
the sentence depends on the length of sentence as well as the onerousness of the
requirements making up the order.
The use of community penalties on the whole has increased between 1999 and
2009. In 2009 14% of all disposals were community penalties, compared with 11%
back in 1999 (Ministry of Justice, 2010). This increase in use of community penalties
may be due to the introduction of the new community order in 2005. Over time
judges may see the merits of the new orders and therefore start to use this disposal
over another.
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2.7.4 Suspended sentence orders
Suspended sentence orders were introduced in the 2003 Criminal Justice Act and
were brought into force on the 4th April 2005 for offences committed on or after this
date. The 2003 Act states that a court which imposes a custodial sentence for a
term of at least 14 days but not more than 1 year (or 6 months in the case of the
magistrates’ court) can suspend the sentence for up to a period of two years10. The
offence must be serious enough to warrant a custodial term and the length of the term
should also be decided upon and only then should the decision be taken to suspend
the sentence (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004). In doing so the offender will then
serve their sentence in the community and will avoid prison providing they comply
with the requirements within the ‘supervision period’ and do not commit a further
offence within the ‘operational period’ as specified in the order (ibid).The supervision
and operational periods must each be at least six months and the operational period
is usually longer than the supervision period: it cannot be shorter. A suspended
sentence order cannot be combined with a community penalty but the requirements
that can be attached are the same as those in the community order.
A court cannot suspend a sentence without imposing any requirements but they
can impose a suspended sentence order with modest requirements, such as a supervi-
sion requirement (Thomas, 2008). If the offender fails to comply with the requirements
set out in the supervision period or the offender commits another offence within the
operational period, the suspended sentence can be activated in full or in part or the
terms of the supervision made more onerous. Although a suspended sentence order
closely resembles a community order, offences which are likely to warrant a suspended
sentence should generally be more serious than for those receiving a community order.
The threat of future punishment (imprisonment) makes the suspended sentence order
10Prior to suspended sentence orders there were suspended sentences under the Powers of Criminal
Courts Act 2000, s.118. The two differed in that the custodial sentence could be up to two years in
length and could be suspended for between 1 and 2 years (Thomas, 2008). Only suspended sentence
orders are included in this research.
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a more severe punishment and with this in mind, the onerousness of the requirements
should be less than those requirements attached to a community order (Sentencing
Guidelines Council, 2004).
Prior to the introduction of the suspended sentence order in 2005, suspended
sentences accounted for less than 1% of disposals given to adult offenders between 1999
and 2005 (Ministry of Justice, 2010) . From 2005 the number of offenders receiving
this disposal increased, and by 2009 3% of disposals were suspended sentence orders
(ibid). Suspended sentence orders are therefore growing in popularity with more
judges now using this type of disposal.
2.7.5 Immediate custody
For a custodial sentence to be given the seriousness of the offence must cross the cus-
tody threshold. This threshold relates The seriousness of an offence must warrant a
custodial sentence. However, if the offender fails to express his willingness to comply
with requirements proposed by the court under a community order, and which the
order requires an expression of willingness (e.g. an alcohol treatment requirement),
or the offender fails to comply with pre-sentence drug testing then nothing in the Act
prevents the court from passing a custodial sentence. However, as with all discre-
tionary custodial sentences, Section 153 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 states the
length of the discretionary sentence should be the shortest possible commensurate
with the seriousness of the offence (Richardson, 2011).
Custodial sentences make up a relatively small proportion of sentences: between
1999 and 2009 custodial sentence use ranged from 6% to 8% of disposals, most recently
in 2009 this figure stood at 7% (Ministry of Justice, 2010).
Where an offender is sentenced for multiple offences that are serious enough to war-
rant a custodial sentence, the judge can order for the sentences to be run concurrently
or consecutively. Sentences which are run consecutively must still be proportionate so
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that the sentence is not overly excessive. This is generally referred to as the principle
of totality (see Section 2.5.2).
Under the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, and the Powers of the Criminal Courts
(Sentencing) Act 2000, magistrates’ courts do not have the power to issue custodial
sentences of over six months in respect to any one offence. If two or more terms are
imposed in respect of a triable either-way offence, the maximum aggregate term is 12
months. Furthermore, these restrictions on aggregate terms do not apply to suspended
sentences or restrictions to default terms fixed in respect of fines imposed on the same
occasion as a custodial sentence is imposed (Thomas, 2008). For summary offences
the maximum term of imprisonment is 6 months. Amendments were made in the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 to extend the powers of the magistrates’ court but at the
time of this research, they are still to be brought into force (Richardson, 2011).
Early release provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (for offences commit-
ted after April 4th 2005) state, offenders sentenced to 12 months or more immediate
custody will usually be released on licence after serving half of their sentence and will
remain on licence until the end of the whole term of the sentence.
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 states the general restriction on imposing a discre-
tionary custodial sentence. Discretionary custodial sentences cannot be given where
there is a sentence already fixed by law, or where the offence(s) are associated with
the use of firearms, is a third class A drug trafficking offence, a dangerous weapon was
used, and where the offender is deemed dangerous and therefore a risk to the public
(Richardson, 2011).
A court in dealing with an offender for an offence under the Firearms Act 1968
must impose at least the required minimum sentence unless there are exceptional
circumstances (Thomas, 2008). The required minimum sentence is five years where
the offender is aged 18 or over. Furthermore the court cannot give a discount for a
guilty plea if the effect would take the term to below the required minimum (ibid).
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Under the Powers of Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000, a court which sen-
tences an offender for a third Class A drug trafficking offence must pass a sentence
of at least seven years. This is providing they are over 18 years of age at the time of
committing the offence and the offence was committed on or after October 1st 1997.
If the offender pleads guilty to the offence, the court can apply the discount for a
guilty plea but the reduction cannot be less than 80% of the seven years (2045 days)
(Thomas, 2008).
Dangerous offenders
The judge can impose life imprisonment, Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP)
or an extended sentence for any offender deemed to be “dangerous” having committed
a specified violent or sexual attack.
Life imprisonment is imposed where the court considers the seriousness of the
offence justifies the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life (Thomas, 2008).
Usually a minimum term of custody will be set and following their release the offender
will remain on licence for the rest of their life.
An IPP must be imposed if the offence is punishable by 10 or more years impris-
onment, but not serious enough to warrant a life sentence. The offender will not be
released until they have served the minimum term. IPPs are indeterminate sentences;
therefore offenders can remain in prison for a period longer than the maximum term
normally given for the offence if the Parole Board still views the offender as dangerous,
and poses a threat to society. Upon release an offender will remain on licence for a
minimum of 10 years. After this specified time, the Parole Board can end the licence
but if they do not give the direction to do so the offender will remain on licence for
the rest of their life. The only difference between the life imprisonment and IPPs is
that the Parole Board can after 10 years choose to cease their licence after prison.
Extended sentences are usually given where a specified offence is not punishable
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with 10 years’ imprisonment. These sentences have two components: ‘appropriate
custodial term’ and ‘the extension period’. Both components combined cannot exceed
the maximum sentence for the offence. Therefore the custodial sentence would be the
same as it would be had the sentence not been extended. The extension period is the
period the offender will be on licence. For a specified violent offence it cannot be more
than five years and for a specified sexual offence it cannot be longer than eight years.
Offenders serving an extended sentence can be released after serving one half of their
sentence unless the Parole Board thinks they are still a threat to public protection
and in that case will have to serve their entire sentence in custody.
2.7.6 Other disposals
This is a miscellaneous category of disposals, which includes compensation orders
and confiscation orders. In official statistics, this category is recorded as ‘otherwise
dealt with’ and accounts for approximately 2% of all disposals. Generally this type
of disposal can be given for a primary sentence, but often this disposal is given as
well as another disposal, such as a fine. However, as is explained in Chapter 4, official
statistics only ever report the primary offence and with that, the most severe sentence
where there are multiple offences or sentences.
2.8 Concluding remarks
This chapter provides a context to the subsequent research which assesses disparity in
sentencing, and sets out how sentencing should be ‘conducted’ in theory, or as stated
by the legislative provisions and guidelines in place in England and Wales.
This chapter also explains the theoretical underpinnings of sentencing, and the
principles that judges should abide by when sentencing offenders. Proportionality is
adopted as the primary rationale, and the severity of the sentences should reflect the
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seriousness of the offence.
Additionally, where relevant and according to the guidelines the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances of the offence should be taken into consideration. However,
as I have highlighted, these guidelines have received some criticism due to ambiguity in
meaning. Therefore, a consequence of this could be disparity if judges are interpreting
guidelines differently or applying different weights to factors they feel are important
which may differ amongst judges.
Also potentially confusing the philosophy underlying sentencing decisions is the
development of the ‘New Penology’ and the concept of risk-management that this en-
tails. The Probation Service use offender’s socio-demographic characteristics to pre-
dict the probability of reoffending, which is then provided to the courts to assist with
the decision-making process. The risk assessment is a fundamentally forward-looking
endeavour which contradicts the principle of proportionality, which is essentially con-
cerned with prior behaviour and the retributivist approach to sentencing.
Finally this chapter provides a brief explanation of the criminal court system in
England and Wales, the judiciary, and the range of sentences that are available to the
courts when sentencing offenders.
The decisions made in the modelling process in subsequent chapters are based on
the information provided in this chapter. Therefore this chapter acts as a reference
point throughout the remainder of this thesis.
The next chapter will provide more of a discussion on disparity in sentencing,
drawing from the literature surrounding equality, consistency and fairness. It then
goes on to discuss the existing literature on disparity and the research that has been
conducted in this area.
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Chapter 3
Review of the literature on
sentencing disparity
3.1 Introduction
Up to now this thesis has concentrated on providing a background to sentencing
in England and Wales, to provide a context to the discussion that follows in this
chapter. In the previous chapter, I referred to the point that Ashworth (1987) makes
that in order to assess disparity, it is necessary to stipulate how sentencing should be
conducted in theory, or by way of the legislation that is in place for that jurisdiction.
Having done so in Chapter 2, I will now provide the context in relation to sentencing
disparity.
One of the basic precepts of justice is that “like cases should be treated alike
and different cases differently” (Ashworth, 2010b, p. 255). This resonates with the
principle of parity, suggesting that ‘like-situated’ offenders should be treated equally
or equivalently. The general rule in legislative provision states that “when two or
more offenders are convicted of the same offence, and their individual responsibility
is the same, and there are no relevant differences in their personal circumstances,
44
they should receive the same sentence” (Thomas, 2008, p. 100). However, there is a
growing body of evidence that suggests that some offenders are not being treated in
this way and that actual sentencing behaviour can diverge quite dramatically from
what is intended (Dhami, 2013).
This chapter will consider and review the sentencing literature in relation to dis-
parity. Firstly by considering what is meant by disparity, then considering the legisla-
tion in relation to sentencing by way of sentencing guidelines and equality legislation.
The remainder of this chapter will then review the literature and research conducted
into sentencing disparity and highlight factors that are commonly considered to be
associated with disparity.
3.2 Disparity
Disparity as a concept is widely discussed in the literature but formal definitions
are rare. Blumstein (1983) defined disparity as a form of unequal treatment that is
often of unexplained cause and is at least incongruous, unfair and disadvantaging in
consequence. It is important to consider legal variables when considering disparity,
and also take into account that sentences on different scales may have equivalent
severity. This leads me to my definition of disparity. In this thesis the definition of
disparity is as follows: disparity in sentencing occurs when offenders are sentenced
not as a result of the offence they have committed but as a result of their extra-
legal or personal characteristics. Disparity in sentencing occurs when two offenders,
who have committed the same offence, and have the same legal characteristics (for
example they have committed the same offence with the same level of seriousness,
have entered the same plea, and have the same conviction histories) are sentenced
and their sentences are not of the equivalent severity. Therefore disparity occurs
when offenders are sentenced as a result of their extra-legal personal characteristics
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and not the seriousness of the offence they have committed. Sentences do not need
to be the same (for example, both offenders must receive a three month custodial
sentence) but the sentences should be equivalent in terms of their severity.
Disparity in sentencing relates to instances where legally-irrelevant or extra-legal
factors impact on the severity of sentences (Albonetti, 1997), although this is often
referred to as ‘unwarranted disparity’ (Bushway and Piehl, 2001); (Maguire, 2010).
This is the definition of disparity used in this research but this definition differs to
that of (Spohn, 2009), who would argue that disparity is a difference in the treatment
or outcome that does not necessarily result from intentional bias. Spohn (2009)
argues that disparity occurs when two offenders are convicted of the same offence
and who have identical offending histories, are sentenced differently, or when very
different offenders receive the same sentence, or when the sentence depends on the
judge and/or where the court is situated.
However, I am inclined to disagree with Spohn (2009), as in this thesis I argue (see
Section 3.3.2 and Chapter 4) that sentences do not need to be the same for there to
be parity, and likewise sentences do not have to be different for there to be sentencing
disparity. Sentences require the same level of severity for there to be parity. I will
argue that different types of sentence can actually have the same penal bite, and thus
disparity occurs when like-situated offenders receive sentences which differ in terms
of the severity rather than the actual sentence given, once the legal characteristics of
the offence are taken into consideration.
I also argue that disparity in sentencing is contrary to the notion of justice, and
introduces discrimination into the sentencing process. Disparity in sentencing can
bring the criminal justice system into disrepute, as well as leading to unpredictable
sentences (Tak, 1995), which relates back to the notion of fuelling the “prison crisis”
(Hough and Jacobson, 2008) as referred to in Section 2.3. Furthermore, Cavadino
and Dignan (2007) state that as disparities in sentencing violate the basic precepts
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of justice it therefore adds to the penal systems crisis of legitimacy. The public also
need to believe that justice has been served. Disparity in sentencing can lead the
public to question the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. Sentencing outcomes
that appear to be too lenient or severe can lead to a sense of injustice, which again
undermines the legitimacy of the judiciary and the criminal justice system (Easton
and Piper, 2008).
It is therefore imperative that research is conducted into disparity in sentencing to
firstly assess whether it is occurring in England and Wales and secondly, where and
how disparity is affecting sentencing decisions.
(In)consistency
Disparity and inconsistency are also often used interchangeably (Maguire, 2010) as
both terms imply undesirable sentencing outcomes and are associated with injustice.
However, there is a lack of a clear definition or explanation of what is meant by
(in)consistency. In my view, the term ‘consistency’ is used when actually they mean
parity. However, I will return to this discussion in Section 3.2.1.
Ashworth (1992) would suggest that it is in fact easier to agree that inconsistency
in sentencing has been a problem in many jurisdictions than it is to agree on a defini-
tion. The Sentencing Council would also agree that there is no universally excepted
definition, however the concept of consistency is clear: similar offenders who commit
similar offences in similar circumstances would be expected to receive similar sen-
tencing outcomes (Sentencing Council, 2010, p. 2). Therefore inconsistency implies
offenders will receive dissimilar sentences.
Consistency in sentencing has been described as a“fluid and slippery concept”
(Padfield, 2013, p. 32) because it is often unclear whether the focus should be on
consistency in the approach or consistency in the outcome. Nonetheless, consistency
is viewed as a way of achieving justice (Ashworth, 2010b) and has also been described
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as a “fundamental constitutional principle of equality before the law” (see Section
3.3) (Samuels, 1987, p. 66). Samuels (1987) explains that this does not mean giving
uniform sentences but being consistent in the approach. So although sentences may
differ in terms of the types of sentences, sentences would be equivalent in terms of the
severity of the sentence, and as a result, offenders are treated fairly. As I have said
in the Chapter 2, one of the primary aims of the Sentencing Council is to promote
consistency in the approach to sentencing, and one way of doing this is by producing
the step-by-step guide to sentencing to ensure consistency in the approach.
Maguire (2010) insists that inconsistency occurs when there are differences in the
legally relevant factors of the case which may result in offenders receiving different
sentences. An example of this would be the result of applying the discount for a
guilty plea. We would expect sentences to reflect this and differ accordingly between
an offender who pleads guilty at the earliest possible opportunity, an offender who
pleads guilty on the day of the trial, and an offender who pleads not guilty but is then
found guilty, once we control for the offence type and the other legal factors of the
case. This could be seen as one form of inconsistency, as the sentencing outcomes will
differ to reflect the discount. Maguire (2010) suggests this difference is warranted, due
to the fact that the legislative provision states that judges should apply a sentencing
discount on this basis. We can then say that unwarranted disparity occurs when
there are differences in sentence severity based on legally irrelevant factors of the case
after the legal factors have been taken into consideration. These differences should
unequivocally not differentiate the severity of the sentence.
In general there is a lack of a clear and agreed definition of consistency and in-
consistency. Maguire (2010) is explicit in her definition of inconsistency but others
do not explain what they mean when they use the term. As a result there is lot of
ambiguity surrounding these terms which make them rather subjective. This has led
me to believe that in fact when the term consistency is used with respect to sentencing
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the term parity would be more accurate. Parity is less subjective because there is a
clear definition of what these terms mean in relation to sentencing. It is also then
possible to quantitatively measure parity, and with that disparity.
Discrimination
It can be said that too much discretion in sentencing can lead to disparity as it allows
‘space’ for discrimination (Easton and Piper, 2008). There is some confusion and
uncertainty within the literature regarding disparity, inconsistency and discrimina-
tion: often these terms are used interchangeably. In Spohn’s (2009) view, disparity
and discrimination do not mean the same thing: discrimination in sentencing occurs
when legally irrelevant factors, such as gender, race and class, etc, are taken into
the sentencing decision after the legally relevant factors of the case are taken into
consideration (Spohn, 2009).
For the purposes of this research, the focus is on disparity in sentencing and this
can be said to occur when the legally-irrelevant factors are taken into consideration at
the decision-making stage. I would argue that in most instances this disparity leads to
discrimination, if for example an offender is sentenced less severely on the basis of them
having a permanent job. As I will discuss in later sections, this disparity in sentencing
then discriminates against those offenders that, for example, do not have a permanent
job. Therefore, I would generally argue that disparity in sentencing essentially leads to
discrimination, which resonates with Easton and Piper’s (2008) point that was made
at the start of this section, that disparity leaves room for discrimination. However,
there are some that would disagree with this notion of disparity and discrimination
which I will discuss in the following sections.
Additionally, (Spohn, 2009) goes on to say that there are two forms of discrimi-
nation; direct and indirect. Direct discrimination occurs when for example a judge
sentences Black and Asian offenders more severely than White offenders even after
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controlling for the legal characteristics of the case. Whereas indirect or subtle discrim-
ination occurs when, for example, race has no direct effect on sentencing but those
who spend time on remand are more likely to receive a custodial sentence, if Black
offenders have a higher likelihood of being kept on remand than White offenders, then
indirectly this will discriminate against Black offenders. Spohn (2009) also refers to
an interaction effect, and this is where for example, women with children are treated
more leniently than men with children, where both offenders are the primary carers
of the child.
Discrimination occurs when the extra-legal factors are taken into consideration,
which is the result of the disparate sentencing.
3.2.1 Model for achieving justice - where does disparity fit
in?
The diagram in Figure 3.1 depicts a conceptual framework for achieving justice. As
I have already explained, consistency is viewed as an objective of sentencing which
if implemented should result in justice being achieved. This then follows the left-
hand pathway of the diagram. However, as I mentioned in Section 3.2, I would argue
that consistency is used more as a euphemism for parity. Parity requires offenders to
be treated similarly (by not taking into consideration the legally irrelevant factors)
- although I argue not necessarily the same as I explained earlier. Adopting the
principle of proportionality should ensure that offenders are sentenced on the basis
of the seriousness of their offence and the legally relevant factors of the case. It is
generally believed that this will essentially lead to equality because offenders are not
treated differently due to their extra-legal characteristics. Continuing to follow this
pathway should then ensure that equality and justice are achieved.
It would then be generally agreed that if this pathway is not followed, i.e. the
principle of parity is not exercised, this will produce disparity in sentencing. In the
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Figure 3.1: Diagram of the conceptual framework for achieving justice
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diagram in Figure 3.1, this is illustrated by the broken line spurring from parity and
resulting in disparity. As I have already explained, disparity occurs when legally
irrelevant factors are taken into consideration during the sentencing decision-making
process and offenders are therefore treated differently on the basis of these extra-legal
factors, such as their gender or ethnicity. This disparity in sentencing leads to some
form of discrimination, if for example, Black offenders are sentenced more severely
than like-situated White offenders, controlling for the offence and other legal factors
of the case. In turn, these offenders are being discriminated against which ultimately
leads to injustice.
3.2.2 Alternative model for achieving justice - is disparity is
necessary?
However, this conceptual model of achieving justice is generally contested by those
who would disagree with the idea that consistency requires parity to facilitate equal-
ity and in turn achieve justice. For example, Hudson (1998) largely criticises this
notion of consistency or rather parity, arguing instead that to accept this idea that
equality and justice are achieved by treating offenders the same is to collude in the
acceptance of the inequalities that co-exist with such treatment. Arguing from a fem-
inist perspective, Hudson (1998) amongst others, such as Eaton (1986), Daly (1989),
Chesney-Lind and Pasko (2012), argues that to assume justice means treating women
like men, is to ignore the different existences of men and women. Figure 3.2 illustrates
an alternative conceptual framework, which illustrates that in order for the idea of
consistency in sentencing to lead to justice, men and women need to be treated differ-
ently (disparately), and only through this disparity can equality be achieved, which
will lead to more ‘just’ sentencing.
I will say more about this model and the literature surrounding this framework in
Section 3.5.1 which looks at disparity based on gender.
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Figure 3.2: Diagram of the alternative conceptual framework for achieving justice
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3.3 Equality before the law
Equality before the law states that offenders should not be discriminated against on
the grounds of their gender, ethnicity, income or social class (Warner, 2012). These
factors are deemed legally irrelevant and should not be taken into consideration at
sentencing. Consequently, disparity in sentencing may then lead to discrimination, if
for example, offenders are being treated differently due to their social characteristics
or circumstances. Disparity in sentencing generally detracts from the principle of
equality before the law.
There is no British Constitution as such which proclaims the principle of equality
before the law (Ashworth, 2010b). However, the Human Rights Act 1998 brings into
law most articles of the European Convention on Human Rights11 (ECHR) (Ashworth,
2010b).
The Human Rights Act 1998 states that all public authorities must ensure that
their actions are compatible with the Convention rights. Article 14 of the ECHR
relates to freedom from discrimination and this seeks to protect individuals from
different treatment - in exercising the other Convention rights such as the right to
a fair trial (Article 6) and no punishment without law (Article 7) - on the grounds
of sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status, as well
as sexual orientation, whether born inside or outside of marriage, disability, marital
status and age (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2006). Therefore individuals
should not be treated differently in similar situations without proper justifications.
To do so is to discriminate against that person.
11The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is an international agreement made by
the member states of the Council of Europe and was ratified by the UK and entered into force
in September 1953 (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2006). However, for many years the
convention was not part of the law in England and Wales until the Human Rights Act 1998 came
into force in 2000. From here on the rights from the ECHR are enforceable in the courts of England
and Wales (ibid).
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The 2006 Equality Act established a general legal anti-discrimination framework
monitored by the Equality and Human Rights Commission12 (EHRC). The Act states
that it is unlawful for any public authority when exercising a function (i.e. sentencing)
to discriminate against a person and that the Commission must promote understand-
ing of the importance of equality and diversity, amongst other objectives (Ashworth,
2010b).
The Equality Act 2010 then replaced the Equality Act 2006, and is an amalga-
mation of other previous discrimination legislation, including the Sex Discrimination
Act 1975, Race Relations Act 1976 and the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. The
Act came into force in October 2010 and set out to ban unfair treatment and provide
equal opportunities within the wider society. This also includes sentencing which is
considered an exercise of public function. The Act makes it illegal to discriminate
against people on the basis of nine protected characteristics - age, disability, gender
reassignment, marriage, and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion
or belief, sex and sexual orientation (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2011).
Yet in spite of this legislation there is evidence to suggest sentencing disparity and
discrimination is prevalent in the England and Wales justice system.
3.3.1 Equal treatment or treatment that is equal?
It is argued that for justice to be achieved, treatment that is equal is required and not
equal treatment per se (Ashworth, 2010b). This sentiment is shared amongst those
who argue that in order to achieve fair and just sentencing, it must be recognised that
the same sentence can have different effects on offenders (Morris and Tonry, 1990),
which is a result of living in an unjust society (Aas, 2005). Many would refer to this
problem as “just deserts in an unjust society”, therefore punishment is unlikely to be
‘just’ when not everyone is equal from the outset (ibid). Tonry (1994) cites poverty
12The Equality and Human Rights Commission was set up under the Equality Act 2006, as a
non-departmental public body, and came into force in October 2007.
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and social disadvantage as just some of the ways in which society is not equal, and
which will impact on those being punished.
Hudson suggests rejecting the idea of ‘sameness’ when considering equality in
sentencing. This is not to reject equality, but what is needed is to ask for a “more
complex formulation of equality” (Hudson, 1998, p. 246).
Morris and Tonry (1990) argue that parity can never be achieved due to the
difficulty of comparing penalties among individuals.
“In subjective terms...two years imprisonment in a single setting will
have very different meanings to different offenders who have committed
the same crime. Two years imprisonment in a maximum security prison
may be rite of passage for a Los Angeles gang member. For an attractive,
effeminate twenty-year old, it may mean the terror of repeated sexual
victimisation. For a forty-year old head of household, it may mean the
loss of a job and a home and a family. For an unhealthy seventy-five-year
old, it may mean a death sentence” (Tonry, 1996, p. 19).
Individuals will therefore experience penalties differently. The concept of equality
- relating to treatment that is equal as opposed to equal treatment - would suggest
sentencing should be individualised and relative to each offender.
A way round this equality debate may be to adopt the principle of equal impact as
opposed to equal treatment (Ashworth, 2010b). Equal impact requires sentences to be
calibrated to create equal penal impact on the offenders subjected to them (Warner,
2012). Kolber (2009) would agree with this individualised approach to sentencing,
as in his view, offenders should be sentenced depending on their baseline conditions,
that is their conditions prior to being sentenced. This, in his opinion, is the only way
to achieve fair and just sentencing. Therefore offenders should be sentenced subjec-
tively, taking into consideration the true severity of incarceration which depends on
the ways in which incarceration changes an offender’s life, as illustrated in the above
56
quote by Tonry (1996). This alternative ‘comparative’ approach would examine the
offender’s life or their ‘baseline’ conditions prior to incarceration and sentence offend-
ers based on these factors. This approach that Kolber (2009) suggests would take
into consideration the fact that not all offenders are equal to begin with. Therefore
the offenders referred to in the above quote would be given different sentences which
take into consideration their different ‘baseline conditions’ (Kolber, 2009).
However, Nagel and Johnson (1994) would argue that if we were to allow for these
“intersubjective comparisons” this would lead to a “free-for-all of sentence individu-
alisation” and the end result of this would be disparity and discrimination (Nagel and
Johnson, 1994, p. 205). In Nagel and Johnson’s (1994) view, structured sentencing
may help to control this, however the argument becomes even more difficult when
female offenders are considered. I will return to this discussion in Section 3.5.1.
Von Hirsch (1992) also comments that the law only deals with standard cases, and
therefore to take into account extraneous factors or extra-legal factors when sentencing
then undermines its objectivity. Sentencing should only take into consideration the
seriousness of the offence. However, deviations can be made for special situations and
thus parity is more of an approximation that an exact measure (ibid).
In England and Wales, fines are the only penalty that are currently means tested
which means the judge will take the financial circumstances of the offender into ac-
count when passing a financial penalty. No other penalties in England and Wales
operate in this manner, although personal mitigation is taken into consideration prior
to sentencing (see Section 3.4.2).
3.3.2 Equivalent sentence severity
However, there may be another way in which parity and equality can be achieved
which in turn leads to just sentencing. That is to reconsider what is meant by these
terms in sentencing - and with that disparity, if we consider the approach suggested
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by Hudson (1998). Rather than taking equality or parity to mean ‘the same sentence’
(i.e. the same sentence or the same length of custodial sentence), we can take parity
in sentencing to mean equivalent severity or leniency (Hudson, 1998). This relates
to the earlier point made by Samuels (1987), where he suggests that consistency (or
rather parity) in the approach to sentencing means that the types of sentences can
vary but not the severity of the sentence, as they must be equivalent.
This resonates with von Hirsch (1992) on the grounds of ordinal proportionality,
who argues that
“Persons convicted of crimes of comparable seriousness should receive
punishments of comparable severity...Persons convicted of crimes differ-
ing in gravity should suffer punishment correspondingly graded in their
onerousness” (von Hirsch, 1992, p. 76)
If we then use the model for achieving justice as shown in Figure 3.1 and take
parity to be considered in terms of sentence severity, then it is possible to ensure
equality and achieve justice. In this respect, disparity occurs when sentences differ in
their severity, as a result of extra-legal factors influencing sentencing decisions once
the legal factors have been taken into consideration. I will say more about this in the
following chapter where I review the literature on how to measure sentence severity.
3.4 Sentencing guidelines
A sentencing system that places emphasis on proportionality should avoid discrim-
ination relating to the offender as the severity of that sentence should be primarily
based on the seriousness of their offence (Ashworth, 2010b). However, in Section 2.2.2
I explained that Ashworth (2010b) is concerned that the hybrid sentencing framework
adopted by the 2003 Criminal Justice Act is likely to undermine the principle of pro-
portionality. Even though proportionality remains the primary sentencing rationale,
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the fact that the 2003 Criminal Justice Act states judges must have regard to all
five principles may detract from proportionality when judges attempt to pursue these
ends. It may be very difficult to balance all five principles especially when a judge
may be more inclined to pursue one particular end if, for example, the judge believes
in a more utilitarian model of sentencing. I will return to this discussion on judicial
preference later in the chapter.
However, sentencing guidelines are said to reduce judicial discretion and make the
decision-making process more transparent and predictable (Aas, 2005). Aas (2005)
explains that in the past judges were not subjected to any rules and this lack of
rules could result in unfair and unequal treatment. Therefore guidelines are seen to
minimise this.
Likewise, Hutton (2013) would argue that guidelines do not necessarily generate
consistency in practice measured by outcomes but they should enable an account
of consistency to be produced. The step-by-step sentencing approach discussed in
Section 2.5.2 provides a more consistent approach to sentencing, which should then
reduce unwarranted disparity. Roberts (2011b) refers to the step-by-step sentencing
guidance as a sentencing “algorithm”. By following this algorithm consistency in
sentencing should be possible.
However, the usefulness of sentencing guidelines may be undermined by the lack of
guidance provided for the use of aggravating and mitigating factors in the sentencing
decision-making process.
3.4.1 Aggravating and mitigating factors
In Section 2.3 I briefly mentioned Roberts’ reservations regarding aggravating and
mitigating factors; namely the lack of adequate guidance provided on them (Roberts,
2011a). This lack of guidance or structure can be viewed as a means that allows the
judiciary to maintain some discretion with only minimal direction from the legislature
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(Roberts, 2008). However, this lack of guidance may also cause the judiciary to use
the aggravating and mitigating factors inconsistently, ultimately undermining the
concepts of equality and fairness which the sentencing guidelines set out to achieve
(ibid). A consequence of this may then lead to sentencing disparity.
Roberts (2011a) also draws attention to the list of aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors: the definitive offence seriousness guidelines list 31 aggravating factors and only
4 mitigating factors, which instantly creates an imbalance towards increasing the se-
riousness of the offence. As well as this, within the list of statutory aggravating and
mitigating factors, there are 4 statutory aggravating factors and 1 statutory mitigating
factor. Firstly Roberts (2011a) points out that the guidelines do not differentiate be-
tween those which are statutory as stated in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and those
that are not: secondly, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not provide any reference
to the weight that each of these factors should carry in determining an appropriate
sentence, including no distinction between the statutory and the non-statutory fac-
tors, where in essence the statutory factors should be given more weight than the
non-statutory factors (Roberts, 2008). Judges are left to make these decisions with-
out any indication as to how much these factors should influence offence seriousness
and consequentially, sentence severity. Dhami (2013) argues that too much discre-
tion appears to lead to unwarranted disparity and this is because judges are given no
guidance on how to use these aggravating and mitigating factors.
However, there is research to suggest this might not actually be the case. Pina-
Sa´nchez and Linacre (2013) conducted research which assessed the use of sentencing
guidelines for assault cases and how they were applied by judges in the Crown Courts
in England and Wales, using data from the Crown Court Survey. Their results sug-
gest that guideline factors are being taken into account in a way that is intended by
the sentencing guidelines, and this is consistent across courts. Their results revealed
that pleading guilty at the first opportunity, showing remorse, being a carer of a
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dependent person, or a public worker, reduced the length of the sentence, where as
having previous convictions, perpetrating on a vulnerable victim, sustained offending
over time, and being under the influence of drugs increased the length of the sentence
(Pina-Sa´nchez and Linacre, 2013). This work ties in with the definition of consis-
tency/inconsistency offered by Maguire (2010), which relates to the legal factors of
the case.
On the basis of this research, it may seem that sentencing is carried out as it
should be - informed by the guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council, and that
judges are applying the aggravating and mitigating factors consistently. However,
these results do not consider the possibility that extra-legal factors may also be taken
into consideration. Johnson (2005) would argue that sentencing does not occur in
a social vacuum and therefore by not taking the extra-legal factors of the case into
consideration we will not get an accurate representation of sentencing.
3.4.2 Personal mitigation
Roberts (2011a) is not alone in his opinion that not enough guidance is given in
relation to aggravating and mitigating factors. Jacobson and Hough (2007) would
argue there is also not enough guidance on personal mitigation. In Section 2.3.1 I
explained that the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is very ambiguous in relation to personal
mitigation, which can be “any matter” that the court feels is “relevant in mitigation
of sentence”. Research conducted by Jacobson and Hough (2007) found that many
different personal mitigation factors were taken into consideration by judges, such
as an offender’s employment status, which was frequently expressed as the deciding
factor for cases on the borderline of the custody threshold.
Additionally, Roberts (2008) draws attention to the fact that the guidelines do not
specify factors that should not be taken into consideration, unlike most other sentenc-
ing guideline systems. For example, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
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sion (2013) states that; race, sex, employment factors - such as being employed at the
time of sentencing, and social factors - such as living arrangements and marital status
should not be factors used to depart from the sentencing guidelines. Roberts (2008)
refers to the offender’s employment status at the time of sentencing, which is often
cited as a mitigating factor where the offence is unrelated to the offender’s employ-
ment13. Additionally, research by Jacobson and Hough (2007) found that offender’s
employment status was frequently expressed as a mitigating factor when cases were
on the borderline of getting a custodial sentence. However, Roberts (2008) points
out that mitigating a sentence on the basis of employment disadvantages offenders
that are not employed at the time of sentencing or those that have poor employment
histories.
Although it may be acceptable to some that a good employment record is a pow-
erful factor in the mitigation of a case, this source of mitigation is not available to
those who do not have a good work record or are unemployed (Roberts, 2008). Using
employment status as a mitigating factor then discriminates against those who are
already less fortunate and for whatever reason have experienced difficulties in obtain-
ing or maintaining paid employment. Ashworth (2010b) would then argue that the
only way to pursue equality in sentencing is to offer no concession at all on the basis
of employment just like the state of Minnesota.
Furthermore Ashworth (2010b) suggests it is perhaps wrong to think of aggravating
and mitigating factors as opposites, in fact we should think of some factors as being
neutral. This may seems plausible when we consider the reduction for a guilty plea
but this does not seem fair when considering the employment status of the offender.
To mitigate on the grounds of being employed could be seen to discriminate against
those who are unemployed (ibid). This discussion will be continued in Chapter 10.
13If the crime arises out of the offenders’ employment, it would be regarded as an abuse of trust
in which case it would be considered an aggravating factor.
62
3.5 The evidence of sentencing disparity
The following section summarises the literature on disparity.
3.5.1 Gender
In 2009, 314,627 women were sentenced in England and Wales - an increase of 9.1%
(difference of 26,289 additional female offenders) from the previous year (Ministry of
Justice, 2010). However, this figure is still much smaller in comparison with the male
figures which stood at 1,046,281 in 2009 - a 0.1% increase from the previous year.
Table 3.1 displays the proportions of persons (aged 21 and over) sentenced at all
courts for indictable offences (these are more serious offences) in 2009 by gender and
disposal. The statistics show that women appear to be sentenced more leniently than
male offenders: women offenders are more likely to receive a fine (81%) compared
to male offenders (69%), whereas a higher proportion of male offenders are given
community orders (11%), suspended sentences (4%) and immediate custody (9%)
compared to female offenders (7%, 2% and 3% respectively) (Ministry of Justice,
2010). Although it is worth noting that these figures only report the primary offences
and do not control for offence type: they therefore cannot be taken at face value
(Ashworth, 2010b).
Male Female
Absolute discharge 0.5% 0.5%
Conditional discharge 5.4% 5.8%
Fine 68.8% 81%
Community order 10.9% 6.9%
Suspended sentence order 3.9% 2.2%
Immediate custody 8.6% 2.5%
Otherwise dealt with 1.9% 1.1%
Source Ministry of Justice (2010) supplementary tables (Table 1d)
Table 3.1: Proportions of persons (aged 21 and over) sentenced for indictable offences
in 2009 by gender and disposal
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Ashworth (2010b) explains that different types of offences are usually committed
by men and women and therefore these figures may not represent the true nature
of sentencing. More women are sentenced for theft and related offences (a common
offence being shoplifting) and less likely to be convicted for burglary and drug offences
which carry heavier penalties (Flood-Page and Mackie, 1998); (Ashworth, 2010b).
Furthermore, women tend to play more minor roles in offences and are therefore
sentenced accordingly (Hedderman and Gelsthorpe, 1997).
The result of this is that a higher proportion of women are sentenced at the
magistrates’ court rather than the Crown Court, due to their involvement in less
serious offences (Ashworth, 2010b). As explained previously, the Powers of Criminal
Courts (sentencing) Act 2000 limits the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ court
and this will likely have an impact on the sentences meted out to women offenders.
Research has shown that between 1992 - 2002, some 37% of women coming be-
fore the courts had no previous convictions (Prison Reform Trust, 2000) which could
explain the differences in the sentencing statistics. However, Dowds and Hedderman
(1997) found that for shoplifting offences, regardless of whether the offender was a
time offender (1% females and 7% males) or a repeat offender (5% females and 15%
males), women offenders were less likely to receive a custodial sentence than male
offenders.
Cavadino and Dignan (2007) acknowledge that by and large commentators agree
females commit fewer offences than males and these offences are generally less seri-
ous than those committed by their male counterparts. Research conducted by Spohn
(2009) found these claims were unsupported. Spohn’s (2009) research found statisti-
cally significant gender differences: judges were 2.5 times more likely to sentence male
offenders to prison than women controlling for the legal factors of the case. Albonetti
(1997) also tested this by looking specifically at drug offences and controlling for the
legal factors of the case. Albonetti (1997) found that not only are women 6% less likely
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to get a custodial sentence compared to men, but when they do receive a custodial
sentence, the length of the sentence is substantially shorter. Stacey and Spohn (2006)
also found male offenders were sentenced significantly longer than female offenders.
Using data from three district courts in the US where the offender was sentenced for
a drug offence between 1998 and 2000, Stacey and Spohn found the average length of
custodial sentence for female offenders was just under 60 months, compared to that
of male offenders, which stood at just over 97 months.
One argument for the disparate sentencing of men and women is that the cultural
and biological differences are relevant and legitimate considerations for sentencing.
The Corston Report14 called for a “distinct, radically different, visibly-led, strategic,
proportionate, holistic, woman-centred, integrated approach” (Corston, 2007, p. 79).
Baroness Corston and the Commission on Women Offenders in Scotland report (Scot-
tish Government, 2012) both highlighted that much of women’s offending is initiated
and propelled by a number of underlying issues, such as; drug and alcohol addiction
and mental health problems. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons reported that in
Scotland’s only all-female prison15 80% of women prisoners had mental health prob-
lems (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, 2007). In another study, 60% of women
prisoners said they had been under the influence of drugs at the time they committed
their offence (Scottish Government, 2012).
It was agreed by the Probation Chiefs Association16 , Prison Governors’ Associa-
tion and Michael Spurr of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) that
the Corston Report had brought to their attention the additional needs of women
offenders and the evidence that “women require a different and distinct approach”
(House of Commons Justice Committee, 2013, p. 9).
14In 2007, Baroness Corston conducted a review of women in the Criminal Justice System resulting
in The Corston Report.
15Up until 2011 Cornton Vale was Scotland’s only female prison but since then wings for female
prisoners have been established at HMP Edinburgh and HMP Greenock.
16The Probation Chiefs Association (PCA) is the independent professional organisation that rep-
resents the professional voice of senior leaders in Probation Trusts in England and Wales
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A source of great controversy is whether female offenders should be treated the
same as male offenders (Spohn, 2009). As already discussed, one argument dominates:
fairness and justice demand equal treatment not ‘special treatment’ (Nagel and John-
son, 1994). This is illustrated by the conceptual framework for achieving justice in
Figure 3.1. However, Baroness Corston maintains “equality does not mean treating
everyone the same” (Corston, 2007, p. 3) and therefore the alternative conceptual
framework shown in Figure 3.2 should be adopted. Corston (2007) argues that the
fundamental difference between male and female offenders indicates that a different
and distinct approach is needed to compensate for the different lives and nature of
men and women, which must mean that they cannot be treated the same.
It has been suggested that gender-based leniency is apparent, as female offenders
tend to benefit from what they refer to as “a benign form of reverse discrimination”
(Nagel and Johnson, 1994, p. 182). This is often referred to in the literature as the
sentencing chivalry.
In a similar vein, Daly (1989) and Carlen (1988) conducted research looking at
judge’s motivations in sentencing of women. Daly (1989) found that judges were
motivated by a desire to protect families (although not necessarily women). In the
Scottish study by Carlen (1988) judges openly admitted their dislike of sentencing
women. Carlen (1988) found judges tended to sentence women offenders on the basis
of whether or not offenders are mothers. Thus if their child was already in care they
would be more inclined to give a custodial sentence. These findings are supported
by surveys of women in prison that highlight the disproportionate numbers of women
with unconventional family backgrounds (Cavadino and Dignan, 2007).
It may also be possible that women are sentenced less harshly because of “gen-
dered presuppositions of crime and justice” (Daly, 1994, p. 197). These more lenient
sentences are a result of judges believing women are less blameworthy, less dangerous,
more likely to be deterred from future offending and that the social cost of punishing
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female offenders has increased (Steffensmeier et al., 1993). Johnson (2005) supports
this argument as his results are consistent with this theoretical perspective, suggesting
courtroom actors may succumb to stereotypical patterned responses which tie offender
characteristics to courtroom assessments of dangerousness and culpability. Addition-
ally research carried out by Hedderman and Gelsthorpe (1997) found that judges
often view women offenders as ‘troubled’ as opposed to ‘troublesome’ because women
tend to be first-time offenders, face less serious charges and behave more respectfully
in court (Hedderman and Gelsthorpe, 1997, p. 26). Although when shoplifting was
conducted for profit rather than necessity, they were seen to be more like their male
counterparts (ibid).
Males and females differ in many aspects but special treatment of female offend-
ers may carry risk (Nagel and Johnson, 1994). The main risk is that those who do
not live up to the typical female stereotype are treated more harshly. Thus they are
deemed as doubly deviant by going against social norms as well as the law (Nagel and
Johnson, 1994; Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). Farrington and Morris (1983) found ev-
idence of this: divorced and separated women, as well as those seen as ‘deviant’(e.g.
unemployed unmarried mothers), received more severe sentences than married ‘nor-
mal’ women. The traditional family unit is seen as the ‘norm’ and therefore having
dependent children is often viewed as a mitigating factor.
However, the Fawcett Society (2009) draws attention to the fact that too many
women are being imprisoned on short sentences for non-violent crime. They argue that
remand is over-used for female defendants and there are too many foreign national
women in prison (ibid). The Fawcett Society attributes the rise in the female prison
population to the significant rise in the severity of sentences given out by the courts.
They are not alone in this belief: the increase in the severity of sentencing in England
and Wales has been the main cause of the rocketing prison population as a whole
according to Halliday (2001) and Carter (2003). Sentencing decisions are seen as a
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potent source of perceived injustices fuelling the crisis of legitimacy (Cavadino and
Dignan, 2007).
In the US the rise in the number of women being incarcerated has been blamed
on the development of drug policy. It is said the ‘war on drugs’ policy resulted in
the increase in penalties for possession and sale of drugs and with this, the “‘war of
drugs’ has translated into war on women” (Chesney-Lind, 1995, p. 111), with women
being treated like their male counterparts.
The literature regarding female sentencing is somewhat mixed: on one side of the
argument there are those that maintain the conceptual model for achieving justice
where offenders need to be sentenced with parity and no ‘special treatment’ (Nagel
and Johnson, 1994) and on the other hand there are the supporters of the alternative
model, where women offenders are treated disparately to deal with their additional
needs, as raised by Corston (2007). There is some evidence to suggest that men and
women are sentenced differently, and this may be a result of some of the factors just
highlighted. Further research is therefore necessary to identify if there is sentencing
disparity based on the severity of the sentence and not just the type of sentence.
3.5.2 Race and ethnicity
The principle of equality before the law states that no person should be sentenced more
severely on account of their race or ethnicity. However, there is evidence to suggest this
may not be the case. The statistics show that Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) group
offenders are over-represented at virtually all stages of the criminal justice system
relative to their representation in the general population (Thomas, 2010). If we take
the prison population in England and Wales as an example, the Ministry of Justice
(2009) reported that in 2008, 27% of the prison population identified themselves as
being from BME groups, that is just over a quarter of the male prison population and
29% of the female prison population. Furthermore, statistics released by the Ministry
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of Justice (2011) show that in 2009, Black offenders received the longest average
custodial sentence length at 20.8 months, compared to Asian and White offenders at
19.9 and 14.8 months respectively.
Black offenders are also more likely to be sentenced at the Crown Court (Hood,
1992; Thomas, 2010). Data obtained from the Crown Court (CREST data) revealed
that BME members are two and a half times more likely to be sentenced at the Crown
Court relative to their representation in the population - 21.7% of those sentenced at
the Crown Court compared to their representation in the population (8.7%) (Thomas,
2010). Black offenders are four times more likely to be sentenced in the Crown Court
- 10.7% of those sentenced at the Crown Court compared to their representation in
the population (2.8%) (ibid). The fact that more BME offenders are sentenced at
the Crown Court could be viewed as one example of indirect discrimination (Spohn,
2009).
Additionally, it is evident from Table 3.2 there are some differences in the propor-
tions of offenders receiving each disposal by their ethnic group. Although we cannot
take these figures at face value [like the previous figures for gender], there are some
substantial differences in those receiving the lesser and more severe disposals. For
example in 2009, a higher proportion of White offenders received condition discharges
and community penalties compared to the Black and Asian offenders, whereas a much
higher proportion of Black and Asian offenders were sentenced to immediate custody
than Whites.
Sentencing is just one stage of the criminal justice system: prior to this stage
those appearing in court are already from a selected group constituted as a result of
reporting, investigating and filtering in the pre-trial stages (Ashworth, 2010b). For
example, Ashworth (2010b) highlights the use of stop and searches carried out by the
police. A consistent finding is that people from ethnic minorities - particularly Black
people - are stopped and searched by the police more often than the White population
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White Black Asian
Absolute discharge 0.5% 0.4% 0.3%
Conditional discharge 12.7% 8.7% 7.8%
Fine 16.3% 18.2% 18.2%
Community order 34.1% 30.1% 27.7%
Suspended sentence order 9.6% 8.3% 10.7%
Immediate custody 23.4% 29.1% 32%
Otherwise dealt with 3.3% 5.2% 3.3%
Source Ministry of Justice (2010) Table 1(vi)
Table 3.2: Proportions of persons (aged 21 and over) sentenced for indictable offences
in 2009 by ethnicity and disposal
(Bowling and Philips, 2003). This targeting of BME people in this manner is likely to
play a part in the over-representation of this group within the criminal justice system
(Phillips and Bowling, 2002).
It was found BME members are also more likely to be refused bail and therefore
are more likely to be remanded in custody prior to appearing in court for sentencing
(Phillips and Brown, 1998). In Phillips and Brown’s (1998) study, they found 26% of
White offenders were refused bail compared with 34% of Black offenders and 35%
of Asian offenders. Evidence suggests that bail decisions are affected by criteria
such as homelessness (Walker, 1989), unemployment and socio-economic factors that
disproportionately affect Black offenders (Phillips and Brown, 1998). Studies have
shown that Black offenders are more likely to be remanded in custody than their
White counterparts and as a result of this, they are then more likely to be given a
custodial sentence if found guilty (Hood, 1992). This can be viewed as one form of
indirect discrimination against Black offenders (Hudson, 1993; Spohn, 2009).
At the sentencing stage BME offenders are more likely to plead not guilty (43%)
than White offenders (35%), resulting in more of these cases going to trial (Thomas,
2010). BME offenders are three and a half times more likely to face a jury verdict
(29% of all trials by jury are for BME offenders), and Black offenders are five times
more likely to face trial by jury (14% of all trials by a jury). There is a general
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belief that juries are fairer that judges (Ashworth and Redmayne, 2010) (see Section
3.5.4). Analysis by Thomas (2010) would suggest this may be the case as the overall
conviction rate for BME offenders is 65% compared to 63% for White offenders.
The most prominent UK study into ethnic disparity in sentencing was carried out
by Hood (1992). This study collected data from five Crown Court centres in the West
Midlands of England in 1989, consisting of 2884 males (half of the sample were White
and other half non-white) and 443 females. This work highlighted severe disparity and
discrimination relating to offenders’ ethnicity. Namely, variations in custody showed a
5% greater probability of Black offenders being sent to prison, which varied by court,
and variations in the use of alternatives to custody showed that Black offenders are
more likely to receive more severe disposals, and for those given custody there were also
differences relating to sentence length, with Black offenders receiving longer sentences
especially those over three years.
This situation appears similar if not worse in the U.S, where studies have shown
severe racial disparity in sentencing, particularly for the Black and Hispanic offenders
(Johnson, 2006; Engen and Gainey, 2000; Bushway and Piehl, 2001). For example,
Albonetti (1997) found there to be substantial differences in the mean length of im-
prisonment for drug offences varying by Black, White and Hispanic offenders. Black
offenders received the longest sentences, averaging 101.97 months, compared to White
and Hispanic offenders, which averaged at 72.45 and 79.58 months respectively: sug-
gesting that sentencing is influenced by an offender’s ethnicity.
These results appear consistent throughout the literature from the US, highlighting
a major problem with ethnic discrimination in the criminal justice systems in the US,
as well as England and Wales.
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3.5.3 Additional characteristics of the offender
There is a lack of recent empirical research which investigates the effects of additional
characteristics of the offender - other than gender and ethnicity - on sentencing prac-
tice. Studies which have been conducted in this area, tend to be outdated and limited
in the methodologies employed to conduct the research. I will return to the issue of
methodologies in the following chapter but for now I will briefly summarise some of
the existing research that has been conducted into disparity.
Additional offender characteristics may be considered as part of the offender’s
personal mitigation. Research conducted by Jacobson and Hough (2007) held fo-
cus groups with Crown Court judges and found that often personal mitigation was
the deciding factor for borderline cases. This research also found evidence that be-
ing employed is treated as a mitigating factor, with judges reluctant to jeopardise
employment prospects. However, as I have previously pointed out, this potentially
discriminates against offenders that are not employed prior to sentencing.
Other studies that have looked at the effects of employment status on sentencing
generally date back to the 1980’s and 1990’s. Nonetheless, Flood-Page and Mackie
(1998), Moxon (1988) and Crow and Simon (1989) all found that employment sta-
tus was strongly associated with the use of fines. Flood-Page and Mackie’s (1998)
results showed that for first-time offenders, 10% of employed offenders received a fine
compared with just over 2% of unemployed offenders and among those with previous
convictions, 8% of employed offenders were fined but none of the unemployed offend-
ers were fined. However, they do acknowledge that this does take into account the
offenders means to pay. These studies also found evidence to suggest that as a result
of judges’ reluctance to fine unemployed offenders, their sentences were more likely to
be up-tariffed to a community order or probation. Therefore, unemployed offenders
are being sentenced more severely due to financial situations.
In the study by Hood (1992), it found that unemployment was treated as an
72
aggravating factor but only for Black offenders, this did not apply to the White or
Asian offenders in the sample. The interaction between Black and unemployed led to
harsher penalties.
Other studies have looked at the effects of living accommodation and offending,
such as Grimshaw (2002) and Kirkwood and Richley (2008). Their research suggests
a cyclical link between committing crime and becoming homeless, and once homeless
committing crime. This link is perpetuated by drug use: many will take drugs to help
cope with their experiences and their addiction will propel them to offend to feed their
addiction (Arnull et al., 2007). However, there does not appear to be any research
which has looked at the relationship between accommodation status and sentencing.
Treating offenders differently goes against the principle of equality (Ashworth,
2010b). Certainly fines are means tested but for any other sentence, Ashworth (2010b)
explains, offenders should not be treated differently on account of their financial cir-
cumstances. As far as I am aware, there appears to be a gap in the research which
investigates the relationship between the financial circumstances of the offender and
sentencing, although perhaps employment status is indicative of the offenders financial
status.
3.5.4 Characteristics and attitudes of the judge
Judges are the people making the decisions on sentencing. They hold a lot of power
and although, as I have explained, guidelines have been brought in to minimise their
discretion, they still have the overall say in the sentencing of offenders.
Hogarth (1971) maintains that sentences can be better explained by knowing more
about the judge rather than the particulars about the case. Research by Johnson
(2006) would endorse this claim. In looking at sentencing disparity in the U.S.,
Johnson found that the effect of the judge’s race was noteworthy: ethnic minority
judges were less punitive and therefore less likely to incarcerate offenders. Where
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they did incarcerate offenders, the sentences were 6% shorter than those given by
White judges (Johnson, 2006). The age of the judge was also significant: older judges
were less likely to incarcerate, and when they did they also gave shorter sentences
(ibid). However, the influence of the judge’s gender was found to be minimal (ibid).
Judges are human and therefore it is important to recognise that they are open to
being shaped by influences from their personal backgrounds and experiences (Hogarth,
1971) just like everyone else. They are not immune to stereotypes and common
conceptions of certain groups within society. As I mentioned previously, Johnson
(2005) rightly argues that the social context of the court has an influence on courtroom
decision-making, that is because, judges and other courtroom actors do not make
decisions in a social vacuum. These decisions are influenced by social, political and
organisational environments (ibid). Judges may also have different views about the
effectiveness of the various sentences and may favour one type of disposal over another
(ibid). Thus, sentencing practices are likely to vary across courts, as well as, within
courts.
This argument finds itself in the realms of legal theory. I will not go into this in
great detail here but the point needs mentioning. The philosophy of law and legal
theory holds that judges apply legal reasons to the facts of a case in a rational, me-
chanical, and deliberative manner (Danziger et al., 2011). Judges are supposed to be
fair and consistent in their decision-making because they base decisions solely on legal
rules and reasons (Leiter, 2005). This is known as Legal Formalism. However, Leiter
explains the twentieth century movement of Legal Realism was the most indigenous
jurisprudential movement in the U.S.. Legal realism argues that the rational appli-
cation of legal reasons does not sufficiently explain the decisions of judges and that
psychological, political, and social factors influence judicial rulings (Danziger et al.,
2011). Therefore extraneous factors, such as gender, ethnicity or socio-economic sta-
tus, may sway decisions, out with the legal factors of the case.
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Research by Danziger et al. (2011) tested this theory. Their study examined the
decisions made by a sample of judges in Israel on granting parole to prisoners. The
study sought to assess whether the judges decision-making was consistent throughout
the day when making repeat decisions. They sought to investigate whether judges
were more favourable in their decision-making following a break in which they had
time to rest and eat etc. Their study split the day into three sections to access
functionality first thing in the morning and following two breaks throughout the day.
The results showed the likelihood of a favourable decision was much greater at
the start of the working day and directly following breaks than later in the sequence
of cases. The probability of a favourable ruling declines from approximately 0.65 at
the start of the session to nearly 0 and jumps back up to around 0.65 following a
break (Danziger et al., 2011). They then accounted for the legal characteristics of the
case (seriousness of the original crime, months served, previous incarcerations and
rehabilitation programme), characteristics of the prisoners (sex, nationality), and the
proportion of favourable rulings to that point in the day, using logistic regression with
the ruling decision, and the judge-specific fixed effects. While controlling for all these
covariates, the pattern of favourable decisions still held (Danziger et al., 2011).
Ashworth (2010b) explains that it is fairly well established that a major source
of disparity in sentencing is the different penal philosophies among judges. Ander-
son and Spohn (2010) also comment on the varying sentencing philosophies of the
judges. A judge with a retributive philosophy is more likely to ignore the extra-legal
characteristics of the offender, focusing primarily on the seriousness of the offence. A
utilitarian judge may give a harsher sentence to an offender who is deemed less likely
to be rehabilitated based on their perceived risk of reoffending. This point is summed
up in this quote by Hogarth, who explains that judges
“differ widely in their purposes, their views as to the effectiveness of dif-
ferent kinds of sentences, the criteria applied in deciding between different
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kinds of sentences, the ways in which conflict between the offender’s needs
and community protection is resolved, the amount of information sup-
port they have for their views, and the kinds of situation in which they
experience difficulty in sentencing” (Hogarth, 1971, p. 91)
Therefore, although the Criminal Justice Act 2003 states that sentencers must
have regard for all five of the sentencing principles (see Subsection 2.2.2), there is no
way of adequately ensuring this. Therefore, this is one way in which disparity is likely
to occur when there is a lack of guidance as to how this can be achieved as well as
different underlying philosophies of the judiciary.
Judges may sentence offenders more severely, not because of the characteristics
of the offender but rather because they are predisposed to using one form of dis-
posal (Johnson, 2005) or believe one type of disposal is more effective than another.
This again highlights judges do not make decisions purely on legal facts and rules.
Discretion may leave room for disparity which may result in certain groups being
discriminated against.
In England and Wales the judiciary has also come under a number of criticisms,
largely because of the use of lay magistrates (Flood-Page and Mackie, 1998). Research
conducted in the mid-1990s compared the sentencing patterns of stipendiaries (now
District Judges) and lay magistrates. Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) found that
stipendiary magistrates were more likely to sentence an offender to custody than lay
magistrates who made more use of community sentences (ibid).
However, Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) also point out the workloads of stipen-
diary magistrates are often very different from lay judges, and stipendiary judges are
also more likely to be involved in more complex cases lasting several days, making it
more difficult to compare the two. Using logistic regression and type of magistrate,
sex of the offender, nature and number of offences, previous convictions or similar
convictions and whether they were subject to any other court orders at the time of
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the offence, Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) found the type of magistrate had an in-
dependent effect on the outcome and confirmed lay magistrates used custody less.
Although, the offence type, whether the offender was already subject to a court order
and total number of offences that they were being sentenced for had a bigger effect
on the outcome (ibid).
Additionally Flood-Page and Mackie tested their hypothesis that the presence of
stipendiaries in courts beside lay magistrates may have an influence on the decision-
making of sentences. Stipendiary magistrates occasionally contribute to the training of
lay magistrates and in some areas sit with them on the bench (Flood-Page and Mackie,
1998; Morgan and Russell, 2000). Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) found evidence of
an increase in severity of sentencing by lay magistrates in courts with stipendiaries.
Morgan and Russell (2000) also tested the theory and found similar results.
Morgan and Russell (2000) carried out similar work to Flood-Page and Mackie
in which they observed 930 occasions where the magistrates passed sentence. They
found that stipendiaries were more likely to use higher sentencing tariffs (25% of cases
resulting in immediate custody compared to just 12% for lay magistrates, and 12% of
cases resulting in probation compared to 8% for lay judges) and less likely to use lower
tariff sentences (8% (stipendaries) and 28% (lay judges) for conditional discharges and
12% (stipendaries) and 39% (lay judges) for fines respectively). Whereas stipendiaries
used probation orders to a greater extent than the lay judges, the reverse is the case
with community penalties and compensation orders - 10% for lay magistrates and 7%
for stipendiaries.
The argument surrounding lay and profession judges also extends to the social
characteristics of these judges. Lay-judges are supposed to represent a more demo-
cratic and socially representative judiciary but studies have shown this not to be the
case. Cavadino and Dignan (2007) report lay judges are still overwhelmingly middle-
aged and middle class, very few are from ethnic minorities and they tend to be more
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‘middle-minded’, with a higher proportion of them inclined to vote Conservative than
the general population. Although women now make up around half of lay judges this
was not always the case. Crown Court judges tend to be slightly older than magis-
trates, are predominantly male, and have even fewer members from ethnic minorities
(Cavadino and Dignan, 2007). The fact they are previously barristers is said to nar-
row the backgrounds that judges come from. Morgan and Russell (2000) suggest that
in reality the social composition of both lay and stipendiary judges are likely to be
very similar, and both very removed from the spheres of those appearing before them.
There is a general perception among defendants that trials at the Crown Court are
fairer than trials at magistrates’ courts (Ashworth and Redmayne, 2010) and many
defendants opt to go to trial at the Crown Court. In doing so, offenders run the
risk of being sentenced more severely due to the increased sentencing powers of the
Crown Court. However, Ashworth and Redmayne (2010) explain there are a number
of reasons why an offender would opt for a Crown Court trial: juries are fresh to cases
and are not ‘case hardened’ in the way magistrates may be; previous convictions are
not known to juries which may benefit the offender; and finally, juries tend to be
more representative of the general population and therefore are perhaps more likely
to understand the predicament of the offender compared to the judge.
This section has shown that it is not only offender characteristics that can lead
to disparate sentencing but also the characteristics of the judge. As Johnson (2005)
adequately phrased it - sentencing does not happen in a “social vacuum” and therefore
a number of extraneous factors can affect the sentencing decisions. These factors need
to be taken into consideration when looking at disparity in sentencing, as has been
done in a number of studies (mainly from the US). However, information on the
characteristics of judges are not recorded in any official data in England and Wales.
This makes it extremely difficult to control for this.
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3.5.5 Geographic location of the court
Kautt (2002) compared American sentencing to real estate, suggesting that sentencing
depends significantly on the geographic location of the court. Ulmer and Johnson
also comment that “if the sentence one receives and the grounds for that sentence
depend on location, then the notions of equal justice that underlie most Western legal
systems may be undermined” (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004, p. 137). Therefore regardless
of where about in the country an offender is sentenced they should be treated with
parity.
Research has shown there to be differences in the sentencing practices between
courts. For example, Halliday (2001) published findings which revealed an ‘unnamed
court’ sentenced half of its domestic burglary offenders to immediate custody, where as
another ‘unnamed court’ court only sentenced 13% of the domestic burglary offenders
to the immediate custody. Similarly, for the offence of Actual Bodily Harm, courts
ranged from sentencing 2% to 53% of offenders convicted of Actual Bodily Harm to
immediate custody. This indicates major sentencing disparity.
Hood (1992) also found sentencing variation between courts and judges, which
was initially masked by only looking at the overall average effect of race. For example
Birmingham Crown Court sentenced a much lower proportion of Black offenders to
custody than would have been expected, whereas the Dudley courts sentenced a much
higher proportion of Black offenders to custody (Hood, 1992). This disparity had
initially been over-looked.
In the US, Ulmer and Johnson (2004) found that sentencing varied across the
county courts: courts were more likely to sentence offenders to jail depending on
the jail capacity. In areas where there was more jail capacity, more offenders were
sentenced to jail after controlling for the legal characteristics of the offence (Ulmer
and Johnson, 2004).
In England and Wales, the Ministry of Justice published results of a study which
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investigated the geographic variation in custodial sentencing (Mason et al., 2007).
Using custody rates and average custodial sentence lengths (ACSLs) for the 42 Crim-
inal Justice Areas (CJAs) in England and Wales, they compared all recorded crime
offences sentenced in the magistrates’ and Crown Courts between 2003 and 2006. The
study found large variations in custody rates, average custodial sentence lengths and
the use of Life and IPP sentences across the 42 CJAs. In particular the custody rates
in the magistrates’ courts and the use of Life and IPP sentences in the Crown court
had the most variation (Mason et al., 2007).
The results showed that the average custody rates in the magistrates’ courts were
fairly stable between 2003 and 2006, although the actual range had narrowed from
15.7% in 2003 to 9.8% in 2006 (ibid). In 2006 the average custody rate was 11%
and half of the 42 (21) CJAs were within 1.7 percentage points of the average. Of
those CJAs with custody rates in the top five in 2006, three (Essex, Bedfordshire and
London - Metropolitan and City of London police force areas were combined) were
consistently in the top five for all years. Similarly those CJAs in the bottom five for
2006, two (Dyfed-Powys and Lincolnshire) were also in the bottom five for 2003, 2004,
and 2005 (ibid).
They report ACSL also remained fairly stable between 2003 and 2006. In 2006
the ACSL at magistrates’ court was 3.0 months with a total range from 2.3 months
to 3.6 months, and half of the CJAs were within 0.2 months of that average. Of those
CJAs in the top five for 2006, two (Northumbria and Cumbria) were consistently in
the top five for 2003, 2004 and 2005. Likewise in the bottom five for ACSL in 2006,
two CJAs (Devon and Cornwall and Essex) were in the bottom five for all years.
Turning to the Crown Court, the custody rates were also fairly stable between
2003 and 2006, apart from the small fall in custody rates between 2005 and 2006.
The authors attribute this fall to the introduction of the suspended sentence order,
which was introduced in 2005. Although, the same pattern of custody rates did
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not occur in the magistrates’ courts in which suspended sentence orders were also
available, so it may be there is an alternative explanation for this fall. In 2006 the
average custody rate was 56% with a total range from 45% to 68%. Half of the 42
CJAs were within 3.2 percentage points of the average.
ACSL has also remained relatively stable over the period of study between 2003
and 2006. The ACSL in 2006 was 24 months with a range of 19.5 months to 28.3
months with half (21) of the CJAs being within 1.8 months of the average. The range
of ACSL has narrowed from 15.2 months in 2003 to 8.8 months in 2006. Of those
CJAs in the top five for ACSL in 2006, two (Sussex and London) were consistently
in the top five. In the bottom five in 2006, only one (South Wales) CJA was also in
the bottom five during 2003, 2004 and 2005 (ibid).
Mason et al. (2007) explain the two measures - custody rates and ACSL - were
influenced by a variety of factors including legislative changes. For example the intro-
duction of Indeterminate Sentences for Public Protection (IPPs) in April 2005 resulted
in a slight fall in ACSL in the Crown Court. In 2006 this average ranged from 1.3%
to 4.6%, and 21 of the 42 CJAs were within 2.5 percentage points of the average.
Mason et al. (2007) point out that although their analysis found large variation in
custody rates, ACSLs and the use of Life and IPP sentences, the sentencing practice
of individual CJAs was relatively consistent. The majority of variation in sentencing
was down to a relatively small number of CJAs.
In their analysis, they found there to be a link between the seriousness of the
offence and sentencing practice in the Crown Court. Although at best 38% and 20%
of the observed variation in custody rates and ACSL respectively can be attributed
to the difference in the seriousness of offences between CJAs (ibid). Therefore this
only partially explains variation in sentencing, leaving the rest unaccounted for. To
add to this, there was a lack of a clear relationship between offence seriousness and
sentencing at the magistrates’ court and so implies that the mix of offences sentenced
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in magistrates’ courts was not a significant factor in explaining sentencing variation
across the CJAs (ibid).
Furthermore, they found committal practices did not explain geographical varia-
tions in sentencing. Neither could the differences in local crime rates and the changes
in recorded crimes and sentencing in the magistrates’ and Crown Courts, suggesting
these two are not linked with sentencing in CJAs (Mason et al., 2007).
Mason et al. (2007) concluded that variation could not be explained solely in
terms of the characteristics of the cases or offenders coming before the courts. These
factors do play a part in the variation but cannot fully account for the geographic
variation. Variations may be down to ‘local justice’17 or the ‘human factor’ (Tarling
and Weatheritt, 1979), which maintains that consistency within individual courts is
more important than maintaining consistency at a national level. Finally Mason
et al. (2007) acknowledge the relationship between judges and other CJAs agencies
who inform the sentencing process, were identified as possibly influencing sentencing
practice.
3.6 Concluding remarks
The literature on sentencing disparity draws from a number of different themes such
as its association with consistency and inconsistency, discrimination, equality and in-
equality. All these notions then resonate with injustice. There are also a number of
beliefs about how justice can be achieved: one is to argue justice can be achieved
through parity and therefore disparity leads to injustice; whereas an alternative ap-
proach would suggest disparate sentencing is necessary to achieve justice in an unequal
world. These two approaches are somewhat debated in the literature.
However, there may be a way around this if we were to consider equivalent severity
17Local justice refers to the fact that not all disposals will be available in every area especially
when disposals are being piloted (Mason et al., 2007)
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or parity in terms of equivalent sentence severity, as opposed to the same sentence
or the same treatment. This would allow for an objective measure in which to assess
sentencing disparity.
To date, there have been a substantial number of studies which have sought to
investigate sentencing disparity, more so in the US than in England and Wales, and
mainly concentrating on gender and ethnicity. There have been some studies which
have also considered additional offender characteristics, such as employment status
and accommodation status, characteristics of the judiciary in terms of the gender, age
and ethnicity, and geographic location of the court. Nevertheless, the overwhelming
picture suggests these extra-legal factors provide the basis for disparity to occur.
In the following chapter I will explain how these studies which investigate sen-
tencing disparity generally measure the dependent variable - sentence severity, and
the problems associated with these measures. I then go on to suggest an alternative
approach which will ultimately provide a more robust measure of sentence severity
and with that more reliable research into sentencing disparity.
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Chapter 4
Previous work on measuring
sentence severity and assessing
disparity
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter reviewed the literature on disparity in sentencing. It highlighted
that much of the previous research has identified four main factors; offender’s gender
and ethnicity, characteristics of the judge and location of the courts contribute to
disparity in sentencing. At the end of the previous chapter, I suggested there are
some weaknesses in this research due to the lack of a clear and explicit definition of
disparity, and the methodologies employed to measure sentence severity, which tend
to be based on hypothetical scenarios or custodial sentences. This chapter will firstly
explain why we measure sentence severity, then discuss the dimensionality of sentence
severity and will finally go on to explain the methods which have been adopted to
measure sentence severity and disparity in this thesis.
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4.1.1 Why measure sentence severity?
Sentence severity can essentially be thought of as a latent concept because it is not
directly measurable. Sentence disparity is intertwined with sentence severity: only
by measuring sentence severity can we begin to assess disparity. Disparity is said to
occur when ‘two like-situated offenders’ are sentenced for the same offence, and where
one offender receives a more severe sentence than the other. For example, after con-
trolling for the offence type and legal characteristics of the case, one offender receives
a custodial sentence of 6 months and the other offender receives a custodial sentence
of 9 months. However. it becomes more difficult to assess sentencing disparity when
offenders receive different types of sentences (von Hirsch, 1993). The different punitive
elements (i.e. monetary, restrictions on time or liberty) of sentences handed down by
the courts, make it very difficult to compare the different types of sentences. There-
fore it can also be thought of as a problem in alignment - how do we determine the
community order equivalence of a 30 day custodial sentence?
To facilitate investigation into disparity it is necessary to quantitatively measure
sentence severity. In 1978 Leslie Sebba wrote;
“In view of the proliferation of sophisticated techniques of quantification
currently applied in criminological research, it is rather surprising to ob-
serve that in one vital area the development of such techniques seems
to have been neglected. That is the problem of the severity of penalties
meted out by the criminal courts” (Sebba, 1978, p. 247).
Some thirty years later we appear to be not much further ahead.
The practice of measuring sentence severity has generally existed within two
spheres; the data driven approach and the opinion/perception approach. These
spheres have remained distinctly separate in the methods used to measure sentence
severity. The data driven approach uses existing data or data that has been col-
lected specifically for the research by survey or from administrative records. This
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data is then analysed using a variety of statistical techniques and from this, disparity
in sentencing can be investigated. This approach differs from research conducted in
the opinion/perception approach, which asks the public or experts their perceptions
and opinions of sentence severity. This method uses a vignette approach, whereby
members of the public or experts (i.e. judges, probation officers, police officers etc.)
are asked to rate the severity of sentences and apply corresponding scores to each of
them. In doing so this creates a series of scores which make up a severity scale. I will
refer back to these approaches throughout the course of the chapter as I discuss the
various methods used to explore sentence severity and disparity.
4.2 Dimensionality of severity
Sentence severity cannot be directly observed or easily measured. However, the prin-
ciple of proportionality permits that punishments/sentences can be ordered on a scale
so that their relative severity reflects the seriousness ranking of the crimes involved
(von Hirsch, 1993). Indeed Sweeten (2012) argues that determinations of seriousness
are intertwined with the notion of unidimensionality. In this vein, sentence severity
can then be thought of as a unidimensional concept of the punitiveness of a criminal
sentence given in a court of law. In fact, a great deal of literature in this area also
considers offence seriousness and sentence severity to be a unidimensional concept
whereby offences and/or sentences can be arranged on a continuum from the least
serious/severe to the most serious/severe sentence (for example Sellin and Wolfgang
(1964); Francis et al. (2001); Sebba (1978); Sweeten (2012)).
Another type of scale that has been used previously is a qualitative or descriptive
scale. This can be seen as a multidimensional representation of sentence severity but
the qualitative factors, such as mobility in the community and financial obligations,
are incorporated into a single unidimensional scale. Schiff’s (1997) research did just
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that by incorporating a number of the punitive elements that make up a sentence and
from that calculated an overall severity score. More will be said about this study in
section 4.3.3.
There are some that are critical of this unidimensional approach to sentencing (for
example Marinos (2005); Braithwaite (1982); Garland (1990)), deeming it as “...de-
fective and unsuccessful because of the lack of consideration of the multidimensional
qualities of the offence and the offender” (Marinos, 2005, p. 44). Braithwaite (1982)
argues that the sole focus on severity (as well as just-desert and the idea of propor-
tionality) ignores the complexities associated with offending and the offender. Indeed
many different factors need to be taken into consideration when sentencing offend-
ers, including the “purposes and functions of individual punishments”(Marinos, 2005,
p. 44). Marinos (2005) also states that in order to embrace the multi-dimensional
nature of sentencing it is also important to take into consideration the nature of the
offence and the age of the offender, as well as the broader relationships among the
purposes of the punishment and the individual sanctions. This suggests that the
different punishments seek to serve different purposes, such as denunciation, rehabil-
itation, incapacitation etc (ibid). This also links back to the point made by Tonry
(1996) and Kolber (2009) (see Section 3.3.1) that sentences need to take into con-
sideration the effects that different sentences can have on the individual offender.
These views emphasise the different theoretical approaches to sentencing and their
conflicting ideologies.
However, I would argue that a scale based on sentence severity does not reject the
complex nature of sentencing, instead we can think of severity as just one-dimension
or aspect of sentencing. Similarly, although referring to offending, Sellin and Wolfgang
(1964) argued that offending is multidimensional but insisted that it is possible to use
a “...homogeneous dimension which can allow for quantitative measurement of this
phenomenon” (Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964, p. 338). Likewise, it is possible to use the
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severity as a homogeneous dimension of sentencing to allow for the measurement of
disparity.
Furthermore, the sentencing framework in England and Wales adopts a hybrid
approach to sentencing, proportionality remains the guiding principle in sentencing
offenders. It therefore seems sensible to use this existing principle to model sentence
severity and to provide a measure in which to then assess sentencing disparity
4.3 Methods to measure sentence severity
This section describes the methods used to measure sentence severity.
4.3.1 In-out decision to incarcerate
Within the data driven approach, one of the methods that is used to measure sen-
tence severity is the ‘in-out’ decision to incarcerate. This method constructs a binary
variable, coded 1 if the offender was sentenced to immediate custody and 0 if they
received any other disposal e.g. a fine or community penalty. This is thus a very sim-
ple and crude measure of sentence severity, and implicitly assumes that any length of
custodial sentences is more severe than any non-custodial sentences. To assess dispar-
ity, the method then models the probability that an offender will receive a custodial
sentence (Ulmer and Johnson, 2004). This can be used to assess for example, whether
being male or female increases or decreases the probability of receiving a custodial
sentence.
This method has been popular, with studies investigating sentencing disparity
carried out by, for example; Wheeler et al. (1982); Ulmer and Johnson (2004); Merrall
et al. (2010); Holleran and Spohn (2004). Wheeler et al. (1982) explain that in
interviews conducted with judges, they explicitly state the hardest decision they make
is whether to incarcerate or not, therefore it is imperative that research investigates
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the decision to incarcerate. These studies also explain there are different variables
which impact on the decision to imprison and in giving a custodial sentence, the
ultimate length of that sentence. Ulmer and Johnson (2004) state it also important
to model the in-out decision and length of the custodial sentence separately to test
for different hypotheses. A number of studies model the in-out decision, as well as
the length of custodial sentence in their research. I will say more about this in the
following section.
The methodology that focuses on the ‘in-out’ decision to incarcerate creates a
very simplified measure of sentence severity and implies that all custodial sentences
are more severe than any non-custodial sentences. It dismisses the possibility that two
different sentences, for example a short custodial sentence and a community order,
can have the same level of sentence severity or parity.
The ‘in-out’ decision method also omits the magnitude of the sentence. It is not
possible to determine whether a sentence is, for example twice as severe than another.
It assumes all custodial sentences are more severe than any non-custodial sentence.
Consequently, this method of measuring sentence severity would appear to be a rather
crude and erroneous measure.
4.3.2 Custodial sentence length
The second and most popular method that is generally used to measure sentence
severity also falls within the data driven sphere. Studies which use real sentencing
data will tend to only include the principal offence18 . These studies then use the
custodial sentence length to determine sentence severity: longer sentences are seen
as more severe then shorter custodial sentences. This method is used in a number
of studies, such as those conducted by; Anderson and Spohn (2010), Britt (2009),
Albonetti (1997), Bushway and Piehl (2001), Helms and Jacobs (2002), Ulmer and
18Where the offender has been found guilty of one or more offences, the principal offence is the
most serious offence which receives the heaviest/most severe sentence (Ministry of Justice, 2010)
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Johnson (2004), Mueller-Johnson and Dhami (2009), Wheeler et al. (1982), Miethe
and Moore (1986), Mustard (2001), and Pina-Sa´nchez and Linacre (2013).
Studies vary in how sentence length is determined. Studies conducted in England
and Wales, such as the study by Pina-Sa´nchez and Linacre (2013), used the length
of custodial sentences recorded by the judges’ in the Crown Court Survey. However,
this differs to those studies conducted in the U.S. especially where the state in which
the research was conducted use a sentencing grid, such as in Minnesota, where the
sentencing grid will provided a minimum and maximum presumptive sentence range
for cases that share the typical criminal history and offence severity characteristics
(Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2013). For example, in looking at
sentencing disparity and departures from the pre-defined guidelines, Helms and Jacobs
(2002) used the awarded minimum and maximum sentence lengths transformed into
months, summed the two and then averaged them. They then added 1 (to avoid
taking the log of 0 in cases where the offender received a non-custodial) and took the
natural logarithm. In contrast, Britt (2009) used the minimum number of months
the offender was sentenced to custody, and again took the logarithm of that sentence
length. Taking the natural logarithm of sentence length reduces the positive skew, as
the majority of offenders receive relatively short sentences (Britt, 2009); (Albonetti,
1997). Others have used the midpoints of sentence length (Miethe and Moore, 1986)
and the average sentence length (Mustard, 2001) to model sentencing disparity.
However, as with any method, there are drawbacks of using this custodial sentence
length approach. This method focuses on only one type of disposal - immediate
custody. It therefore dismisses a large proportion of sentences which do not result in
immediate custody. In doing so, Leslie Sebba comments it “ignores the disparities in
terms of severity found among non-custodial penalties”(Sebba, 1978, p. 250). This
method inevitably leads to bias in the data, as it excludes important sentencing
information (Merrall et al., 2010) by omitting the multitude of sentences which do
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not result in a custodial sentence.
By omitting all non-custodial sentences, this method does not facilitate the idea
that certain sentences can be equivalent in terms of their severity, whereby a non-
custodial sentence i.e. a community order, could be as severe as certain custodial
sentences. Therefore it rejects the idea that two different disposals can have the same
level of severity.
A number of studies have opted to combine the ‘in-out method’ with the length of
custodial sentence to measure severity, and ultimately sentencing disparity. Studies
such as those conducted by Bushway and Piehl (2001) and Albonetti (1997) combine
the decision to incarcerate with sentence length, while others have opted to model
them separately, for example Wheeler et al. (1982), Ulmer and Johnson (2004), and
Merrall et al. (2010). There are arguments for and against modelling the probability
of custody and custodial sentence length together, which will be discussed in Section
4.4.
4.3.3 Severity scales
Sebba (1978) argues that in order to conduct any comprehensive analysis on sentenc-
ing practice, it is imperative that the various disposals are placed on a single scale.
This is so all disposals can be considered “simultaneously, and in a meaningful way”
(Sebba, 1978, p. 249). Consequently, a third way of measuring sentence severity does
just that. It involves constructing a single scale to allow all sentences to be incor-
porated, and so the focus is not on just custody which the previous two methods
rely on but the entire spectrum of sentences meted out by the courts in England
and Wales. Generally these scales have fallen into the opinion driven approach of
measuring sentence severity due to the methods used to construct these scales.
The diagram in Figure 4.1 represents the unidimensional severity scale which is
based on the principle of proportionality, and more specifically resonates with von
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Figure 4.1: Sentence severity scale
Hirsch’s (1993) notion of ordinal proportionality. This requires that sentences are de-
termined by the seriousness of the offence, and therefore offenders that have committed
the same gravity of offence should be treated with like severity, but not necessarily the
same sentence (ibid). Sentences must however be comparable (Duff, 2001).This ties
in with parity, which I discussed in the previous chapter. Sentences must be ranked
in order of their severity based on the ranked seriousness of the corresponding offence.
Thus, as the seriousness of the offence increases (y-axis) it passes through the various
thresholds for each type of disposal, whether that is a fine, a community order or the
immediate custody threshold. The distribution of disposals are superimposed onto a
single scale of sentence severity (x-axis). The spacing on the scale then represents the
relative severity of each sentence in conjunction with the other sentences in the scale
(ibid).
Morris and Tonry (1990) refer to this type of scale as a “continuum of sanctions”,
and by arranging sentences in this way, it is possible to determine how sentences
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relate to each other and in relation to imprisonment. When sentences are ordered by
their severity, like in this example, sentences can overlap in terms of their comparative
severity. When von Hirsch (1993) refers to parity, he refers to sentences that have the
same level of onerousness and not necessarily the same sentence. When two sentences
are of comparative severity, von Hirsch (1993) refers to this as the sentences having
an equivalent penal bite. In von Hirsch et al.’s (1989) earlier paper, they address the
ways in which non-custodial sentences can be arranged on a penalty scale and how
much substitution is acceptable. The first model he discusses is the ‘No Substitution
model’, whereby sentences are arranged on a continuum but the non-custodial and
custodial sentences do not overlap. The second is the ‘Full Substitution model’ which
operates on a penalty unit basis. Therefore all sentences are given a score, which can
then be substituted with a number of non-custodial sentences which equal the same
penalty unit amount. However, von Hirsch et al. (1989) suggest this type of model is
complex and overly complicated and therefore may not be useful. The third model is
the ‘Partial Substitution model’. Here there are a number of bands and within some
of these bands it would be possible to substitute penalties of equivalent severity. This
is the most useful of the three. Therefore, I argue that different types of sentences can
be used interchangeably as long as they carry the equivalent ‘penal bite’. The idea
of interchangeability, meaning that sentences can overlap in terms of their severity
can be seen in the diagram. For example, an onerous community order can have
the same severity as a short-term custodial sentence: both penalties carry the same
severity-equivalence. I will return to this point in Section 10.3 where I examine the
implications of such a scale.
The 1960’s, 1970’s and 1980’s witnessed a large number of studies which focused on
scaling offence seriousness and sentence severity. The work by Sellin and Wolfgang in
1964 appears to have started off this trend which continued for some years. However,
since the mid-1980’s there have been very few studies which have looked at creating
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similar scales, suggesting a drop in popularity. The late 1980’s/early 1990’s saw a
brief revival in scaling research in the U.S. due to the introduction of intermediate
sanctions, defined as punishments with middle-range severity, employable for crimes
of medium and upper-medium seriousness (von Hirsch et al., 1989). However, the
methods and techniques did not change or move forward. The remainder of this
section will outline the various types of severity scales which have been created in
order to measure sentence severity.
Research conducted by Tiffany et al. (1975), used a pre-existing sentence severity
scale based on a version created by the US Administrative office for their reporting
purposes19 . Arbitrary scores were assigned to a range of 16 sentences, including sus-
pended sentences, fines and custodial sentences (for example a suspended sentence
was assigned the value of 0, a fine was assigned the value of 1, 1-6 months imprison-
ment was assigned a value of three, and imprisonment of over 120 months received a
value of 50) to create a single severity scale. The scale was then used as the dependent
variable in which to model sentencing disparity.
Similarly, Malila (2012), in looking at disparity in sentencing in Botswana, assigned
arbitrary scores to different types of punishment to represent their severity, relative
to the other punishments. Malila then identified the severity of multiple punishments
by adopting a unit scoring approach, similar to that employed in research by Schiff
(1997). I will return to Schiff’s (1997) research later in this chapter.
Studies like those conducted by Tiffany et al. (1975), and Malila (2012), have
received criticism for assigning arbitrary scores to sentences (McDavid and Stipak,
1981); (Klepper et al., 1983). Klepper et al. make the case that although these
scales are generally reasonable, questions arise as to whether “findings are simply an
artefact of an artificial scale” (1983: 58). Consequently, using a different scale could
19Tiffany et al. (1975) explain that the scale implemented by the U.S. Administrative Office was
developed by James A. McCafferty in a paper entitled ‘Weighting’, and was presented at the 96th
Congress of Correction in 1966, Baltimore, Maryland. Attempts have been made to source this paper
but they have been unsuccessful.
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give different results. There are also issues with how to interpret these scores. Without
the relevant context, the scores are not easy to interpret and are not intuitive.
In the past severity scales have also been constructed on the basis of perceived
sentence severity. Here, groups of people in society, such as members of the judiciary,
the public, students, or police officers, were asked to score sentences in respect to their
perceived severity. Often research of this kind used hypothetical offences, offenders
and cases, and asked respondents to decide on an appropriate sentence. The outcome
was a series of scores which were ranked in order of severity within a single scale.
Studies such as those conducted by Erickson and Gibbs (1979), Sebba and Nathan
(1984), Allen and Anson (1985), and Harlow et al. (1995), used a psychometric scaling
technique called magnitude estimation to create a sentence severity scale. Magnitude
estimation employs a survey method of perceived severity, where respondents are
required to rank a sample of sentences based on their perceived severity. Respondents
are presented with a list of sentences, which are randomly ordered and where one
penalty - for example a 1 year custodial sentence - is anchored, and given a value
of 100, or some such value. The respondents are then asked to assign values to the
additional sentences relative to the score of 100 (i.e. 1 year custodial sentence). The
respondents are asked not to look back at their previous scores so that each score will
be measured against the 100 score. The individual scores for each penalty are usually
then averaged to produce a final scale with various scores for each sentence.
In contrast, Harlow et al. (1995) used both line production (LP) and number es-
timation (NE) which are also types of psychometric scaling. LP involves respondents
drawing lines to replicate the severity of a series of sentences relative to one another.
NE is similar to magnitude estimation in which respondents are asked to score sen-
tences relative to the previous sentence. They acknowledge the scale values are not
interpretable on their own because the values only have meaning in comparison to
each other but the ratio of numbers corresponding to different sentences are mean-
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ingful. They give this example; 1-year probation with a scale value of 54.29 can be
considered about half as severe as a 1-year intensive supervision programme, with a
scale of 111.79. This gives the scores far more context than previous studies have
managed.
Harlow et al. (1995) admit magnitude scaling is time-consuming for both the
researcher and respondents: the actual preparation of the surveys and scale validation
once the data has been collected is also time-consuming. However, they reason that it
allows freedom in determining the adequate range of responses (Harlow et al., 1995).
In other words, respondents are not limited by having to choose from pre-chosen
categories, which is likely to restrict their perceptions of sentence severity.
Other studies have used paired comparisons to create severity scales. In this
manner, two stimuli - sentences - are compared to establish which sentence is perceived
to be more severe. In the case of Buchner’s (1979) study, she based her assessment
of sentence severity on Thurstone’s Law of Comparative Judgements using paired-
comparisons. This bases the difference in sentences on a ‘psychological continuum’
(Thurstone, 1994, p. 266) and creates a single severity scale in which all sentences are
ordered.
Unlike Buchner’s (1979) study which used hypothetical cases, Francis et al. (2001)
used real data from the courts. Although, they were modelling offence seriousness
rather than sentence severity, the same principles apply. In their study they used
data in the form of pairs of real offences sentenced at the same time for the same
offender and in doing so, this controls for the various factors which come into the
judges decision-making process. Judges then identified the offences they perceived
as being more serious within each pair. From this information a preference scale
can be constructed, which ranks offences by their seriousness (ibid). Although, this
methodology is more robust than the studies which use hypothetical cases, it still
relies on a judgement of which offence is more serious.
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There are problems associated with approaches which focus on people’s perceptions
of sentence severity. McDavid and Stipak (1981) make the point that it is highly
subjective: opinions relating to severity are likely to vary depending on those surveyed.
This is evident in the work by Sebba and Nathan (1984) who found that prisoners gave
the highest mean scores relating to the various sentences forming the severity scale,
followed by students, probation officers and then finally police officers. In contrast,
Erickson and Gibbs (1979) found police officers scored sentences more severely than
general citizens. This emphasises the subjective nature of studies which base their
scales on the perception of sentence severity. Francis et al. (2001) also criticise these
types of studies, referring to them as volatile because different societal groups have
different views. Also members of the public are more susceptible to the influence of
the media and the moral panics which they can create. This will likely affect their
perceptions and opinions of sentences (Francis et al., 2001, p. 729-730).
Francis et al. recognise the merit in “tapping into a real situation... using the
representativeness of the community whose task is to assess ‘seriousness’ ”(Francis
et al., 2001, p. 730) referring to the judiciary and the magistracy who are actually
deciding on the seriousness of the various offences and punishing offenders accord-
ingly. Although they were looking specifically at offence seriousness as opposed to
sentence severity, they recognise the benefit of using real sentencing data as opposed
to perceived or hypothetical cases which may not capture or illustrate the actual
truth.
These types of studies are also costly to perform. Francis et al. (2001) comment
that these types of studies are unwieldy because they involve expensive fieldwork in
the form of interviewing respondents, a point also echoed by McDavid and Stipak
(1981). The data to create this type of analysis is not readily available and therefore
needs to be collected, which is also time consuming and labour intensive (ibid).
Furthermore, a major drawback of most of these studies is the relatively small
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sample sizes that they use. The studies are frequently conducted with a small number
of respondents, for example 44 members of the public (Harlow et al., 1995); 51 judges
(Buchner, 1979); 81 students (Allen and Anson, 1985); 84 respondents (Sebba and
Nathan, 1984). These samples are therefore not generalisable to any one population
and the results are likely to vary were a different sample from the same population
used in the analysis.
Another type of scale that has been used is a qualitative or descriptive scale.
This can be seen as a multi-dimensional scale but where the qualitative factors are
incorporated into a single unidimensional scale. Schiff (1997) created the Criminal
Penalty Severity Scale (CPSS), and employed what he calls a ‘penalty unit approach’:
whereby each component of a sanction is said to characterise a ‘unique and essential
dimension of criminal punishment’. This model is based on the Delaware Model,
which uses a number of accountability levels to help determine the restrictiveness of
a particular sanction. Schiff’s (1997) model uses five levels relating to ‘restriction to a
prescribed space’, ‘direct supervision of compulsory activities’, ‘categorical supervision
of normal activities’, ‘resource limitations’ and ‘length of supervision’. Each penalty is
scored in reference to these five categories and each level is also assigned a subjective
weight. No score has an absolute value or cardinal meaning but is said to give a sense
of relative severity for one penalty vis-a-vis another (Schiff, 1997). The CPSS then
computes a numerical value for each individual penalty. Values are created for each
separate component of the sanction by multiplying the level of accountability by its
weight. The total score is then divided by 10 to make the numbers more manageable
to create a score for each penalty. Again, this method is computationally intensive
and does not use real sentencing data.
An alternative method that has been employed by McDavid and Stipak (1981)
is canonical correlation. Their study used real sentencing data obtained from the
Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency records for 1977. Their study
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used 2321 cases/offenders and seven categories for type of offence and seven categories
of various sentences. Canonical correlation extracts a linear combination called a
‘canonical variate’ from each set of variables (offence and sentence). The method
extracts pairs of canonical variates so that the correlation (canonical correlation)
between variates from each set of factors is maximised (ibid). The highest correlation
is the best. Scores for each category of sentence and offence are then produced.
In other words canonical correlation measures the linear relationship between two
variables (Borga, 2001). Borga (2001) explains that canonical correlation finds the
two bases in which the correlation matrix between offence and sentence is diagonal
and the correlations on the diagonal are maximised.
McDavid and Stipak (1981) point out that an advantage of this method is that
other variables can be built into the model: it is possible to account for variables
which are likely to impact on the severity of the sentence, for example the offenders
plea and previous convictions. This will increase the correlation between offence and
sentence as these additional variables are being included in the model which explains
the relationship of the data better.
The one factor that all of these methods have in common is they produce some
form of sentence severity measure. This measure then acts as a dependent variable in
which to investigate sentencing disparity. The next section will discuss the methods
that have previously been used to measure sentencing disparity.
4.4 Methods to measure sentencing disparity
Assuming that a sentence severity score can be produced, how can this score be used
to assess disparity in sentencing? In the existing literature, generally five quanti-
tative methods have been used. This section will discuss each of these methods in
turn. It will then discuss an alternative way of assessing sentencing disparity using a
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qualitative approach using simulated case studies.
4.4.1 Ordinary least squares regression
Regression analysis is a statistical tool for investigating the relationship between vari-
ables (Sykes, 1993). A number of studies, including those by Croyle (1983), Tiffany
et al. (1975) and Engen and Gainey (2000) have used regression analysis in the form of
ordinary least squares (OLS) to model disparity in sentencing. For example, sentence
length is often used as the dependent variable in a regression analysis. A number of
independent variables, such as gender and ethnicity are then fitted to the model to
assess how these variables affect sentence length. We could then use the results of
this type of analysis to predict sentences for offenders with a given set characteristics
(Tiffany et al., 1975).
This method is rather simplistic in its nature and therefore is not used in many
sentencing disparity studies. However, it is described here to document the evolution
of methodology.
4.4.2 Logistic regression
Logistic regression models the relationship between a dichotomous dependent vari-
able (e.g. the ‘in-out’ decision) and one or more explanatory variables, to estimate
the probability of an event occurring. As well as using OLS, Steffensmeier et al.
(1993) use logistic regression to model the effects of gender on the ‘in-out‘ decision
to incarcerate. This then estimates the probability of being incarcerated for males
compared to females in the sample.
Steffensmeier et al. (1993) use both OLS and logistic regression to model the effects
of gender on the ‘in-out‘ decision to incarcerate. Although the two methods produce
similar results they rely mainly on OLS to report the findings. This is because they
feel OLS is more familiar to most readers and it is more straightforward to interpret
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than logistic regression (ibid).
4.4.3 Tobit analysis
Studies that have opted to jointly model the decision to incarcerate in combination
with the length of the custodial sentence, such as Bushway and Piehl (2001) and
Albonetti (1997), have combined these two measures using tobit analysis. Albonetti
insists the same set of independent variables are thought to affect the decision to
incarcerate and the length of sentence, and therefore, models them simultaneously.
In Albonetti’s (1997) sample, 91% of offenders received a custodial sentence; it was
therefore necessary to take account of those (9%) who, as a result of not getting a
custodial sentence received a zero length. This is referred to as left-censoring because
the non-custodial sentences, with length of zero, occurs outside of the range of cus-
todial sentence length. Tobit analysis therefore allows for left-censoring to generate
unbiased results.
As mentioned previously, Wheeler et al. (1982) and Ulmer and Johnson (2004)
however chose not to combine the decision to incarcerate with sentence length. Ulmer
and Johnson (2004) state three reasons for this: firstly, their analysis indicated that
different independent variables affect the decision to incarcerate and the length of
the custodial sentence. Wheeler et al. (1982) also report this. Therefore they believe
combining the two would bias their results. Secondly, some of Ulmer and Johnson’s
hypotheses look to establish the link between prison capacity and the decision to
incarcerate. Consequently, combining the two measures would not allow them to test
this hypothesis. The third reason they give for modelling both methods separately
is that to their knowledge, tobit analysis cannot be used in the multilevel modelling
which they used to carry out their analysis. I will return to the method of multilevel
modelling later in this section.
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4.4.4 Quantile Regression Modelling
Britt (2009) criticises these statistical models just discussed, because they only es-
timate constant effects of the independent variables on the conditional mean of the
dependent variable. This assumes that the effect of the independent variable is con-
stant across all sentence length. Another method that has been identified to measure
disparity is quantile regression modelling. This method is similar to regression analy-
sis but looks at the effects of certain characteristics on sections of the sentence length
distribution. A quantile is a percentile in the distribution of a variable (Britt, 2009,
p. 348).
Consequently, quantile regression analysis in this instance looks at various quan-
tiles within sentence length to identify if and where disparity exists and to what extent.
Research conducted by Britt found that the biggest discrepancy between OLS and
quantile regression modelling in his research was the effect of being convicted through
a jury trial (compared to pleading guilty). Britt reports that the OLS result showed
sentence length to be almost 16 months longer than those who plead guilty. Using
quantile regression analysis, the results ranged from about 1 month (at the 0.10 quan-
tile) to more than 31 months (at the 0.9 quantile). Concluding that quantile regression
modelling is far more accurate than traditional regression analysis. Additionally, like
the tobit model, quantile regression analysis allows for left-censoring of the dependent
variable to ensure unbiased estimates.
4.4.5 Multilevel modelling
The most common method used in the study of sentencing disparity is multilevel
modelling. Studies, such as those conducted by Weidner et al. (2005), Ulmer and
Johnson (2004), Johnson (2006) and Pina-Sa´nchez and Linacre (2013), have employed
this method. Once more these studies have used either the decision to incarcerate or
sentence length as the dependent variable, and a number of independent variables,
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such as gender, and race, to assess where disparity occurs.
Multilevel models are a type of regression model, used to analyse data with a
hierarchical or nested structure (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992), such as individual
offenders nested in courts (Pina-Sa´nchez and Linacre, 2013) or individual offenders
nested in courts, nested within counties (Johnson, 2006). They differ from regression
models in that the equations defining the multilevel models contain more than one
error term (one for each level)(Luke, 2004). Independent variables can then be added
to the model, corresponding to the relevant level. For example, in the study by
Johnson (2006) age of the offender is an individual characteristic (level 1), size of the
court is court level characteristic (level 2) and population demographic is a county
level characteristic (level 3).
This method has numerous advantages over traditional analytical strategies such
as ordinary least squares (OLS). Weidner et al. (2005) explain that unlike single-level
regression models, multilevel models can account for the lack of independence across
levels of nested data. Where data are nested, there are likely to be dependencies
between individual responses, and therefore not taking this into account can lead
to biased parameter estimates. Single-level multivariate techniques are also likely to
underestimate standard errors and in doing so exaggerate the significance of parameter
estimates (ibid).
Secondly, multilevel modelling allows one to partition the variance for each level in
the model, for example, individual and county levels, which will allow the researcher to
assess the degree of variation amongst these levels individually (Ulmer and Johnson,
2004). The researcher can then assess the variation that exists when explanatory
variables are added to the model and how these help to explain sentencing disparity
(ibid).
Another advantage of using a multilevel model is that it does not assume the
impact of explanatory variables is the same across all counties (Weidner et al., 2005).
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By using a random slope model as opposed to a random intercept model, it may
reveal that certain individual explanatory variables, such as race, do not have the
same impact across all counties. Weidner et al. (2005) explain that multilevel models
are far more accurate at estimating model parameters.
4.4.6 Simulated case studies
Simulated case studies are a qualitative approach used to assess sentencing disparity.
This approach focuses on groups of judges to identify if their opinions vary in terms
of the types and severity of sentences they impose. In this approach, judges are
given a number of identical case studies with hypothetical information relating to a
number of offences, the circumstances surrounding these offences and information on
the suspects/offenders. In some instances, judges are asked to indicate whether they
find the suspect(s) in each of the cases guilty, such as in the study by Austin and
Williams (1977). Judges are then asked to impose a sentence for each offender. Palys
and Divorski (1986) argue that this approach has the ability to hold cases constant and
obtain multiple judgements on identical cases. In doing so, any sentencing disparity
will be apparent. However, they also acknowledge that these are not ‘real’ cases with
‘real’ consequences, and therefore we must be cautious about the external validity of
the results (Palys and Divorski, 1986).
Studies that have used this method have found there to be disparity in the verdict
(for example, Austin and Williams (1977)), choice of disposal (for example, Austin
and Williams (1977); Palys and Divorski (1986); Maguire (2010)) and magnitude of
the penalty (ibid). The type of offence tends to be related to the degree of disparity
(Austin and Williams, 1977): judges were more likely to be consistent on the type of
disposal where the offence was more serious, and less likely to agree for less serious
offences (Maguire, 2010). Although, even where there was agreement on the type of
disposal, there was disparity in the magnitude of the sentences, such as the amount
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of the fine or length of the community sentence (ibid).
Although these studies identify sentencing disparity, they tend to rely on small
sample sizes and may not reflect the population of judges. For example, 15 judges
were included in Irish study by Maguire (2010), and 47 judges were included in US
study by Austin and Williams (1977). Although, the Canadian study by Palys and
Divorski (1986) had a much bigger sample (n ≈ 200). However, these studies are all
based on hypothetical sentencing vignettes, and this may not be a true representation
of what happens in real life situations. Furthermore, this method makes it hard to
detect systematic disparity associated with the personal characteristics of the offender,
which may influence sentencing decisions.
4.5 Concluding remarks
In summary, sentence severity can be thought of as a unidimensional concept that can
be modelled on the existing sentencing framework of England and Wales. Research in
this area has very much been conducted within two distinct spheres. The data driven
sphere, uses real sentencing data and the ‘in-out’ decision to incarcerate, or custodial
sentence length. On the other hand, research conducted in the opinion/perception
sphere, has tended to use hypothetical cases, where certain groups within society are
asked to rate their perceived severity of certain sentences. The outcome of this is
a severity scale where sentences are ranked by their perceived severity. All of these
methods create an output of sentence severity that can be modelled as a dependent
variable in which to then assess sentencing disparity. Again there are a number of
possible ways of doing this, such as; regression analysis, tobit regression analysis,
quantile regression analysis and multilevel modelling. Alternatively there are also
more qualitative method using simulated case studies. However, these have very
small sample sizes and are based on hypothetical sentencing vignettes.
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Conducting a thorough review of the existing methodological literature in this
area has lead me to develop an alternative method to measure sentence severity and
assess sentencing disparity. This research will bridge the gap between the methods
used within the spheres. In doing so, it will use real sentencing data relating to of-
fences and sentences. I will use a method that has not been previously used in this
type of research, called Goodman Row Column Association analysis. The method
will be developed and extended in this thesis to allow for legal covariates which affect
sentencing decisions. The estimates produced from this method will then be used
to build a scale measuring sentence severity. In subsequent chapters this unidimen-
sional scale will then be used as the dependent variable in a multilevel model with
levels at the offence level (level 1) and the offender level (level 2). A number of in-
dependent/explanatory variables will then be added to this model to identify which
covariates impact on and lead to disparity in sentencing. This will lead to a far more
technically robust investigation of sentencing disparity than has been conducted to
date.
The following chapter will discuss the data and sample used to carry out this
research before going on to discuss the methods involved in the process.
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Chapter 5
Data and preliminary analysis
5.1 Introduction
The crux of this doctoral research is to investigate disparity in sentencing. However,
this requires developing a better measure of sentence severity than has previously been
used. The first part of this research therefore sets out to construct a scale of sentence
severity; this uses real sentencing data and includes a wide variety of offences and
sentences. In doing so, this facilitates the second part of the research which allows
the assessment of disparity by using this new measure.
This chapter will firstly discuss the sources of data used in this research and will
go on to describe the sample. The final part of the chapter will see the data being
arranged into a two-way contingency table which provides the conceptual basis for
developing the scale. The two-way contingency table forms the basis for conducting
a new and innovative statistical analysis which will be discussed in Chapter 6.
5.2 Sources of data
The research uses data derived from the Offender Assessment System (OASys) merged
with data from the Police National Computer (PNC). Applications for data were
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made to the OASys Data Evaluation and Assessment Team (O-DEAT) and the PNC
Information Access Panel (PIAP) within the Justice Statistics Analytical Services
Unit (JSAS) of the Ministry of Justice.
The OASys data is the major dataset used in this research. A sample of the
data in the form of pre-sentence reports (as described in section 2.5.1) was collated
and later matched with PNC data by O-DEAT following sentencing, specifically for
this research. OASys data provides information on the offence, socio-demographic
characteristics of the offender, needs of the offender, and their predicted risk of future
offending. The PNC data then provides details of the offence, such as: the Home
Office (HO) offence code, HO disposal code, duration or amount of disposal, plea,
and the previous conviction history of the offender.
5.2.1 Offender Assessment System
The Offender Assessment System was jointly developed and piloted by the Prison
Service and Probation Service between 1999 and 2001 (Holden, 2007). A paper-based
system was initially used prior to an electronic version becoming available, and by
2003 the Prison Service and Probation Service had both developed their own electronic
versions due to different IT structures (ibid). It was not until early 2006 that the
systems were amalgamated to allow the exchange of OASys assessments (Howard,
2011). Around the same time the National Probation Directorate issued a new court
report framework which standardised the provision of pre-sentence reports and with
the implementation of OASys, it was then possible to produce a standard delivery
report from the OASys assessment (Holden, 2007).
As discussed briefly in section 2.4, the Offender Assessment System is a tool used
to assess the risk and needs of offenders. It is used by the Probation Service generally
at the pre-sentence stage - in the form of pre-sentence reports. As well as at the start
of most community and custodial sentences, and at regular intervals throughout the
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offender’s sentence (Howard, 2006). The OASys assessment is generally reserved for
offenders that have committed relatively serious offences and are therefore likely to
receive a community or custodial sentence.
There are five main parts to the Offender Assessment System;
• Risk of reconviction and offending-related factors
• Risk of serious harm, risks to individuals, and other risks
• OASys summary sheet
• Supervision and sentence planning
• Self-assessment
The first part consists of 12 sections, which includes information on the offender
and analysis of the offence, the factors associated with risk, as well as information
relating to the health and other considerations such as the suitability of electronic
monitoring. These sections are illustrated in the diagram shown in Figure 5.1. The
arrows pointing to the offender at the centre of the diagram represents the fact that
these factors are said to contribute to the offender’s potential future behaviour which
are assessed by the actuarial risk assessment.
The second part of OASys looks at the risk of serious harm, risks to the individual
and risks to others. This section covers significant events and behaviours, which are
also likely to impact on future risk. It also assesses the offender’s mental state, i.e.
their vulnerability or whether they are coping. It also assess if there are other groups
that may be at risk of their offending, for example children.
The summary sheet draws together key information from the assessment and in-
cludes a scoring schedule to allow the scores to be tallied. The OASys General reof-
fending Predictor (OGP) score is out of 100 and estimates the likelihood of the offender
reoffending: a higher score indicates they are more likely to reoffend. The supervision
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Figure 5.1: OASys risk factors
and sentence planning section includes pre-sentence report plans and review plans.
The self-assessment aspect of OASys summarises the attitudes and behaviours that
the offender needs to work on and consequently improve throughout their sentence.
There is also a confidential section which is not disclosed to the offender.
Missing data
There is a substantial amount of missing data in this sample. Although this does not
cause problems for the initial part of this research - constructing the severity scale
- it does impact later on in the analysis. As a result, not all the factors shown in
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Figure 5.1 can be included in the analysis aimed at identifying sentencing disparity.
Furthermore, to allow for a complete case analysis, additional cases had to be removed
from the sample. I will go on to say more about this in Chapter 9.
5.2.2 Police National Computer
The Police National Computer (PNC) was introduced in 1974 and was initially used
as a database for stolen vehicles. Since then it has grown in size and usage, housing
several separate databases as well as links to many others. The PNC is an electronic
database containing information on arrests, court summons and court disposals for
each offender in England and Wales, as well as Scotland. The police authority initially
records the data, which is then updated with information from the courts following
sentencing via Crest and Libra; the court systems of the Crown and magistrates’ court
respectively.
The operational database also records information on local intelligence, co-defendants,
known associates, previous addresses, as well as offender’s distinguishing scars, marks
and descriptions. This includes links to fingerprints and DNA. In general this extra
intelligence information is not available to researchers. Additionally, the PNC does
not hold information on the social characteristics and circumstances of the offender.
Therefore this additional data had to be sought from another source i.e. the Offender
Assessment System.
Data quality issues in the PNC
Following sentencing, information from the court systems (Crest and Libra) is up-
loaded to the PNC. Within the PNC database, up to four sentence disposals for each
offence can be recorded, with each disposal consisting of four fields: type of disposal,
duration of the disposal, amount of the disposal (fines) and the Home Office disposal
code. Custodial sentences and fines appear relatively straight-forward to record. How-
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ever, the complex nature of some of the relatively new sentences make these difficult
to accurately record in the existing PNC database categories.
The complexity of new disposals such as the community order, make recording
them in the PNC very difficult. A community order can have a number of requirements
attached to this disposal; these requirements dictate the severity of the sentence. To
use an example to demonstrate; an unpaid work requirement can vary from 40-80
hours within the low range; 80-150 for medium range; and 150-300 hours in the high
range category under the guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines Counci, 2004). Ideally
the PNC would record all of this information, as well as the length of the full order.
However, there is currently no way of doing this. Therefore, we only know the length
of the overall order.
There are also instances from the data, which suggest offenders are receiving mul-
tiple community orders and suspended sentence orders. We know this is not the case
because they can only receive one community order or suspended sentence. It is the
combination of requirements that reflect the severity of that sentence. It is not clear
why community orders and suspended sentence orders have been recorded in this way.
It could be interpreted that each subsequent community order or suspended sentence
order that is recorded is actually referring to the number of requirements attached to
the order but this is merely speculation.
Furthermore, in recording a suspended sentence order, the PNC would ideally
record the length of the custodial sentence and the length of the suspension period.
However, this is not the case. Only after conducting exploratory analysis on the data
did it become clear that the PNC only records the length of the custodial sentence
and not the length of the suspension period.
The PNC does not record information relating to the conditions placed on offend-
ers’ that are given a conditional discharge. Again, only the length of the conditional
discharge is recorded in the PNC.
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Finally, it is not possible to differentiate between consecutive and concurrent cus-
todial sentences in instances where offenders are being sentenced for multiple offences.
My understanding is that magistrates courts cannot grant consecutive custodial sen-
tences but this does not correspond with the data. This suggests either that, mag-
istrates are giving consecutive custodial sentences or that the Home Office disposal
codes are being recorded inaccurately by the PNC operatives. The latter explana-
tion would seem more likely considering the other problems identified with recording
sentences in the PNC.
As a result of all these issues, the decision was taken to use only the first disposal
recorded in the PNC; based on the assumption that the first disposal is the most
severe sentence and likely to be the most accurate.
5.3 The dataset
The original dataset was provided in IBM SPSS for Windows Version 19.0, which was
then stored on an external hard drive and held in a secure office. All the cleaning
of the data and data manipulation was carried out in SPSS before it was imported
into R for data analysis. The following section will discuss the steps taken before any
analysis for this research could be undertaken.
5.3.1 Data manipulation
The original dataset contained information relating to 39,520 offenders and 83,423
offences. The data was in a long format: each line in the dataset related to one
offence. In total there was 527 variables, and very few of these variables had data
labels. Some of the variable names were self-explanatory and therefore did not require
additional data labels, for example psrcase related to the pre-sentence report case.
Other variable names, such as S1Q3 was less clear initially and would have benefited
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from having a data label. However, it was possible to match these variables up with a
paper copy of the OASys assessment questionnaire. Additionally, these variables also
required value labels which were again obtained from the OASys questionnaire and
entered manually into the SPSS dataset.
A substantial amount of time was spent cleaning the data due to the different ways
in which certain variables were manually entered into the OASys system. For example,
the type of court the offender was sentenced in was recorded, in most instances, as
CRN for Crown Court and MAG for magistrates’ court. However, there were a
number of variations of this, such as crn, Crn, CRO, and mag which therefore required
recoding.
In the original dataset the type of offence and the length of the sentence were in two
separate categories. These two categories had to be manipulated into one category,
for example an Immediate custody sentence of 3 months 6 months. As explained in
Section 5.2.2, for community orders, suspended sentences and conditional discharges,
the requirements were not recorded and therefore these sentences were also categorised
by sentence length.
Research conducted in the data driven sphere will, as a rule, only include the
principal offence in subsequent analysis. This will inevitably create an inaccurate
depiction of sentencing in practice. To avoid this, and to create a more realistic
picture of current sentencing practice, all offences are included in this research. Data
was aggregated by the pre-sentence report case number to identify the number of
offences the offender was being sentenced for. In this sample 12,753 offenders (52%)
were sentenced for only one offence, 24% were sentenced for two offences, and the
remaining 24% were sentenced for three or more offences. The average number of
offences that offenders are sentenced for is 2.19 (SD=2.47). To take into account the
cases where the offender was sentenced for multiple offences, an additional variable
was created Numoff. This variable was dichotomised: those sentenced for two or less
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offences in the first category and those sentence for three or more offences in a second
category. It is then possible to investigate the principle of totality.
There is one slight caveat that needs to be mentioned, which concerns custodial
sentences in the data: where an offender is sentenced for multiple custodial sentences
there is no indication of whether that sentence ran concurrently or consecutively. The
new sentencing guidelines which came into operation after this data was collected
explain that concurrent sentences may be longer for multiple offences than for single
offences to reflect the overall seriousness of the combined offences. On the other hand,
sentences that are run consecutively may then be shorter where there are multiple
offences, so that the overall time the offender spends in prison is proportionate to the
seriousness of the combined offences. This said, we would still expect to see offenders
that are being sentenced for multiple offences sentenced more severely than an offender
sentenced for a single offence, once the legal characteristics of the offence are taken
into consideration.
For any single offence an offender can receive a combination of disposals. For
example, an offender can receive a community order with a number of requirements,
a fine, and a compensation order. The most severe disposal would usually be recorded
as the first disposal. In this example, the community order is the most severe of the
three but all three disposals add to the overall severity of the sentence. Every offence
will have at least one disposal as a proportion of the 49,590 offences, 60% of the
sample received at least two disposals, 42% received at least three disposals and 24%
received four disposals. However, the decision was made to only use the first disposal
due to problems with the way disposals are recorded in the PNC which has already
been discussed in Section 5.2.2.
An additional variable was also created at this stage which indicated whether
the offender had previously appeared in court because the dataset did not contain
information relating to the offender’s conviction history. Information on whether the
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offender had previously appeared before the court was included and therefore this
was used as an indicator of prior offending. Prior therefore became a dichotomised
variable indicating whether the offender had a prior court appearance to be used in
the subsequent analysis.
Offenders excluded from the sample
As explained in 5.2.2, data quality issues relating to the way offences are recorded in
the PNC meant that information relating to 4,448 offenders also had to be removed
from the sample. An additional 4,355 offenders were also excluded from the sample
where the offence plea was missing.
Following the discussion in section 2.7.1, cases resulting in an absolute discharge
were also removed from the sample for two reasons: a conviction resulting in an abso-
lute discharge does not count as a conviction for most future purposes, and secondly
there were very few cases which resulted in this type of disposal (N=45 offenders).
Under the age of 21, offenders are treated differently within the Criminal Justice
System in England and Wales. The decision was taken to only include adult offenders
in this research and so all offenders under the age of 21 were removed from the sample
(N=6134 offenders).
The final sample size for the first analysis therefore comprised of 24,538 offenders
and 49,590 offences.
5.3.2 Demographics of the sample
This section will document the socio-demographics of the offenders in the sample
(Table 8.1 also displays these characteristics).
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Sex
The majority (88%) of offenders in the sample are male with only 12% being female.
There are slightly more male offenders in this sample compared to figures reported
in the sentencing statistics for England and Wales 2009 (Ministry of Justice, 2010),
where only 77% of the sample are male. The higher number of males in this sample
is likely to reflect the more serious nature of offences recorded in OASys data. As
noted earlier, Cavadino and Dignan (2007) and Schwartz and Steffensmeier (2007)
have suggested that women tend to play subsidiary roles in offences which implies
that they are convicted of less serious crimes.
Age
Figure 5.2 shows the range and frequency of ages in the adult sample. The age range
of the sample is 21 to 90, where each bar refers to one year of age. The average age of
the sample is 34.9 years (SD = 11.29). The sample peaks at 21 and gradually declines
with age with a few small unexplained spikes. It is unclear why there is such a strong
peak at age 21. Official statistics break age down into age groups; 10-17, 18-20 and
21 and over: there is no information on the individual age years of the offender. It
is therefore not possible to compare the age demographics of this sample with the
general offending population.
Prior court appearances
This variable relates to the offender’s prior court appearances which acts as an in-
dicator variable for their offending history. Just under 5,500 offenders in the sample
(22%) had previously not appeared in court, and therefore were first time defendants.
The other 78% of the sample had previously appeared in court.
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Figure 5.2: Age of offenders in sample (N=24,538)
Number of offences
This variable records the aggregate number of offences for each offender in the sample,
which will allow the principle of totality to be explored. Approximately 76% of the
sample were sentenced for one or two offences, the remaining 24% were sentenced for
three or more offences.
Court type
58% of the sample (14,178 offenders) were eventually sentenced at the magistrates’
court, compared with 42% who were sentenced at the Crown court. This is very
different from the figures reported by the Ministry of Justice (2010). The Ministry
of Justice report that in 2009 the majority (93%) of offences were sentenced at the
118
magistrates’ court and the remaining 7% were sentenced at the Crown Court (Ministry
of Justice, 2010). This discrepancy is likely due to using OASys data. OASys data
is collected by the Probation Service in the form of pre-sentence reports and these
are only prepared where offences are more serious in nature passing the community
penalty threshold. The offences within this sample are more serious in nature than
those in the general population.
Plea
Offenders mostly plead guilty to their offences - 84% and 7% plead not guilty. The plea
for the remaining 9% of the sample was unknown. The Crown Prosecution Service
(2012) report that in 2009-10 68% of cases at the magistrates’ court gave a guilty
plea, and 74% of cases at the Crown Court gave a guilty plea.
5.4 Primary variables of interest
It is the offence and sentence categories which are of interest initially, as this thesis
looks to see if it is possible to incorporate these into a single scale measuring severity.
The following sections then discuss the offence and sentence categories and how the
data can be arranged to facilitate model building.
5.4.1 Offence categories
PNC Home Office offence codes were grouped into major offence codes, reducing the
number of categories of offences in the sample from 477 to 99 categories. For example,
the Home Office offence code 3.01 relates to making threats to kill, code 3.03 relates
to assisting an offender by impeding his apprehension or prosecution in a case of
murder, and code 3.04 is intentionally encouraging or assisting commission of murder:
these codes are then summarised by major offence code 3.00 Threat, Conspiracy or
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Incitement to Murder.
Some major offence categories were excluded from the sample where there was very
small numbers of offenders or no offenders having committed these types of offences.
For example, no offenders in the sample were sentenced for major offence code 6 -
endangering railway passengers - or major offence code 7 - endangering life at sea.
As can be seen from Table 5.1, offences such as malicious wounding, obscene pub-
lications, misuse of drugs, common and other types of assault, fraud and shoplifting
occur more than any other types of offences. Offences such as murder, frauds by
agents, trustees, company directors etc., and health and safety at work are much less
common.
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Table 5.1: Offences in the sample
Major offence code Type of offence Frequency Percent
1.00 Murder 5 < 0.1
2.00 Attempted murder 8 < 0.1
3.00 Threats, Conspiracy or Incitement to murder 112 0.2
4.00 Manslaughter 91 0.2
5.00 Wounding and other acts endangering life 384 0.8
8.00 Malicious wounding and other like offences 4,867 9.8
11.00 Cruelty to or neglect of children 263 0.5
13.00 Abduction of a child 18 < 0.1
16.00 Buggery or attempted buggery* 9 < 0.1
17.00 Indecent assault on a male 214 0.4
18.00 Indecency between males* 20 < 0.1
19.00 Rape of male or female 311 0.6
20.00 Indecent assault on a female 1,166 2.4
21.00 Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 13 137 0.3
Continued on next page
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Table 5.1-continued from previous page
Major offence code Type of offence Frequency Percent
22.00 Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 16 438 0.9
23.00 Incest with girl under 13 years old 115 0.2
24.00 Procuration of males and females 20 < 0.1
28.00 Burglary in a dwelling 1,175 2.4
29.00 Aggravated burglary in a dwelling (including attempts) 39 0.1
30.00 Burglary other than a dwelling 608 1.2
33.00 Going equipped for stealing 120 0.2
34.00 Robbery and assaults with intent to rob 709 1.4
35.00 Blackmail 36 0.1
36.00 Kidnapping 109 0.2
37.00 Aggravated taking of a vehicle 98 0.2
38.00 Concealing 319 0.6
39.00 Stealing from another person 315 0.6
40.00 Stealing in a dwelling other than from automatic machines and meters 112 0.1
41.00 Stealing by an employee 464 0.9
Continued on next page
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Table 5.1-continued from previous page
Major offence code Type of offence Frequency Percent
42.00 Unlawfully taking away or opening a mail bag 28 0.1
43.00 Abstracting electricity 46 0.1
44.00 Stealing pedal cycles 29 0.1
45.00 Stealing from vehicles 305 0.6
46.00 Stealing from shops and stalls (shoplifting) 2,581 5.2
47.00 Stealing from automatic machines 30 0.1
48.00 Theft of motor vehicle 93 0.2
49.00 Other stealing and unauthorised takings 930 1.9
51.00 Frauds by agents, trustees, company directors etc. 8 < 0.1
52.00 False accounting 101 0.2
53.00 Other frauds 2,903 5.9
54.00 Receiving/handling stolen goods 562 1.1
55.00 Bankruptcy 36 0.1
56.00 Arson 153 0.3
57.00 Other criminal damage endangering life 10 < 0.1
Continued on next page
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Table 5.1-continued from previous page
Major offence code Type of offence Frequency Percent
58.00 Other criminal damage 384 0.8
59.00 Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage 58 0.1
60.00 Forgery of prescription 10 < 0.1
61.00 Other Forgery 447 0.9
65.00 Public Order Act 1986 Sec 2 Violent Disorder 45 0.1
66.00 Other offences (against the State and Public Order) 1,413 2.8
67.00 Perjury 16 < 0.1
69.00 Intending to facilitate prison escape 12 < 0.1
71.00 Child prostitution 11 < 0.1
73.00 Abuse of trust - Sexual offences 31 0.1
74.00 Gross indecency with a child 217 0.4
78.00 Immigration Act including people trafficking 30 0.1
79.00 Attempting to pervert the course of justice 256 0.5
80.00 Absconding from lawful custody 20 < 0.1
81.00 Firearms offences 315 0.6
Continued on next page
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Table 5.1-continued from previous page
Major offence code Type of offence Frequency Percent
82.00 Offences against laws relating to Customs, Excise and Inland Revenue 34 0.1
83.00 Bail offences 1,419 2.9
84.00 Trade Descriptions and similar offences 256 0.5
85.00 Health and Safety at work 6 < 0.1
86.00 Obscene publications 4,274 8.6
88.00 Sexual Offences Act 2003 including grooming and other sexual acts 263 0.5
92.00 Misuse of Drugs Act 4,357 8.8
93.00 Permitting premises to be uses for unlawful (drug-related) purposes 70 0.1
99.00 Other indictable offences 121 0.2
104.00 Assault on a constable 1,183 2.4
105.00 Common and other types of assault 6,416 12.9
108.00 Cruelty to animals, ill treatment, neglect etc. 170 0.3
111.00 Offences in relation to dogs Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 10 < 0.1
112.00 Preventing child from receiving information 36 0.1
115.00 Firearms Act 1968 30 0.1
Continued on next page
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Table 5.1-continued from previous page
Major offence code Type of offence Frequency Percent
125.00 Offences against Public Order 976 2.00
126.00 Interference with a motor vehicle 72 0.1
130.00 Stealing and unauthorised takings 174 0.4
131.00 Aggravated vehicle taking 98 0.2
141.00 Drunk and disorderly 103 0.2
143.00 Licensing Act offences 5 < 0.1
149.00 Criminal Damage 1,899 3.8
151.00 Benefit offences 195 0.4
162.00 Offences relating to Police regulations 5 < 0.1
164.00 Public health - By-laws 7 < 0.1
169.00 Transport offences 7 < 0.1
185.00 Picklock related offences 10 < 0.1
193.00 Misuse of drug related offences 77 0.2
195.00 Other offences excluding motoring offences 755 1.5
196.00 Improper use of public electronic communications network 127 0.3
Continued on next page
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Table 5.1-continued from previous page
Major offence code Type of offence Frequency Percent
802.00 Dangerous Driving 431 0.9
803.00 Driving or attempting to drive after consuming alcohol or drugs 1,131 2.3
804.00 Careless driving 44 0.1
805.00 Accident offence 124 0.3
807.00 Driving licence offences 925 1.9
809.00 Vehicle insurance offences 365 0.7
813.00 Vehicle Test Offences 9 < 0.1
814.00 Fraud, Forgery associated with vehicle or driving records 10 < 0.1
816.00 Speed limit offences 8 < 0.1
818.00 Road traffic offence, neglect, directions etc. 19 < 0.1
Total 49,590 100.00
*These offences have now been re-classified as male rape
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5.4.2 Sentence Categories
This research uses only the primary disposal. There are six different types of disposal,
which are displayed in Table 5.2, along with the number of cases and percentage of
the sample receiving each type of disposal.
Table 5.2: Disposals in the sample
Type of disposal Frequency Percent
Immediate custody 19,844 40.0
Suspended sentence 10,252 20.7
Community order 15,059 30.4
Conditional discharge 938 1.9
Fine 1,133 2.3
Other 2,364 4.8
Total 49,590 100.00
Sentencing statistics produced by the Ministry of Justice (2010) in 2009 reported
that only 7% of offences resulted in immediate custody, 3% were suspended sentences,
14% were community sentences, 67% were fines and 8% were ‘other’ sentences. As
can be seen from Table 5.2, these figures are very different to those reported by the
MOJ and is the result of using data obtained from pre-sentence reports for reasons
explained previously in Section 5.3.1. Therefore the sentences used in this research
are slightly more severe in nature than would be observed in the general offending
population. That being said, the data does still include non-custodial sentences which
have previously been omitted from any empirical research in this area.
From the six disposal categories, sentences were then arranged into 35 distinct
categories, by choosing sensible cut points based on the frequencies in each category.
Table 5.3 displays the sentence categories in the sample.
Offences resulting in a custodial sentence of less than one week are generally for
offences relating to breaching bail conditions and shoplifting. Fines are generally
given for offences such as being drunk and disorderly, drug offences and public order
offences. Other sentences will generally include compensation orders and confiscation
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Table 5.3: Sentences in the sample
Disposal Sentence Frequency Percent
Immediate custody
≤ 1 week 230 0.5
> 1 week ≤ 2 weeks 313 0.6
> 2 week ≤ 1 month 1,242 2.5
> 1 month ≤ 2 months 1,361 2.7
> 2 months ≤ 3 months 1,578 3.2
> 3 months ≤ 4 months 1,387 2.8
> 4 months ≤ 6 months 1,889 3.8
> 6 months ≤ 9 months 1,490 3.0
> 9 months ≤ 12 months 2,088 4.2
> 12 months ≤ 18 months 2,137 4.3
> 18 months ≤ 24 months 1,854 3.7
> 2 years ≤ 3 years 1,800 3.6
> 3 years ≤ 4 years 1,089 2.2
> 4 years ≤ 5 years 530 1.1
> 5 years ≤ 6 years 318 0.6
> 6 years ≤ 7 years 153 0.3
> 7 years ≤ 8 years 133 0.3
> 8 years ≤ 10 years 86 0.2
> 10 years including life 166 0.3
Suspended sentence
≤ 1 month 788 1.6
> 1 month ≤ 2 months 1,121 2.3
> 2 months ≤ 3 months 1,602 3.2
> 3 months ≤ 4 months 1,625 3.3
> 4 months ≤ 5 months 469 0.9
> 5 months ≤ 6 months 897 1.8
> 6 months ≤ 9 months 1,913 3.9
> 9 months ≤ 12 months 1,837 3.7
Community order
≤ 12 months 12,286 24.8
> 12 months ≤ 2 years 1,665 3.4
> 2 years ≤ 3 years 1,108 2.2
Fine Fine 1,133 2.3
Conditional discharge
≤ 12 months 608 1.2
> 12 months ≤ 2 years 286 0.6
> 2 years ≤ 3 years 44 0.1
Other Other 2,364 4.8
Total 49,590 100.00
orders, and these are usually given for offences such as common assault and motor
vehicle offences.
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5.5 Concluding remarks
The data for this research comes from OASys data which is then merged with PNC
data following sentencing at the Crown or magistrates’ court. Due to the nature of
OASys data, this sample contains more serious offences/severe sentences than might
be expected. However, this is no different to the data used by Pina-Sa´nchez and
Linacre (2013) for example, who use Crown Court survey data.
Unlike the other studies that have used real sentencing data, this research does
not use only the principle offence. Instead this research includes all offences and their
corresponding sentences to more accurately depict sentencing practice. It is in-fact
these two variables which are of initial interest and it is the offences and sentences
which will be used to create the severity scale. The following chapter will explain the
methodology employed to create this scale.
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Chapter 6
Measuring sentence severity using
log-linear models
6.1 Introduction
The way in which sentence severity is measured is of particular importance, as the
way in which this is done may affect the findings (Sweeten, 2012). The first aim of
this empirical work is to create a scale measuring sentence severity which includes
the full spectrum of sentences meted out by the courts in England and Wales. As
discussed in Chapter 4, there are a variety of methods that have been utilised in the
past to create the measure of severity, each with their own merits and shortcomings.
Fundamentally, these past measures introduce bias into the sample, and therefore a
new, more robust and accurate measure is required.
This work bridges the two approaches of measuring severity: it uses real sentencing
data, as opposed to using hypothetical scenarios, and constructs a scale using statis-
tical modelling rather than psychometric scaling. The scale will then have two uses.
Firstly, by producing a scale which incorporates both custodial and non-custodial
sentences, this will enable use to identify sentences which are of equivalent severity.
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The second aim is then to use this scale as the dependent variable within a multilevel
model, and a number of legal and extra-legal characteristics will be tested to examine
their effects on sentence severity to access disparity in sentencing.
In this chapter the aim is to use a statistical modelling approach to model the
offence by sentence categories in a two-way contingency table. I start by considering
the Goodman RC association model, which has been used by many authors in which
to build scores for the levels of the categorical variables making up a two-way table
(e.g. Clogg, 1982). This model provides a set of scores for the row variable (which
we will take to be ‘offence’) and the column variable (taken to be ‘sentence’). Such
scores are estimated by modelling the association between the offence and sentence
categories. I will explain the steps which lead to the Goodman RC model by first
describing two simpler models - the independence model and the saturated model.
I then discuss how it is possible to extend this model to take account of a number
of legal variables which we know impact on the sentences which offenders receive.
Controlling for the effects of these legal variables will provide better estimates of the
sentence severity score.
6.2 Contingency tables
A two-way contingency table is a statistical tool for summarising and displaying results
for categorical variables, where each variable corresponds to one dimension of the
table. I can thus organise the offence and sentence data into a O by S contingency
table, where the offences are the rows and sentences are the columns. There are
O = 99 offence categories (rows) and S = 35 sentence categories (columns), resulting
in a 99× 35 table with 3465 cells.
This part of the research seeks to model the association between offences and
sentences to create a scale which measures sentence severity. Firstly, I need to establish
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this association statistically. Of course, in this application, we would expect a strong
association between the offence and sentence variables
6.2.1 The classical test for independence: the Pearson Chi-
squared test
If the offence and sentence categories are independent they are mutually exclusive,
and therefore, there is no association. I can test this by conducting a Pearson’s Chi-
Square test. This test is well-known and is described in many introductory statistical
textbooks (e.g. Fielding and Gilbert, 2006, p. 270). Testing the null hypothesis of
no association gives a value of X2 of 82408.59 - this is compared to a chi-squared
distribution with (O − 1) × (S − 1), or 3332 degrees of freedom. This is highly
significant with a p-value of p<0.0001, suggesting that there is strong association
between offence and sentence categories as would be expected.
6.3 Log-linear models
An alternative method of testing for independence is to take a log-linear modelling
approach. Let Cos be the observed cells of the contingency table. I assume that the
cell counts are Poisson distributed with means µos
Cos ∼ Poisson(µos)
Then the log-linear model of independence can be written as
log(µos) = θ + αo + βs
For identifiability, it is usual to define α1 = β1 = 0, setting the first level of each
variable to be the reference category. An equivalent way of writing the model is to
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reparameterise by removing the θ parameter,
log(µos) = αo + βs
where the α parameters have absorbed the θ parameter.
The deviance, (or minus twice the log-likelihood ratio of the model compared to
the saturated model) of this model has a chi-squared distribution with (O−1)×(S−1)
degrees of freedom if there no evidence of association in the table. When applying
this model to the data, I obtain a deviance of 50,360.41 on 3332 degrees of freedom,
which is again highly significant (p<0.0001)
A second model is the saturated model. This models the association between the
row and column variables by adding in a set of interaction parameters, one for each
cell. This model totally reproduces the observed cell counts and has a deviance of 0
on 0 degrees of freedom.
log(µos) = αo + βs + γos
The Goodman model and other association models aim to find a model which
explains the interaction structure between offence and sentence with a relatively small
number of parameters - a model between the independence model and the saturated
model.
6.3.1 Linear by linear and score association models
The simplest way of modelling an association in a two way table is to give each row
and column a fixed score. For example, if we knew a seriousness score for offences,
and a severity score for sentences, then these scores could be used directly in the
model. If these scores are called scoreo and scores then the product of these scores
can be formed, and make an additional explanatory variable in the model. The score
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association model is then:
log(µos) = αo + βs + λ.scores × scoreo
A special form of this model is the linear by linear score association model, where
the scores for the offences are simply the number 1, 2, . . . , O for each row, and scores
for the sentences are similarly 1, 2, . . . , S for each column. This model really assumes
that the categories are in some natural order, and that therefore it makes sense to
assign a rank order, For example, this model might be considered if the columns were
categories of a likert response and the rows of the table were social class categories.
However, of course, we do not know either a seriousness score for offences or a
severity score for sentences, and therefore these need to be estimated from the model.
I replace scoreo and scores by γo and δs with the Greek letter notation indicating that
the scores now need to be estimated from the model. This motivates the Goodman
RC association model.
6.4 Goodman RC association model
The simplest form of the model can be written as
log(µos) = αo + βs + λγoδs
This model is known as a log-multiplicative model, and is also known as the
Goodman RC(1) model. The (1) means that there is just one multiplicative term in
the model. The λ parameter is just a scaling parameter, and can be absorbed into
either the γo or the δs parameters. This gives the model
log(µos) = αo + βs + γoδs
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The table displayed in Table 6.1 represents a simplified contingency table with
three levels of offence seriousness - high, medium and low - and three levels of sentence
severity - high, medium and low. If the offence categories were ranked in order of
seriousness and the sentence categories were ranked by seriousness, then we would
expect to see a high number of counts in the diagonal cells. This is because, for
example, offences with high levels of seriousness would receive sentences with high
levels of severity. Similarly low level offences would receive low severity sentences
etc. I am thus interested in the association (represented by high counts) between the
offence and corresponding sentence categories which frequent the diagonal cells in the
table.
Table 6.1: Association within a contingency table
Sentence
Low Medium High
Offence
High Low counts Low counts High counts
Medium Low counts High counts Low counts
Low High counts Low counts Low counts
In section 6.3.1, I explained that we do not know either the rank order of offences
by seriousness or the order of sentences by their severity, and therefore this ruled out
using the score association model. Consequently, the Goodman RC association model
does not assume the correct ordering of categories: instead the model reveals the
ordering of the categories through estimating the two unknown parameters (Powers
and Xie, 2000) γo and δs. This requires an iterative procedure at the model building
stage and this requires starting with a random set of starting values, whereby one
set of parameters are treated as being known to update the other set of estimates
until they both stabilise. This presents us with a series of scores (ibid), which then
becomes the latent variable/sentence severity scale.
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6.5 Extending the Goodman RC association model
While the simple Goodman RC model can be used to estimate severity scores, the
estimates will not be optimal. In Chapter 2 it was explained that judges are required
to consider a number of aggravating and mitigating factors before reaching a final
decision. I therefore want to control for some of these variables when estimating the
model scores.
In Section 2.3.1 I explained the sentencing guidelines in practice as well as the
use of aggravating and mitigating factors which judges must consider when passing a
sentence. This includes a number of statutory factors such as, previous convictions,
whether the offence was committed when the offender was on bail, whether the offence
was aggravated in relation to race, religion, disability or sexual orientation of the
victim, whether the offence involved a terrorist connection, and also the plea, which
is considered a mitigating factor if the offender pleads guilty to the offence. Therefore,
within the extended Goodman RC model, I wanted to be able to control for these
statutory types of covariates.
Some of these factors were recorded in the OASys data such as the offence plea,
whereas others such as whether the offence was committed when the offender was on
bail and whether the offence was aggravated in relation to race, religion, disability or
sexual orientation of the victim were recorded but contained a lot of missing cases
which raised questions about their validity. There was no information recorded on
the previous convictions of the offenders. As a result of this, the majority of these
factors could not be used in the subsequent analysis.
Two additional variables were created for the subsequent analysis (see Section
5.3.1): the first was an indicator of prior offending and the second identified cases
where the offender was sentenced for multiple offences. The first variable used infor-
mation relating to whether the offender had previously appeared in court to indicate
prior offending which would act as a proxy for previous convictions. The second vari-
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able indicated whether the offender was sentenced for multiple offences to reflect the
totality principle. It would therefore be expected that offenders that are sentenced
for multiple offences would be sentenced more severely to reflect the their offending
behaviour and ensure the principle of proportionality was adhered to.
We can think of each offence in the table as having a distribution of sentences
over the sentence categories, but that distribution will be affected by the combination
of legal variable, such as plea, prior convictions etc. An offence which is a debut
offence for offenders will attract lower sentences compared to another offence of equal
seriousness that is committed later in a criminal career. I therefore develop the model
to include such effects. It would have been possible to include more legal variables
(aggravating and mitigating factors) in the model but this would have made the model
overly complicated.
In this research, I consider three categorised legal variables: number of offences
(≤2/>3), prior court appearance (prior/no prior) and plea (guilty/not guilty/unknown).
There are 12 possible combinations of levels of these three variables (e.g. ≤2 offences-
prior-guilty is one combination) and each combination now has its own offence by
sentence table. An example of the raw data prior to creating the table can be seen
in Appendix C and a sample of the code used to create the table and the extended
Goodman RC model can be seen in Appendix F.
Conceptually, the whole data now consists of a set of 12 separate layers of 35 by
99 tables, as illustrated in Figure 6.1 - or a three-way table of 12 x 35 x 99 with 41,580
cells in total. By creating additional cells, the data in the contingency table would be
too sparse.
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Figure 6.1: Diagram representing the Extended Goodman RC Association model
6.5.1 Existing extensions of two-way contingency table mod-
els with layers
Other authors have extended the Goodman RC association model into three dimen-
sions to model data in the form row x column x layers. Probably the best known
extension is by Xie (1992) which is known as the log-multiplicative layer effect model.
This fits a full interaction between layers and rows, and between layers and columns,
and assumes a common association between the rows and the columns of the table
for each layer, but multiplied by a different constant for each layer. Such models
have been used by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) to model social mobility tables
and how they change over time. This model is inappropriate for this work as it does
not decompose the row column interaction term into row and column scores.
A different approach was suggested by Goodman and Hout (1982), who proposed
a ‘modified regression-type approach’ for modelling the association between rows and
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columns in the presence of layers. Essentially, this approach decomposes the inter-
action into a common interaction term present for all layers, and a second common
term which is multiplied by a layer-specific constant. This method has been used
to examine how the association between job satisfaction and self-employment varies
across occupational groups. This model is again inappropriate for my purposes, as
again, there are no row and columns scores estimated in the model.
In addition, neither of these approaches allow for covariates to be placed on the
estimated association parameters. I therefore proceed to develop a new model.
6.5.2 A new model for incorporating sentence covariates into
the Goodman model
None of the previous work described above supplies a suitable form of model to allow
the sentence scores δs to be themselves modelled by legal covariates. I therefore am
proposing a new extension to the Goodman model, which is described below.
Let Cos` be the three way table of counts with Cos` ∼ Poisson(µos`)
Then I propose
log(µos`) = αo + βs + τ` + γoδs`
where
δs` = δs +
∑
p
θpXps
The δs in the standard Goodman model is replaced by δs` with the sentence scores
now additionally depending on the layer. The δs` is decomposed into δs and the
additive effects of the covariates. The Xps will represent dummy variables for plea,
prior court appearance, and number of offences and θp are a set of unknown regression
coefficients. The adjusted sentence severity scores are given by the δs which will
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now control for the legal variables. I can determine which of the legal variables are
significant by fitting a series of extended Goodman models, each with a different
subset of covariates.
However, only one scale or set of scores is actually produced. The final sentence
severity scale or set of scores correct for the effects of the legal factors. Aggravating
factors will increase the sentence severity, whereas the mitigating factors will decrease
the sentence severity. Therefore by controlling for the legal covariates (aggravating
and mitigating factors) we are able to control for the imbalance these factors have
on sentence severity. These scores are then standardised using linear interpolation
which is explained in Section 6.8. Custodial sentence days are anchored and therefore
linear interpolation standardises the non-custodial scores in relation to these days in
custody.
In the second part of this PhD research, the new scale is used as the dependent
variable in a multilevel model and the same legal variables (plea, prior and number of
offences) are included as independent/explanatory variables. This allows us to assess
the impact that these covariates have on sentence severity. For example, we will be
able to assess if there is a reduction in sentence severity where an offender pleads
guilty compared to an offender that pleads not guilty, controlling for a number of
other legal and extra-legal factors such as, offence type, sex, ethnicity and so on.
6.6 Software
For this research, the R software environment was used to fit the Goodman RC
association model and the extended Goodman RC models. An example of the layout
of the dataset prior to fitting the Goodman RC and extended Goodman RC models
can be see in Appendix C.
Due to the large amount of data and the memory capacity of my own machine,
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the model fitting was undertaken using Lancaster University’s High End Computing
Cluster. The High End Computing Cluster is a service that supports researchers and
research students who require high performance computing. The service supports the
use of a number of third-party software, including R.
The ‘gnm’ package by Turner and Firth (2012), provides the facilities for fitting
generalised non-linear models, including both the Goodman RC model and the ex-
tended Goodman RC model. The gnm model is fitted using the Poisson family log
link function. The ‘Mult’ function forms part of the model formula and provides the
log-multiplicative term in the model formula. Thus the following command:
RC = gnm(Freq ∼ SENT +OFF +Mult(SENT,OFF ), family = Poisson)
fits the basic Goodman RC model, and
ExtRC = gnm(Freq ∼ SENT +OFF +Mult((SENT + Plea+Numoff + Prior), OFF ) + Plea+Numoff + Prior, family = Poisson)
fits the most complex extended Goodman RC model. See Appendix F for the
sample code and commentary used to create the extended Goodman RC model.
6.7 Model fitting
A number of models were fitted and these can be seen in Table 6.2 along with the
deviance (minus twice the log-likelihood ratio of the model compared to the saturated
model) for that model, the difference in deviance between the nested model, the
difference in degrees of freedom between the two models, and finally the associated
p-value. A p-value of less than 0.001 suggested that the more complicated model
(the model with the additional parameters) provided the best model fit for the data.
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Table 6.2 shows the first model to be fitted was the basic Goodman RC model with
no legal covariates (Model 1). Maximum likelihood estimation was used to assess
model fit and provide the model deviance. The legal covariates were then added to
the standard Goodman RC model - one variable at a time and then combinations
of the variables were added - to produce the extended Goodman RC model. To test
whether the additional covariates improve model fit, it is standard practice to use the
reduction in deviance and the degrees of freedom for each of the nested models. This
in turn provides a p-value which suggests whether there is sufficient evidence to reject
or not reject the additional parameters in the model.
In total, seven models were fitted: the basic Goodman RC model and six extended
Goodman RC models. The models with only one legal covariate (Models 2, 3 and
4) were compared to the basic Goodman RC model (Model 1). The models with
two legal covariates (Models 5 and 6) were then compared to Model 2 with just plea
as a covariate. The final model with all three legal covariates (Model 7) was then
compared to model 5. As can be seen from table 6.2 the model with the lowest
deviance score and biggest difference in deviance on 2 degrees of freedom was Model
7, which contained all three legal variables. Model 7 is therefore the optimal model.
The results of this analysis will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7.
6.8 Linear interpolation
The extended Goodman RC analysis then provides us with a series of 35 sentence
severity scores. Although the scores (sentence severity scale) were estimated using
sophisticated statistical techniques, and provide us with a measure of sentence severity
in their own right, the scores do not have any real meaning and therefore appear
arbitrary. For example, a score of -5.17 (immediate custody >2 weeks ≤1 month) is
less severe than a score of -4.38 (immediate custody >1 month ≤2 months), and a
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score of -4.48 (conditional discharge ≤12 months) is somewhere in-between. However,
the scale has no anchor points.
However, I also know the modal20 number of days in custody for each of the
custodial sentence categories. For example, immediate custody >2 weeks ≤1 month is
approximately 28 days and immediate custody >1 month ≤2 months is approximately
54 days. It would then be useful if it were possible to anchor the extended Goodman
RC scores to estimate the equivalent number of days in custody for the non-custodial
sentences.
Having said that, it is possible to use a technique called Linear Interpolation,
which estimates a point (e.g. a non-custodial sentence category) between two known
points (e.g. two custodial sentence categories). The custodial days for each of the
custodial sentence categories act as an anchor to then standardise the non-custodial
sentences in relation to the known days. As I know the modal number of days the
custodial sentences equate to in each category, I can use these figures to estimate the
equivalent days in custody (Y) for the non-custodial sentence categories using the
following formula,
Y = Y0 + (Y1 − Y0)
(
X −X0
X1 −X0
)
In this equation Y1 (immediate custody >1 month ≤2 months) and Y0 (immediate
custody >2 weeks ≤1 month) relate to the modal number of days in custody for each
of the two custodial sentences. The X’s relate to the raw scores obtained from the
extended Goodman RC Association analysis (see Table 7.2), where X is the score for
the non-custodial sentence (conditional discharge ≤12 months), and X1 (immediate
custody >1 month ≤2 months) and X0 (immediate custody >2 weeks ≤1 month)
20The modal or most common number of days in custody was used instead of the average number of
days in custody so that the categories were not effected by any outliers (especially for the immediate
custody category of 10 years and over including life) although there was not much difference in the
number of days for each sentence category when the average was used. Alternatively the average
number of days in custody could have been used.
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are the raw scores for the two custodial sentences. We can therefore estimate the
equivalent number of days in custody for the non-custodial sentence Y (conditional
discharge ≤12 months) by inserting the appropriate numbers into the formula. The
diagram in Figure 6.2 illustrates the figures that are entered into the formula to
produce the equivalent days in custody for the example given above. This calculation
was done by hand for each of the non-custodial sentence categories.
Figure 6.2: Diagram representing linear interpolation
The results of the linear interpolation are provided in Chapter 7. It is important
to emphasis that linear interpolation only yields an approximate measure. However,
it provides a series of sentence severity scores (or sentence severity scale) which can
be interpreted in a meaningful way. These sentence severity scores - equivalent days
in custody - then provide us with a new and improved measure of sentence severity,
which can then be used to investigate sentencing disparity. It also provides us with a
scale which allows us to assess the interchangeability of sentences, which Sebba (1978),
von Hirsch (1993), and Morris and Tonry (1990) view as of primary importance.
6.9 How can the sentence severity scale be used?
In Section 6.1 I explained that the aim of creating this type of sentence severity
scale (extended Goodman RC model) was two-fold. Firstly, by incorporating the
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non-custodial and custodial sentences into a single scale, it is possible to identify
sentences that overlap or are equivalent in terms of their level of sentence severity (see
Section 7.3.2). This could potentially be an aid to judges by identifying alternative
non-custodial sentences which are equivalent in terms of their severity to custodial
sentences, and thus encourage/facilitate the use of non-custodial sentences. Secondly,
the scale is a tool in which we can measure sentencing disparity across the spectrum
of different disposals, replacing the previous methods discussed in Sections 4.3.1 and
4.3.2.
This research uses the new sentence severity scale to investigate sentencing dis-
parity. In this instance, the sentence severity scale becomes the dependent variable in
the multilevel model (see Section 8.3). A number of legal (for example; offence plea
and type of court the offender was sentenced in) and extra-legal factors (For example,
the offender’s sex and ethnicity) are then fitted as independent variables (see Section
8.4) in the model to try and explain the variability in sentence severity scores.
6.10 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have shown that it is possible to use Goodman RC association
analysis to model the association between two categorical variables - offence and
sentence. Furthermore, it was possible to extend this model and control for legal
variables, which sentencing legislation states, should impact on sentence severity.
Linear interpolation then allowed us to estimate the equivalent number of days
in custody that the non-custodial sentence categories equate to using the extended
Goodman RC association estimates for the custodial sentences. The outcome of this
is a scale, which is meaningful, and also facilitates the investigation into sentencing
disparity.
The following chapter provides the results of the Goodman RC association anal-
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ysis, extended Goodman RC analysis and the linear interpolation.
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Chapter 7
Results of log-linear modelling
7.1 Introduction
To recall, the main focus of this doctoral research is to assess disparity in the sentenc-
ing of offenders in the magistrates’ and Crown Courts of England and Wales. In order
to do this effectively, it is essential to use a measure of sentence severity that does not
introduce bias in the sample. In Chapter 4, I discussed the methods typically used
to measure sentence severity; the ‘in-out’ decision to incarcerate, length of custodial
sentences and scales based on the perception of severity for a range of sentences. Ad-
ditionally, I expressed my concern regarding the robustness and objectivity of these
methods. This then prompted me to find an alternative, more effective and accurate
way to measure sentence severity: one that incorporates the full range of sentences
meted out by the courts in England and Wales, and models real sentencing data.
Goodman RC association analysis facilitated this.
Goodman RC association analysis models the association between the offence and
sentence categories, incorporating the full range of sentences issued by the courts. It
then estimates a series of scores, which serves as a scale, measuring sentence severity.
Therefore, the full range of sentences are aligned on a single scale. We can then
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extend this model by adding a range of legal covariates. By controlling for the legal
factors (offence plea, number of offences and prior offending), the aim is to more
closely model/replicate and explain what is happening in the courts and to get a
better understanding of the ‘real’ situation in sentencing.
Chapter 6 discussed the Goodman RC association and extended Goodman RC
association models, and how these are used to estimate sentence severity scores. I
then explained how linear interpolation was used to transform the scores (δs) from
the extended Goodman RC analysis into the equivalent number days in immediate
custody.
This chapter (Chapter 7) will now briefly discuss the results from the Goodman
RC association and extended Goodman RC analysis, as well as, the results from the
linear interpolation. This then provides a scale of sentence severity that is meaningful
in its own right, and is then used to assess sentencing disparity.
7.2 Basic Goodman RC model - no legal covariates
Basic Goodman RC association analysis models the association between the offence
and sentence categories, with no additional covariates. The results from this analysis
are displayed in Table 7.1, where the first column in the table relates to the sentence
categories, and the second column displays the raw scores from the Goodman RC
analysis.
7.2.1 Sentence severity scale - alignment of sentences
The results displayed in Table 7.1 clearly demonstrate that the range or distribution
of sentence categories can be arranged on a single scale modelling one dimension of
sentence severity. The scale ranges from the least severe sentence - Immediate custody
≤1 week - with a raw score of −5.616, up to the most severe sentence - Immediate
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Table 7.1: Raw scores from the basic Goodman RC model ranked in order from least
to most severe
Sentence category Raw score (δs)
Immediate custody ≤1 week −5.616
Immediate custody >1 week ≤ 2 weeks −5.432
Fine −5.147
Suspended sentence ≤1 month −4.915
Immediate custody >2 week ≤1 month −4.860
Conditional discharge ≤12 months −4.469
Immediate custody >1 month ≤2 months −4.305
Conditional discharge >12 months ≤2 years −4.255
Conditional discharge >2 years ≤3 years −4.205
Community order ≤12 months −4.139
Suspended sentence >1 month ≤2 months −4.128
Other −4.062
Community order >12 months ≤2 years −3.958
Suspended sentence >2 months ≤3 months −3.815
Immediate custody >2 months ≤3 months −3.692
Suspended sentence >3 months ≤4 months −3.486
Immediate custody >3 months ≤4 months −3.338
Suspended sentence >4 months ≤5 months −3.181
Suspended sentence >5 months ≤6 months −1.461
Immediate custody >4 months ≤6 months −1.386
Suspended sentence >6 months ≤9 months 0.416
Suspended sentence >9 months ≤12 months 0.831
Immediate custody >6 months ≤9 months 0.966
Immediate custody >9 months ≤12 months 2.325
Immediate custody >12 months ≤18 months 3.342
Community order >2 years ≤3 years 4.013
Immediate custody >18 months ≤24 months 5.321
Immediate custody >2 years ≤3 years 6.883
Immediate custody >3 years ≤4 years 8.723
Immediate custody >4 years ≤5 years 10.452
Immediate custody >5 years ≤6 years 11.258
Immediate custody >6 years ≤7 years 11.812
Immediate custody >7 years ≤8 years 12.235
Immediate custody >8 years ≤10 years 14.411
Immediate custody >10 years including life 17.098
custody >10 years including life - with a raw score of 17.098, incorporating and
aligning the full range of sentences, each with their different punitive elements.
The raw scores provide the magnitude of severity for each sentence, which enables
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the categories to be ranked in order of sentence severity. To inspect whether the
basic Goodman model has achieved this, we can consider the raw scores for just the
immediate custody categories. Now it is generally accepted that as the length of a
custodial sentence increases, so too does the severity of that sentence. The estimates
for the immediate custody categories displayed in Table 7.1, corroborate with this
notion. Therefore, we can then be fairly confident that the other (non-custodial)
sentence category estimates are in the correct rank order.
We would perhaps not expect to see the immediate custody categories appearing
so low on the scale. However, these sentences (e.g. immediate custody ≤1 week the
least severe sentence) are generally given for the least serious offences, such as failing
to adhere to bail conditions. Additionally, these sentences will generally be awarded
to offenders who are also being sentenced for another offence which will also likely
result in a term of immediate custody.
Conditional discharges all seem to receive fairly low sentence severity scores. The
conditions placed on the discharge would have given us a more accurate measure of
the severity of these sentences, however, this information was not available.
The ‘fine’ category has a relatively low sentence severity score. Although we need
to keep in mind that fines are also dependent on the financial situation of the offender
and are means tested. This may then have a different effect on sentence severity.
The ’other’ category includes sentences such as confiscation orders and compen-
sation orders. This sentence category received a score of −4.062, and this is more
severe than expected. Although, again these are usually given with a combination of
sentences (e.g. community orders).
Community orders generally fall between the shorter suspended sentence categories
on the scale of sentence severity. The community order category relating to greater
than two years and less than or equal to three years is estimated as a lot more severe
than the other community order categories. A community order of greater than two
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years and less than or equal to three years receives a raw sentence severity score
of 4.013 which is ranked between immediate custody greater than 12 months and
less than or equal to 18 months (δs=3.342), and immediate custody greater than 18
months and less than or equal to 24 months (δs=5.321). This would seem reasonable
as a community order greater than two years and less than or equal to three years
would be awarded for a relatively serious offence, which may be on the border of
getting a custodial sentence.
It seems reasonable that the range of suspended sentence scores are slightly less
(on the scale of sentence severity) than the same range of custodial sentences. The
legislation suggests that only once the length of the custodial sentence has been de-
cided should the judge then decide to suspend it. So for example a suspended sentence
order of less than one month is shown as slightly less severe than a custodial sentence
of between two weeks and one month. This is replicated with the other suspended
sentence and immediate custody sentence categories. There is one anomaly, where
the suspended sentence category relating to greater than one month and less than or
equal to two months receives a raw score of −4.007 which is more severe than the
equivalent custodial sentence of similar length (greater then one month and less than
or equal to two months) with a raw score of −4.379. This would suggest that this
custodial sentence is less severe than this suspended sentence, which we would not
expect to be the case. This result could be caused by the inaccurate recording of data
when it was uploaded onto the PNC.
The actual raw scores range from -5.616 to 17.008 but they have no real meaning
other than they provide the rank order for the sentence categories, based on the
association between the offence and sentence categories. This is because, as explained
in Section 6.4, these are estimated from a random set of starting values to facilitate
the iterative procedure as there is no anchoring to the raw scale. A different set of
starting values will give the same model fit - deviance - but different positioning of the
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scale. Consequently, these raw scores cannot be directly compared with, for example,
the estimates from the extended Goodman RC model.
I will now go on to explain the results of the extended Goodman RC model which
includes the legal covariates, which is the optimal and preferred model.
7.3 Extended Goodman RC model - controlling for
legal covariates
In section 6.5, I discussed extending the Goodman RC association model to include
additional legal covariates (offender’s plea, total number of offences they are being
sentenced for, and prior court appearance, acting as an indicator of prior offending)
to more accurately reflect the seriousness of an offence and in turn the severity of
a given sentence. This then controls for the imbalance that legal factors have on
sentencing and therefore we are able to provide a far more accurate representation
of the sentence severity by controlling for some of the factors that are taken into the
sentencing decision-making process.
Controlling for the legal covariates in the model correct for the imbalance that
these factors have on sentencing - by either decreasing or increasing the severity of
sentences. Furthermore, linear interpolation then standardises these scores relative
to the severity of the custodial sentences. The end result is a single sentence severity
scale which orders the sentences by their magnitude of sentence severity and allows
for the imbalance that legal covariates create.
Recall that in Section 6.5.2 I proposed the Extended Goodman model to be:
log(µos`) = αo + βs + τ` + γoδs`
where
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δs` = δs +
∑
p
θpXps
The Extended Goodman RC model therefore produces a number of parameter
estimates in addition to the sentence severity scores which are later used to create the
sentence severity scale. All the parameter estimates generated by fitting the Extended
Goodman model are displayed and explained in the following sections.
7.3.1 Sentence severity scores
The raw sentence scores (δs) and final scores (obtained through linear interpolation)
from this model are displayed in Table 7.2. The final scores highlighted in bold indicate
the equivalent number of days in custody which were calculated using the linear
interpolation equation (see Section 6.8) and are therefore estimates of the number of
days in custody.
Again the raw scores provide the magnitude of severity, which enables the cate-
gories to be ranked in order of sentence severity. These estimates are different to the
estimates obtained from the Goodman RC model: firstly because a different set of
starting values are used at the model building stage, and secondly because there are
now also a number of covariates added to the model. The two models are not nested,
and therefore they are not comparable.
Although, the extended Goodman RC model produces a series of sentence severity
estimates that allow the sentences to be ranked in order of severity, out-with this scale,
the scores do not have any real meaning because they have not been anchored and
therefore they appear arbitrary. As this model is now the optimal and preferred
model, linear interpolation was used, as explained in section 6.8, to produce a final
set of sentence severity scores. This then uses the modal number of days for each of
the immediate custody categories to estimate the equivalent (approximate) number
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Table 7.2: Scores from the extended Goodman RC model with legal covariates
Sentence category Raw score (δs) Final score (Days)
Immediate custody >1 week ≤2 weeks −6.663 14
Immediate custody ≤1 week −6.585 7
Fine −5.256 27
Suspended sentence ≤1 month −5.173 28
Immediate custody>2 week ≤1 month −5.168 28
Conditional discharge ≤12 months −4.478 50
Immediate custody>1 month ≤2 months −4.379 54
Conditional discharge >12 months ≤2 years −4.115 63
Community order ≤12 months −4.028 65
Suspended sentence>1 month ≤2 months −4.007 66
Community order >12 months ≤2 years −3.881 72
Suspended sentence >2 months ≤3 months −3.611 79
Immediate custody >2 months ≤3 months −3.390 86
Other −3.371 88
Suspended sentence >3 months ≤4 months −3.265 97
Conditional discharge >2 years ≤3 years −3.205 103
Immediate custody >3 months ≤4 months −3.050 117
Suspended sentence >4 months ≤5 months −2.717 126
Suspended sentence >5 months ≤6 months −1.352 163
Immediate custody >4 months ≤6 months −1.060 171
Suspended sentence >9 months ≤12 months −0.286 216
Suspended sentence >6 months ≤9 months −0.264 217
Immediate custody >6 months ≤9 months 0.347 252
Immediate custody >9 months ≤12 months 0.761 351
Immediate custody >12 months ≤18 months 1.023 494
Immediate custody >18 months ≤24 months 5.321 705
Immediate custody >2 years ≤3 years 2.008 998
Community order >2 years ≤3 years 2.821 1335
Immediate custody >3 years ≤4 years 2.886 1362
Immediate custody >4 years ≤5 years 4.085 1770
Immediate custody >5 years ≤6 years 4.449 2156
Immediate custody >6 years ≤7 years 4.835 2495
Immediate custody >7 years ≤8 years 4.914 2888
Immediate custody >8 years ≤10 years 6.416 3514
Immediate custody >10 years including life 8.008 4816
of days in custody for the non-custodial sentence categories.
The actual rank order of the sentence categories from the extended Goodman RC
model are similar to the rank order that we have seen for the Goodman RC model,
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albeit with some slight differences. For example, the immediate custody category
of less than or equal to one week is estimated as now marginally more severe than
immediate custody of greater than a week and less than or equal to two weeks category,
which is why the final scores appear out of sequence in Table 7.2 with 14 appearing
before 7 in the final score category based on the modal days in custody. There may
be many reasons why this might have happened, such as anomalies in the data and
the way the offences or sentences were recorded. Another reason for this may relate to
the fact those receiving a sentence of less than one week tend to be for bail offences.
In this situation, multiple offences will be recorded which will increase the severity of
a sentence, and the offender is also more likely to plead not guilty for the bail offence
which are now taken into consideration with the extended Goodman model. This
will increase the severity of the sentences and hence will appear more severe than the
immediate custody sentence of 14 days.
The suspended sentence greater than six months and less than or equal to nine
months category (δs=−0.264) is estimated as more severe than the nine to twelve
months suspended sentence category (δs=−0.286). Although the difference is quite
small, this again is likely to be the result of anomalies in the data and the way that
these types of offences have been recorded in the PNC. As I explained in Section 2.7.4,
the severity of suspended sentences is based on the length of the custodial sentence
as well as the length of time that is suspended. Therefore by only using the length
of the custodial part of the sentence as a category as I have had to do here leaves it
open to these discrepancies. More accurate recording of sentencing data would vastly
improve these estimates.
Other sentence categories also appear slightly less or more severe in comparison
to the other sentences than would perhaps been anticipated. I would have expected
the conditional discharge sentences to be much lower on the severity scale than they
appear, for example the conditional discharge of between two and three years which
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following the linear interpolation equates to over three months in prison. However
again only the length of this type of order was recorded in the PNC data and without
the finer gradations of the sentence in relation to the conditions attached to the
sentence, it is not possible to more accurately model these types of sentence. In a
similar vein, I would have expected some of the custodial sentences to have appeared
more severe, such as the immediate custody of two to three years. This could be the
way these sentences were categorised and again finer gradation of custodial sentences
would have prevented this.
Sentence severity scores with a different subset of covariates
The raw scores displayed in Table 7.2 are based on one combination of the legal covari-
ates. Consequently, it would have been possible to choose another layer or combina-
tion of legal covariates using the θp parameter estimates obtained from the extended
Goodman RC analysis. The θp in table 7.3 displays the additional coefficients.
Table 7.3: Theta parameters
Coefficient θ
Plea: Not guilty 1.028
Plea: Unknown -0.240
Numoff2: >3 0.895
Prior: Prior -1.306
We can therefore use the θp parameters to change the legal characteristics or
baseline characteristics by adding the relevant coefficient estimates to the raw sentence
severity scores estimated in the Extended Goodman RC model. For example we can
calculate scores based on the following characteristics - the offender plead not guilty
(1.028), was sentenced for three or more offences (0.895) and had no prior court
appearances (no change - same as previous baseline). Table 7.4 shows the new raw
scores (δs) for each sentence and we can see that each sentence has increased in severity
by 1.923 (1.028 + 0.895) indicating more severe sentence severity scores.
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However, following linear interpolation (see Section 6.8) to anchor the scores, we
can see that there is actually no change in the estimated equivalent days in custody
for each of the sentence categories also shown in Table 7.3 and that is because only
one scale is actually created. Extending the Goodman RC model allows us to control
for the legal factors and therefore control for the imbalance or affects that the legal
factor have on sentence severity.
The sentence severity scale now provides a quantitative measure of sentence sever-
ity which places sentences in rank order, based on how they are used in practice in
England and Wales. By controlling for the legal covariates, the aim was to more accu-
rately model the complex nature of sentencing whilst controlling for the imbalance or
effects that legal factors have on sentence severity. Whilst it should be kept in mind
that this provides an approximation of sentencing, this scale facilitates the second
part of this research which looks into sentencing disparity.
Interchangeability of sentences
The results (final scores) shown in Table 7.2 (and Table 7.4) can also be displayed
graphically in the form of a dotplot shown in Figure 7.1. The dots represent the
equivalent number of days in custody for each of the sentence severity scores, estimated
by linear interpolation (for the non-custodial sentence, as described in section 6.8).
The X-axis provides the sentence severity scale and the various sentences are arranged
on this scale to represent their equivalent severity score. This scale displays the levels
of severity from left to right, with the least severe sentences on the left to the most
severe sentences on the right-hand side of the scale. This graphical representation of
the data replicates the diagram of the sentence severity scale (Figure 4.1) produced
in Chapter 4, where the original idea was conveyed.
The 35 sentence categories are grouped by type of disposal, represented by different
coloured dots on the graph. The dark blue dots represent the different community
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Table 7.4: Alternative scores from the extended Goodman RC model using different
theta parameters
Sentence category Raw score (δs) Final score (Days)
Immediate custody >1 week ≤2 weeks −4.740 14
Immediate custody ≤1 week −4.662 7
Fine −3.333 27
Suspended sentence ≤1 month −3.250 28
Immediate custody>2 week ≤1 month −3.245 28
Conditional discharge ≤12 months −2.555 50
Immediate custody>1 month ≤2 months −2.456 54
Conditional discharge >12 months ≤2 years −2.192 63
Community order ≤12 months −2.105 65
Suspended sentence>1 month ≤2 months −2.084 66
Community order >12 months ≤2 years −1.958 72
Suspended sentence >2 months ≤3 months −1.688 79
Immediate custody >2 months ≤3 months −1.467 86
Other −1.448 88
Suspended sentence >3 months ≤4 months −1.342 97
Conditional discharge >2 years ≤3 years −1.282 103
Immediate custody >3 months ≤4 months −1.127 117
Suspended sentence >4 months ≤5 months −0.794 126
Suspended sentence >5 months ≤6 months 0.571 163
Immediate custody >4 months ≤6 months 0.863 171
Suspended sentence >9 months ≤12 months 1.637 216
Suspended sentence >6 months ≤9 months 1.659 217
Immediate custody >6 months ≤9 months 2.270 252
Immediate custody >9 months ≤12 months 2.684 351
Immediate custody >12 months ≤18 months 2.946 494
Immediate custody >18 months ≤24 months 7.244 705
Immediate custody >2 years ≤3 years 3.931 998
Community order >2 years ≤3 years 4.744 1335
Immediate custody >3 years ≤4 years 4.809 1362
Immediate custody >4 years ≤5 years 6.008 1770
Immediate custody >5 years ≤6 years 6.372 2156
Immediate custody >6 years ≤7 years 6.758 2495
Immediate custody >7 years ≤8 years 6.837 2888
Immediate custody >8 years ≤10 years 8.339 3514
Immediate custody >10 years including life 9.931 4816
order categories, light grey dots represent the conditional discharge categories, orange
represents the fine category, immediate custody categories are displayed in red, the
green dot represents the other category , and finally the suspended sentence category
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estimates are displayed in lilac.
Figure 7.1: Dotplot - Extended Goodman RC model - Sentence severity scores
In creating a single severity scale which incorporates the full range of sentences
issued by the courts in England and Wales, it is possible to observe the equivalent
sentence severity score for each sentence, where offences of similar seriousness are
given sentences of equivalent severity. I have previously argued that sentences can
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and do overlap in terms of their severity, even though the type of sentence, or the
punitive elements of the sentences are very different - such as monetary or liberty.
This is referred to in the sentencing literature as the interchangeability of sentences.
The dotplot in Figure 7.1 effectively illustrates this point by demonstrating that sen-
tences are interchangeable, because sentences can and do overlap when comparing
the severity of these sentences. By using the methodology (Extended Goodman RC
association analysis) employed to create this sentence severity scale and incorporating
the full range of sentences exercised by the courts, and then converting these scores
into equivalent days in custody using the method of linear interpolation, it is evident
that, some non-custodial sentences are essentially on par with the shorter custodial
sentences. This notion of interchangeability is discussed further in Chapter 10 but
first some examples of interchangeable sentences are provided to illustrate this point.
One example of interchangeability from this scale shows that, a community order
of less than 12 months (δs = -4.028) is roughly equivalent to a suspended sentence
order of greater than one month and less than or equal to 2 months (δs = -4.007).
Following linear interpolation these two sentences are then approximately 65 and 66
days in custody respectively. Likewise the conditional discharge of less than or equal
to a year category (δs = -4.115) equates to 63 days in custody following the linear
interpolation. Another example indicates, the sentence category for greater than three
and less than or equal to four years immediate custody (δs = 2.886) is relatively close
to a community order of greater than two years and less than or equal to three years
(δs = 2.821). In days the community order equates 1335 days in custody which is
similar to the modal number of days for the immediate custody of greater than three
years and less than four years category (1362 days).
The final scores obtained from the extended Goodman RC analysis and linear
interpolation become the sentence severity scale, which was used to assess sentencing
disparity.
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7.3.2 Offence seriousness scores
In addition to the sentence severity scores, the extended Goodman model also esti-
mates a number of γo parameters which relate to the offences (major offences). These
offence scores can be seen in Table 7.5 ranging from the most to the least serious.
Table 7.5: Offences scores
Offence type Raw score (γo)
Rape of male or female 1.73
Attempted murder 1.53
Buggery or attempted buggery 1.37
Murder 1.15
Incest with girl under 13 years old 1.11
Aggravated burglary in a dwelling (including attempts) 1.11
Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 13 1.08
Indecent assault on a male 1.05
Kidnapping 0.99
Gross indecency with a child 0.96
Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 16 0.94
Indecent assault on a female 0.92
Indecency between males 0.85
Blackmail 0.84
Robbery and assaults with intent to rob 0.83
Manslaughter 0.81
Wounding and other acts endangering life 0.77
Child prostitution 0.77
Abuse of trust - Sexual offences 0.69
Continued on next page
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Table 7.5-continued from previous page
Offence type Raw score (γo)
Obscene publications 0.64
Other criminal damage endangering life 0.59
Public Order Act 1986 Sec 2 Violent Disorder 0.58
False accounting 0.56
Immigration Act including people trafficking 0.55
Abduction of a child 0.53
Offences against laws relating to Customs, Excise and 0.53
Burglary in a dwelling 0.50
Sexual Offences Act 2003 including grooming and other 0.50
Procuration of males and females 0.50
Concealing 0.46
Other Forgery 0.46
Arson 0.44
Frauds by agents, trustees, company directors etc. 0.40
Stealing by an employee 0.39
Firearms offences 0.38
Bankruptcy 0.37
Cruelty to or neglect of children 0.37
Threats, Conspiracy or Incitement to murder 0.37
Theft of motor vehicle 0.35
Other frauds 0.33
Aggravated taking of a vehicle 0.31
Misuse of Drugs Act 0.30
Dangerous Driving 0.27
Continued on next page
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Table 7.5-continued from previous page
Offence type Raw score (γo)
Unlawfully taking away or opening a mail bag 0.26
Trade Descriptions and similar offences 0.26
Other indictable offences 0.25
Intending to facilitate prison escape 0.25
Other stealing and unauthorised takings 0.22
Receiving/handling stolen goods 0.20
Permitting premises to be uses for unlawful (drug-related) purposes 0.19
Attempting to pervert the course of justice 0.18
Perjury 0.17
Malicious wounding and other like offences 0.16
Benefit offences 0.15
Stealing from another person 0.14
Forgery of prescription 0.13
Absconding from lawful custody 0.12
Burglary other than a dwelling 0.10
Other offences (against the State and Public Order) 0.09
Aggravated vehicle taking 0.05
Stealing from automatic machines 0.05
Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage 0.04
Stealing in a dwelling other than from automatic machine 0.00
Speed limit offences -0.03
Health and Safety at work -0.05
Firearms Act 1968 -0.12
Improper use of public electronic communications networks -0.16
Continued on next page
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Table 7.5-continued from previous page
Offence type Raw score (γo)
Cruelty to animals, ill treatment, neglect etc. -0.17
Stealing and unauthorised takings -0.20
Offences in relation to dogs Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 -0.20
Abstracting electricity -0.21
Stealing from vehicles -0.22
Accident offence -0.24
Driving license offences -0.24
Going equipped for stealing -0.30
Vehicle Test Offences -0.32
Road traffic offence, neglect, directions etc. -0.32
Driving or attempting to drive after consuming alcohol or drugs -0.34
Common and other types of assault -0.37
Other offences excluding motoring offences -0.37
Other criminal damage -0.40
Vehicle insurance offences -0.42
Assault on a constable -0.42
Preventing child from receiving information -0.52
Criminal Damage -0.55
Offences against Public Order -0.57
Careless driving -0.58
Stealing pedal cycles -0.59
Fraud, Forgery associated with vehicle or driving records -0.63
Stealing from shops and stalls (shoplifting) -0.64
Interference with a motor vehicle -0.71
Continued on next page
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Table 7.5-continued from previous page
Offence type Raw score (γo)
Picklock related offences -0.81
Misuse of drug related offences -0.93
Public health - By-laws -0.95
Drunk and disorderly -1.07
Bail offences -1.14
Licensing Act offences -1.36
Offences relating to Police regulations -1.36
Transport offences -1.72
The order of the major offences in Table 7.5 are determined by the γo parameters
also obtained from the extending Goodman RC association model based on the asso-
ciation with the corresponding sentence categories and correcting for the imbalance of
legal covariates. These parameters provide the magnitude of offence seriousness which
then enable the offences to be ranked in order of offence seriousness just like the sen-
tence severity scores shown in Table 7.2. Offences such as murder, attempted murder
and rape offences are ranked amongst the most serious offences. At the other end of
the scale bail offences, licensing Act offences, offences relating to Police regulations
and transport offences are amongst the least serious offences.
Although there are no official Ministry of Justice offence seriousness scales in
England and Wales, murder would be considered the most serious type of offence.
Murder however, does not come out as the most serious offence in the scale. Rape,
attempted murder and buggery (now re-classified as male rape) are all ranked slightly
above murder. This could be explained by some anomalies in the data, such as the
way this offence was recorded or the sentences they received. Or it could be the
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result of the offence murder not being a very common type of offence with very few
offences in the sample (n=5 or <1%). In Section 6.4 I explained that within a two-way
contingency table of sentences by offences (see Table 6.1), the diagonal cells of a table
would contain a high number of counts based on certain offences receiving certain
types of sentences. Where certain offences are committed less frequency (for example
murder) the counts in these cells will also be small which will reduce the accuracy of
the estimates and this may cause certain offences to be out of the expected sequence.
Additionally, in all of these cases we do not know the actual culpability and harm
caused or intended by the offender which determines the seriousness of all of the indi-
vidual offences. For any given offence we have no information on whether the offence
was rated as a category 1 offence indicating greater harm and higher culpability, a
category 2 offence indicating greater harm and lower culpability or lesser harm and
higher culpability, or a category 3 offence indicating lesser harm and lower culpability.
Neither do we know the aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the offence which
will ultimately determine the sentence passed by the judge. Therefore although we
know the major offence code, we do not know exactly just how serious the offence
faired in comparison to other similar types of offences. Lastly, we are unable to ac-
count for the discretion shown by the judge. It may be that some judges exhibit more
discretion than others, which is likely to result in different sentences being passed.
The raw offence scores (γo) provide the magnitude of offence seriousness which
allows the scores to be ranked in order of their seriousness. However like the sentence
severity scores (δs) these scores also appear arbitrary and have no real meaning out-
with the scale. As the focus of this research is on sentence severity, we do not attempt
to standardise or anchor these scores to make them meaningful in their own right.
The offence seriousness scores are not required for this research and therefore will not
be discussed further.
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7.3.3 Additional parameter estimates
A series of popularity parameters are also estimated in the Extended Goodman RC
model for the offence (αo) and sentence (βs) categories. These estimates indicate
the popularity or frequency of the categories compared to the reference categories,
although these estimates might not be representative of offences in the general pop-
ulation. Table 7.6 displays the αo estimates with Murder as the reference category
and no αo estimate. Table 7.7 displays the βs estimates with less than one week in
immediate custody as the reference category and again no βs parameter is estimated
for this category. Again these estimates do not provide any useful information for the
purposes of measuring sentence severity and therefore do not feature in the remainder
of this thesis.
Table 7.6: α estimates
Offence type αo estimates
Murder
Attempted murder -1.015
Threats, Conspiracy or Incitement to murder 3.892
Manslaughter 3.637
Wounding and other acts endangering life 5.131
Malicious wounding and other like offences 7.255
Cruelty to or neglect of children 4.747
Abduction of a child 2.193
Buggery or attempted buggery -0.1849
Indecent assault on a male 4.021
Indecency between males 2.071
Rape of male or female 1.516
Continued on next page
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Table 7.6-continued from previous page
Offence type αo estimates
Indecent assault on a female 6.016
Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 13 3.511
Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl under 16 4.995
Incest with girl under 13 years old 3.244
Procuration of males and females 1.856
Burglary in a dwelling 6.361
Aggravated burglary in a dwelling (including attempts) 2.178
Burglary other than a dwelling 5.014
Going equipped for stealing 1.898
Robbery and assaults with intent to rob 5.66
Blackmail 2.674
Kidnapping 3.497
Aggravated taking of a vehicle 3.687
Concealing 5.039
Stealing from another person 4.476
Stealing in a dwelling other than from automatic machines and meters 3.01
Stealing by an employee 5.343
Unlawfully taking away or opening a mail bag 2.331
Abstracting electricity 1.343
Stealing pedal cycles -0.8737
Stealing from vehicles 3.191
Stealing from shops and stalls (shoplifting) 3.386
Stealing from automatic machines 1.86
Theft of motor vehicle 3.685
Continued on next page
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Table 7.6-continued from previous page
Offence type αo estimates
Other stealing and unauthorised takings 5.76
Frauds by agents, trustees, company directors etc. 1.293
False accounting 3.92
Other frauds 7.093
Receiving/handling stolen goods 5.207
Bankruptcy 2.76
Arson 4.286
Other criminal damage endangering life 1.605
Other criminal damage 2.601
Threat or possession with intent to commit criminal damage 2.474
Forgery of prescription 0.9846
Other Forgery 5.375
Public Order Act 1986 Sec 2 Violent Disorder 3.111
Other offences (against the State and Public Order) 5.842
Perjury 1.558
Intending to facilitate prison escape 1.473
Child prostitution 1.579
Abuse of trust - Sexual offences 2.69
Gross indecency with a child 4.248
Immigration Act including people trafficking 2.706
Attempting to pervert the course of justice 4.357
Absconding from lawful custody 1.644
Firearms offences 4.952
Offences against laws relating to Customs, Excise and Inland Revenue 2.829
Continued on next page
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Table 7.6-continued from previous page
Offence type αo estimates
Bail offences 0.18
Trade Descriptions and similar offences 4.542
Health and Safety at work -0.09262
Obscene publications 7.648
Sexual Offences Act 2003 including grooming and other sexual acts 4.864
Misuse of Drugs Act 7.456
Permitting premises to be uses for unlawful (drug-related) purposes 3.093
Other indictable offences 3.785
Assault on a constable 3.648
Common and other types of assault 5.586
Cruelty to animals, ill treatment, neglect etc. 2.79
Offences in relation to dogs Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 -0.1674
Preventing child from receiving information -0.2949
Firearms Act 1968 1.252
Offences against Public Order 2.757
Interference with a motor vehicle -0.528
Stealing and unauthorised takings 2.693
Aggravated vehicle taking 3.051
Drunk and disorderly -2.06
Licensing Act offences -6.659
Criminal Damage 3.522
Benefit offences 4.005
Offences relating to Police regulations -6.657
Public health - By-laws -4.064
Continued on next page
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Table 7.6-continued from previous page
Offence type αo estimates
Transport offences -8.534
Picklock related offences -2.994
Misuse of drug related offences -1.609
Other offences excluding motoring offences 3.412
Improper use of public electronic communications network 2.531
Dangerous Driving 5.082
Driving or attempting to drive after consuming alcohol or drugs 3.962
Careless driving -0.3625
Accident offence 2.208
Driving licence offences 4.197
Vehicle insurance offences 2.477
Vehicle Test Offences -0.7597
Fraud, Forgery associated with vehicle or driving records -2.108
Speed limit offences 0.2566
Road traffic offence, neglect, directions etc. -0.05
7.4 Concluding remarks
Chapter 7 has reported on the results of the Goodman RC analysis, and the extended
Goodman RC analysis. The extended Goodman RC model was the optimal and
preferred model because it controlled for the three legal variables. Linear interpolation
then made it possible to calculate the equivalent number of days in custody for each
of the non-custodial sentence categories based on the modal number of days for each
173
of the immediate custody categories. The end result was a series of final scores which
are now anchored and therefore provides meaningful estimates rather than arbitrary
measures.
The final scores - displayed in Table 7.2 - are obtained from the extended Goodman
RC analysis and linear interpolation and now become the scale in which to assess
sentencing disparity. The scores provide an approximate measure of sentence severity
that incorporates the range of sentences issued by the courts in England and Wales,
modelling real sentencing data to produce an objective measure of sentence severity.
The next chapter will discuss the second stage of this PhD thesis: identifying
and assessing disparity in sentencing. Chapter 8 will explain the multilevel modelling
approach which will use the newly formed sentence severity scale, and a variety of
explanatory variables to facilitate this research into sentencing disparity.
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Table 7.7: βs estimates
Disposal Sentence βs estimate
Immediate custody
≤ 1 week
> 1 week ≤ 2 weeks 0.260
> 2 week ≤ 1 month 2.407
> 1 month ≤ 2 months 2.761
> 2 months ≤ 3 months 3.087
> 3 months ≤ 4 months 2.982
> 4 months ≤ 6 months 3.079
> 6 months ≤ 9 months 2.399
> 9 months ≤ 12 months 2.567
> 12 months ≤ 18 months 2.476
> 18 months ≤ 24 months 1.993
> 2 years ≤ 3 years 1.815
> 3 years ≤ 4 years 0.780
> 4 years ≤ 5 years 0.750
> 5 years ≤ 6 years 1.547
> 6 years ≤ 7 years 2.604
> 7 years ≤ 8 years 2.813
> 8 years ≤ 10 years 4.787
> 10 years including life 6.269
Suspended sentence
≤ 1 month 1.952
> 1 month ≤ 2 months 2.653
> 2 months ≤ 3 months 3.076
> 3 months ≤ 4 months 3.127
> 4 months ≤ 5 months 1.903
> 5 months ≤ 6 months 2.400
> 6 months ≤ 9 months 2.867
> 9 months ≤ 12 months 2.833
Community order
≤ 12 months 5.043
> 12 months ≤ 2 years 3.084
> 2 years ≤ 3 years 0.858
Fine Fine 2.281
Conditional discharge
≤ 12 months 1.925
> 12 months ≤ 2 years 1.264
> 2 years ≤ 3 years 0.477
Other Other 3.493
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Chapter 8
Measuring sentencing disparity
using multilevel modelling
8.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4, I explained that one of the most common methods used to measure
sentencing disparity is multilevel modelling. The aim of multilevel modelling is to
construct a model that expresses how the dependent variable - sentence severity -
depends on, or is explained by the exploratory - independent - variables (Snijders
and Bosker, 2012). In the past, studies that have used multilevel modelling, such as
those conducted by Pina-Sa´nchez and Linacre (2013), Ulmer and Johnson (2004), and
Johnson (2006), have tended to use sentence length or the probability of incarceration
as the dependent variable, and numerous explanatory variables to assess sentencing
disparity. However, all of these studies have not been able to include non-custodial
sentences, such as fines and community orders, even though these sentences are used
more often than custodial sentences (see Section 5.4.2) and are also just as important
to include as custodial sentences (von Hirsch et al., 1989). This research differs in
that it uses the new measure of sentence severity - the sentence severity scale or a
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transformation of it - as the dependent variable, which incorporates the full range of
offences meted out by the courts in England and Wales. It then models the effect
of legal and extra-legal characteristics of the offence and the offender, on sentence
severity to assess sentencing disparity. This chapter will explain multilevel modelling
and how it is used to identify and measure sentencing disparity.
8.2 Multilevel modelling
The goal of multilevel modelling is to predict values of the dependent variable based
on a function of predictor or explanatory variables at more than one level (Luke,
2004). Multilevel modelling enables me to examine how sentencing is influenced by
legal factors at the offence level and extra-legal factors at the offender level. In section
4.4.1, I explained that sentencing disparity is intertwined with sentence severity: only
by measuring sentence severity can we assess disparity. Consequently, I use multilevel
modelling to predict the effect that the explanatory variables have on sentencing
(sentence severity) by defining which are statistically significant to determine which
factors are attributing towards this disparity.
Multilevel modelling is a type of regression analysis, used to analyse data with a
hierarchical or nested structure (Bryk and Raudenbush, 1992). It is used in a variety
of fields, and is particularly popular in educational research, specifically education
attainment. In this context there are two levels; pupils (level-1) and schools (level-2),
where pupils are nested within schools: multilevel modelling is then used to assess
the factors which impact on test results at both these levels. Multilevel modelling
has also become increasingly popular within the field of criminology, with numerous
studies adopting this method, such as those mentioned in section 4.4.5. In my data,
I also have a nested structure and therefore, it is appropriate to also use multilevel
modelling. In this case, offences (level-1) are nested within individual offenders (level-
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2) and these act as levels within the multilevel structure. If there had been court level
information available, such as the specific court that the offender was sentenced in,
this would have been a third-level in the multilevel model. It its absence, I will test
a third-level, that is the Probation Trust area in which the court is located. I will
discuss this further in sections 8.2.2 and 8.6.
Regression analysis that does not take account of the multilevel structure in the
data is making the assumption that the observations are independent of one another
(Luke, 2004). Where there is a nested structure, there is a good chance that this
independence assumption will be violated (ibid), which can lead to biased parameter
estimates (Weidner et al., 2005). We would expect that the offences committed by
one specific offender are more similar in nature, such as two offences for theft and a
third for handling stolen goods. Moreover the sentence for that offender will be more
similar due to unmeasured variables, such as attitude towards the court.
Single-level multivariate techniques are also likely to underestimate standard errors
and in doing so exaggerate the significance of parameter estimates (Weidner et al.,
2005).
The ecological fallacy
The ecological fallacy occurs when conclusions are drawn about individuals based only
on the analysis of grouped or aggregate data (Freedman, 2001). In this case it would
be problematic to draw conclusions about sentencing disparity without taking into
account the offence(s) that the offender was sentenced for. For example, an offender
sentenced for assault will receive a more severe sentence than an offender sentenced for
being drunk and disorderly. Without taking this level-1 factor into account, it would
lead us to make unsound conclusions about the severity of the sentences offenders
received and ultimately sentencing disparity.
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8.2.1 Variance components model
The variance components model/random effects model containing no covariates is
referred to as the null or ‘empty model’ Snijders and Bosker (2012). This is the
simplest type of multilevel model and is usually the starting point for any multilevel
modelling analysis. The variance components model is
Yij = β0 + uj + eij
where Yij is the predicted sentence severity score for the level-1 units (offence
i) within the level-2 units (offender j ), β0 is the intercept, and uj and eij are the
random error terms at the offender level (level-2 units) and for offence i in group j,
respectively.
The intercept (β0 ) can be interpreted as the average value of the dependent
variable across all offenders in the sample (Luke, 2004).
Multilevel modelling differs from regression analysis in that the equation defin-
ing the model contains more than one error term - one error term for each level in
the analysis (Snijders and Bosker, 2012). We assume that uj and eij have Normal
distributions as follows;
uj ∼ Normal(0, σ2u)
eij ∼ Normal(0, σ2e)
The initial variation in the data is usually calculated at this stage using the intr-
aclass correlation coefficient.
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Intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC)
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) measures the proportion of variance in the
dependent variable that is accounted for by the groups in the data (Hox, 2010) (i.e.
the proportion of variation in sentence severity - disparity - between offenders (level
2 units)), as shown by:
p =
σ2u
(σ2u + σ
2
e)
Here σ2u is the estimate for the level-2 variance and σ
2
e is the estimate for the level-1
variance. The equation therefore states that that ICC is the proportion of between
group variance compared to the total variance.
By adding covariates - independent explanatory variables - to the model, we can
then begin to account for some of this sentencing variability. To do so, I fit a random
intercept model.
8.2.2 Random intercept model
The random intercept model builds on the variance components model by adding P
explanatory variables or covariates to the model, as shown by;
Yij = β0 +
P∑
p=1
βpxijp + uj + eij
There are actually two parts to this equation: the fixed part
[
β0 +
P∑
p=1
βpxijp
]
and
the random part [uj + eij]. The fixed effects part of the equation controls for the
explanatory variables. Adding explanatory variables to the model aims to account
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for some of the sentencing variation. For example, it is important to control for the
type of offence the offender is being sentenced for, as this will/should be the most
important determinant. The random part of the equation then contains the variation
at the offender level (σ2u) and offence level (σ
2
e) that is left unexplained in the model.
As the covariates - legal and non-legal factors - are added to the model, we would
anticipate the variation in sentence severity to go down, providing these factors are
influencing judges’ decisions when sentencing.
So far I have spoken about a random intercept model that has two levels; offences
at level-1 and offenders at level-2. However, it is possible to introduce a third level
into the analysis to identify if there is any geographical variation21 in sentencing
outcomes. The Probation Trust area is therefore considered as the third level in the
multilevel model.
Therefore the model can now be shown as,
Yijk = β0 +
P∑
p=1
βpxijkp + vk + uj + eij
The k subscript now relates to the third level in the multi level model and vk is
the additional error term where
vk ∼ Normal(0, σ2v)
Possible extensions to the model
If we take the three level model as an example, the random intercept model allows
each Probation Trust area (vk) to contribute an “effect” to sentence severity i.e. to
21Prior to obtaining the data for this research, the data was fully anonoymised by the OASys Data
Evaluation and Analysis Team (O-DEAT). This meant that the information relating to the specific
court the offender was sentenced in was removed from the data set.
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have a different intercept but equal slopes. This is illustrated in the left-hand diagram
(a) in Figure 8.1 for four Probation Trusts, where each Probation Trust’s line crosses
the y-axis at a different point. In this instance, covariates in the model have the same
affect on sentence severity for each Probation Trust area.
Figure 8.1: Multilevel model examples
Another way of extending this model would be to introduce a random coefficient
model. A random coefficient model would allow the model to have different intercepts,
as well as different slopes. This is illustrated in the right-hand diagram (b) in Figure
8.1 for four Probation Trusts, where each Probation Trust’s line crosses the y-axis
at a different point and the slopes are no longer parallel. This indicates that the
relationship between one of more of the covariates and sentence severity varies by
Probation Trust. For example, this could be in relation to ethnicity, where the effects
of ethnicity on sentence severity are greater in one Probation Trust compared to
another Probation Trust.
In this research the random coefficient model was not fitted. In Section 8.6 I
explain that the optimal model is the two-level model, and therefore fitting a random
coefficient model where the intercepts and slopes for 13,495 offenders vary, would be
overly complicated. Perhaps more importantly, substantively it makes little sense.
On the other hand, if the three-level model had been the optimal model then fitting a
random coefficient model would have been appropriate to identify if the relationship
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between covariates varied by Probation Trust area.
8.3 The dependent variable of sentence severity
One of the major differences between this research and research that has been con-
ducted in the past is the development of a new measure of sentence severity. In
Chapter 7 I displayed the results from the extended Goodman RC association analy-
sis (see Table 7.2), which produced the new sentence severity scale (raw scores) and
the linear interpolation of this into equivalent days in custody (final scores). The final
scores (days in custody) are treated as continuous for modelling purposes, which is
used to model sentence severity and assess any sentencing disparity.
8.3.1 Log transformation of dependent variable
In Chapter 4, I explained that a number of studies, such as those conducted by Helms
and Jacobs (2002) and Britt (2009), take the natural logarithm of the dependent vari-
able - sentence length - to reduce the skew in the data. This is because more offenders
receive shorter custodial sentences than mid-length or longer custodial sentences. The
same skew occurs when using the new measure of sentence severity, as the majority
of offenders will receive less severe/shorter sentences. Few offenders receive sentences
in excess of 1000 days. Figure 8.2 displays the distribution of the equivalent days in
custody for the included sample. The skew in the data is very apparent and therefore
to remedy this I also take the natural logarithm of the dependent variable - final
scores (equivalent days in custody). This reduces the skew in the data, which can be
seen in Figure 8.3.
Once transformed, the new dependent variable is treated as a continuous variable
with normal distributions assumed for the random effects. The data is treated as
continuous because the dependent variable is a scale, and therefore approximates
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normality (Hox, 2002). Furthermore, the bias of treating categorical variables as
continuous is very small when there are a large numbers of categories (n=35) (Hox,
2002).
Figure 8.2: Distribution of the equivalent number of days in custody
8.4 Independent variables
The covariates used in this analysis reflect the data that was available and where
possible, I have tried to control for the OASys risks factors, which I discussed in
Chapter 5. However, a number of variables in the dataset had large amounts of
missing data, and therefore it was not possible to account for all the factors shown in
Figure 5.1. It was also decided at this stage to also omit the cases where the offence
plea was recorded as unknown (n=2,227) as no further information was recorded
to explain why the plea was unknown. Some of the other covariates included in
the analysis had some missing data in relation to the offender’s ethnicity (n=4,408),
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Figure 8.3: Distribution of the Log transformed equivalent number of days in custody
accommodation status (n=5,094), employment status (n=5,050), and income status
(n=5,082). An example of the raw data used in the multilevel modelling analysis can
be seen in Appendix D.
The next section will discuss how these cases were dealt with. The following
section will then go on to introduce the independent variables used in the analysis.
Missing cases
For the multilevel modelling analysis a complete case analysis was undertaken: cases
with missing data were removed from the sample based on the assumption they were
missing completely at random (MCAR). Treating the data as MCAR assumes that
the missing data is unconnected to any of the characteristics of the offenders in the
sample. The data is a sub-sample of pre-sentence reports carried out between March
2008 and April 2010. It is my belief that the missing data is the result of those who
carried out the original OASys assessments and who failed to complete sections of the
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assessment prior to these becoming mandatory.
To test the MCAR assumption an analysis of the missing sample (excluded sample)
characteristics was carried out and this was compared with the characteristics of
complete case data (included sample).
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Table 8.1: Full sample
Full1 Included2 Excluded3
Type of covariate Covariate levels Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
Legal Plea Guilty 41,589* (83.9) 25,265* (93.1) 16.321* (91.4)
Not guilty 3,397* (6.9) 1,860* (6.9) 1,537* (8.6)
Unknown 4,604* (9.3)
Numoff <2 offences 18,726 (76.3) 10,619 (76.1) 6,559 (76.2)
>3 offences 5,812 (23.7) 3,326 (23.9) 2,054 (23.8)
Prior Prior 19,173 (78.1) 11,576 (83.0) 6,064 (70.4)
No prior 5,363 (21.9) 2,369 (17.0) 2,548 (29.6)
Additional legal covariates Court Crown 10,360 (42.2) 5,394 (38.7) 4,162 (48.3)
Magistrates’ 14,178 (57.8) 8,551 (61.3) 4,451 (51.7)
Weapon No 43,052* (86.8) 23,455* (86.5) 15,579* (87.2)
Yes 6,537* (13.2) 3,670* (13.5) 2,279* (12.8)
Direct victim No 333,319* (67.2) 18,116* (66.8) 12,004* (67.2)
Yes 16,270* (32.8) 9,009* (33.2) 5,854* (32.8)
Continued on next page
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Table 8.1-continued from previous page
Full1 Included2 Excluded3
Type of covariate Covariate levels Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
Extra-legal Sex Male 21,549 (87.8) 12,272 (88.0) 7,535 (87.5)
Female 2,989 (12.2) 1,673 (12.0) 1,078 (12.5)
Ethnicity White UK and Irish 15,419 (62.8) 11,026 (79.1) 3,115 (36.2)
White other 845 (3.4) 541 (3.9) 224 (2.6)
Mixed 594 (2.4) 416 (3.0) 130 (1.5)
Asian 1,117 (4.6) 738 (5.3) 286 (3.3)
Black 1,601 (6.5) 1,089 (7.8) 396 (4.6)
Other 201 (0.8) 135 (1.0) 54 (0.6)
Missing 4,761 (19.4) 4,408 (51.2)
Age category 21-24 5,284 (21.5) 3,037 (21.8) 2,548 (29.6)
25-29 5,388 (22.0) 3,143 (22.5) 1,806 (21.0)
30-40 7,979 (32.5) 4,692 (33.6) 2,646(30.7)
41-54 4,942 (20.1) 2,617 (18.8) 1,917 (22.3)
55+ 945 (3.9) 456 (3.3) 415 (4.8)
Continued on next page
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Table 8.1-continued from previous page
Full1 Included2 Excluded3
Type of covariate Covariate levels Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
Employment status Employed 5,697 (23.2) 3,851 (27.6) 1,306 (15.2)
Temp/casual 478 (1.9) 359 (2.6) 80 (0.9)
Educ/training 314 (1.3) 220 (1.6) 64 (0.7)
Unemployed 9,504 (38.7) 7,205 (51.7) 1,486 (17.3)
Unavailable for work 3,224 (13.1) 2,310 (16.6) 627 (7.3)
Missing 5,321 (21.7) 5,050 (58.6)
Income status Wages 6,456 (26.3) 4,408 (31.6) 1,448 (16.8)
Pension 217 (0.9) 132 (0.9) 62 (0.7)
State benefits 10,607 (43.2) 8,058 (57.8) 1,645 (19.1)
Other 634 (2.6) 443 (3.2) 142 (1.6)
No income 1,271 (5.2) 904 (6.5) 234 (2.7)
Missing 5,353 (21.8) 5,082 (59.0)
Accommodation status Permanent 14,698 (59.9) 10,556 (75.7) 2,872 (33.3)
Probation/supported 592 (2.4) 452 (3.2) 86 (1.0)
Continued on next page
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Table 8.1-continued from previous page
Full1 Included2 Excluded3
Type of covariate Covariate levels Frequency (%) Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
Short-term 2,855 (11.6) 2,105 (15.1) 458(5.3)
No fixed abode 955 (4.2) 832 (6.0) 123(1.4)
Missing 5,074 (22.5) 5,074 (58.9)
Drug misuse No 9,168 (37.4) 4,585 (32.9) 3,876 (45.0)
Yes 15,370 (62.6) 9,360 (67.1) 4,737 (55.0)
1Offenders in Full sample = 24,538 Offences in Full sample = 49,590
2Offenders in Included sample = 13,945; Offences in Included sample = 27,125
3Offenders in Excluded sample = 8613; Offences in Excluded sample = 17,858
*Figures relate to offences
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Table 8.1 displays the comparisons of the full sample (used to conduct the Good-
man RC analysis), included sample (used to conduct the multilevel model analysis)
and the excluded sample (missing data) for all of the covariates used in this research,
grouped by legal covariates, additional legal covariates and extra-legal characteristics
of the offenders. All of the frequencies and percentages in the table are aggregated to
the offender level, except for plea, weapon and direct victim which relate directly to
each offence and these are indicated with asterisk.
The biggest difference between the three samples relate to the offence plea which
is the result of removing offenders where at least one of their offences was unknown
(n=2,227). The included and excluded samples show similar proportions pleading
guilty and not guilty. Similarly, the proportion of the number of offences the offenders
are sentenced for are also similar across all three samples. Although the included
sample have a higher proportion of offenders who have had a prior court appearance
(83%) compared to the excluded sample (70%). This could potentially indicate that
assessments are completed more thoroughly if offenders have a history of offending
(i.e. no fields are left incomplete resulting in no missing data) than if the offender
had no history of offending. Although, we have no way of validating this hypothesis.
Comparing the additional legal covariates reveals no noteworthy differences between
the three samples
The same proportion of males and females are present in all three samples, as are
the proportions. The age groups of offenders are also similar for the full and included
samples, with slightly more younger (aged 21-24) and older (aged 55+) offenders in
the excluded sample.
It seems that there are only very subtle differences in the samples which indicates
the missing data is MCAR and potentially an administrative oversight is responsible
for the missing data.
Snijders and Bosker (2012) explains there are two basic reasons for attempting to
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deal with missing data in a suitable way. The first is that in some cases, the absence
of the data is related to meaningful information, and ignoring this can lead to bias in
the results. Secondly, deleting incomplete cases is wasteful and leads to unnecessarily
large standard errors of estimators. Although there are other more appropriate ways
of dealing with missing data, such as maximum likelihood and multiple imputation
(Snijders and Bosker, 2012), it was felt that there were too many missing data points
(9,226) to accurately use imputation methods. It was felt that even with the reduced
sample size, the sample was still sufficiently large.
8.4.1 Legal covariates
This section will now explain the legal covariates or characteristics of the offence which
were added first in the multilevel model building stage (see Section 8.6). These covari-
ates relate to the offence which are level 1 explanatory variables, although prior court
appearances and number of offences are level 2 explanatory variables. These covari-
ates are listed below: the variable name is given in parentheses and the proportions
reported are based on the included sample as shown in Table 8.1.
Offence type(Offence)
This variable relates to the type of offence the offender was sentenced for. The 99
major offence categories were previously displayed in Table 5.1. It was anticipated
that offence type would be the most important factor in explaining a substantial
amount of the sentencing variation based on the principle of proportionality.
Plea(Plea)
Offence plea is a legal characteristic: an early guilty plea can reduce the severity of
the sentence by up to 30% (Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004). In the included
sample, 93% of all the offences resulted in a guilty plea, the remaining 7% resulted
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in a not guilty plea. A guilty plea is the reference category in the multilevel model
analysis.
Prior court appearance (Prior)
This variable acts as an indicator of previous offending. It is a dichotomous variable:
83% of the sample had previously appeared in court (labelled as ‘prior’) and therefore
have a history of offending, 17% of the sample had not previously appeared in court
(‘no prior’). The category for no prior court appearance is the reference category.
Number of offences (Numoff )
This variable records the aggregate number of offences that an offender is being sen-
tenced for on that sentencing occasion in which they were subject to a PSR. This
variable has been dichotomised into ‘two or less offences’ (approximately 76% of the
sample) and ‘three or more offences’ (approximately 24% of the sample). The ‘less
than two offences’ category is the reference category.
8.4.2 Additional legal covariates
These are the additional legal covariates which were fitted during stage two of building
the multilevel model. The covariates indicating whether there was a direct victim or a
weapon used are both level 1 explanatory variables and the type of court the offender
was sentenced in is a level 2 explanatory variable.
Type of court (Court)
The type of court the offender was sentenced in is a dichotomous variable: ‘magis-
trates’ court’ or ‘Crown Court’. In the included sample, a bigger proportion of offences
(61%) were tried in the magistrates’ court, while the other 39% of offences were tried
in the Crown Court. The ‘Crown’ court category is the reference category. In 2009,
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93% of offences were sentenced at the magistrates’ court Ministry of Justice (2009)
which illustrates that the more serious cases are included in this sample due to using
OASys data.
Direct Victim (Dir)
This variable indicates if the offence involved a direct victim, either through contact
or targeting, which inevitably makes an offence more serious (Sentencing Guidelines
Council, 2004). In the included sample, fewer than 10,000 cases (33% of offences)
involved a direct victim. This is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the offence
involved a direct victim - ‘yes’ or ‘no’. No direct victim is the reference category.
Weapon (Weap)
This variable indicates whether a weapon was carried during the offence. An offence
which involves carrying or using a weapon increases the seriousness of that offence
(Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004). In this sample, 14% of cases were identified
as using a weapon (‘yes’). Again this is a dichotomous variable, whereby ‘no’ is the
reference category.
8.4.3 Extra-legal - characteristics of the offender
These covariates were added at the third stage of the model building. All of these
variable relate to the offender and are therefore level 2 explanatory variables.
Sex (Sex)
The sample is male dominated: 88% of the included sample being male, and 12%
being female. The ‘female’ category is the reference category.
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Ethnicity (Eth)
The majority (79%) of the included sample are categorised as ‘White British and
Irish‘ (reference category) and a further 4% are categorised as ‘White Other’. The
second largest group are ‘Black’ offenders (8%) followed by ‘Asian’ offenders (5%).
The ‘Mixed’ offender category and ‘Other’ offender category account for 3% and 1%
of the sample respectively.
Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) do heed warning over using such broad ethnic
categories as this may mask some of the findings, and therefore it would be more
robust to refine the ethnic categories; for example to account for Pakistani, Indian,
and Bangladeshi offenders in the Asian category. However, the numbers in these
sub-categories were too small and therefore had to be grouped together.
Age
Over the age of 21, age is not considered a relevant factor in sentencing. Within the lit-
erature and previous research into disparity age has tended to be under-conceptualised
(Mueller-Johnson and Dhami, 2009) and therefore it was included in this analysis.
Age was organised into 5 age categories; 21-24 (22%), 25-29 (23%), 30-40 (34%), 41-
54 (19%), and 55+ (3%). The reference category was the youngest age group (21-24).
Age was included as a categorical measure to access if there was any significant dif-
ferences between age groups. A continuous measure of age or the square root of age
would only have identified if there was a linear or curve-linear relationship.
Employment (Emp)
The majority of the sample were ‘unemployed’ (52%) prior to sentencing, with a
further 17% were recorded as ‘unavailable to work’ (for example, those who are unable
to work due to incapacity or ill health). 28% were employed (either full or part-time),
while just under 3% were in temporary or casual employment. The remaining 2% were
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in education or training prior to sentencing. The employed group are the reference
category.
Income (Inc)
A large proportion of the sample (58%) were in receipt of benefits prior to sentencing,
less than 1% were living on pensions or maintenance payments. Just under 7% stated
they had no income prior to sentencing, whilst 3% were classified as ‘other’. Only
32% of the sample relied on their wages or partners wages as their source of income.
This is the reference category.
Accommodation status (Acc)
The majority (76%) of the sample reported they lived in ‘permanent independent
housing’ (reference category). Just over 3% lived in ‘probation or supported housing’
and 15% were living in short-term transient accommodation. The remaining 6% of
the sample were recorded as having ‘no fixed abode’.
Misuse of drugs (Drugs)
The UK Drug Policy Commission (UKDPC) report problem drug users are more likely
to be found within the criminal justice system than within the wider population (UK
Drug Policy Commission, 2008). Problem drug users also tend to have higher rates of
offending and are particularly associated with acquisitive crimes, such as shoplifting
and burglary (ibid). This variable is dichotomous, in which 67% of the offenders in
the sample admitted to misusing drugs - ‘yes’, the other 33% reported they had not
misused drugs - ‘no’ (reference category).
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8.4.4 Variables not available to use in the analysis
A number of variables, such as the number of the offender’s prior convictions, previous
spent sentences, the court (location and size) the offender was sentenced in, and the
characteristics of the judges, i.e. their gender and ethnicity was not available in the
data. Had this information been available then we would have a more accurate picture
of the possible factors impacting on sentencing. Additionally, a number of variables
that were available form OASys could also not be included, such as, marital status,
attitudinal factors, risk of recidivism scores etc., as there was a substantial amount
of missing data.
At this stage it is also important to highlight that it is not possible to ever fully
explain sentencing disparity by modelling the data: there will always be some vari-
ability that cannot be explained. As I have previously highlighted, sentencing does
not occur in a vacuum: there may be factors impacting on sentences that are not
recorded in the data, such as the offender’s attitude in court or the judge’s mood.
We would therefore expect there to be some unexplained variation in sentencing to
account for these extraneous factors.
8.5 Software
A number of software packages (e.g. R, SPSS, SAS and STATA) allow multilevel
models to be fitted. There are also special software packages (e.g. HLM, MLwiN,
and the MOXOR suite (Snijders and Bosker, 2012)) that are specifically aimed at
applying multilevel modelling techniques and have been designed by pioneers in the
field of multilevel modelling (Snijders and Bosker, 2012). Snijders and Bosker (2012)
describes MLwiN as the most extensive multilevel package, written by researchers at
the University of Bristol. It is a flexible package, which also allows for data manipula-
tion, graphing, simple statistical computations and file manipulation (ibid). For these
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reasons, it seemed sensible to use this package to conduct the multilevel analysis for
this research.
After attempting to fit the first basic model in MLwiN, it became clear that
due to the amount of data and the memory capacity of my machine, it would not
be possible to continue with this software. The same problem also occurred when
using the R software environment on my own machine, even with a reduced sample
size. Therefore, I again used Lancaster University’s High End Computing Cluster.
Although this service supports a number of third-party software, including R, it does
not support MLwiN.
Consequently, the multilevel modelling analysis was conducted using the R soft-
ware environment and the University’s High End Computing Cluster service. An
example of the layout of the dataset used to conduct the multilevel modelling can be
seen in Appendix D.
The ‘lme4’ package by Bates et al. (2014) provided the functions for fitting the
multilevel models. The final model (Model 24) was fitted using the following com-
mand:
MODEL24← lmer(Logdays ∼ OFFENCE+Plea+Numoff+Court+Emp+Acc
+ Inc+ Sex+ Eth+ Age+ (1 | SentOcc), data = DATA,REML = FALSE)
A sample of the code used to create the optimal multilevel model in R can be seen
in Appendix F.
8.6 Model fitting
A typical approach to multilevel model building according to Luke (2004) is to work
from the bottom up. By this, he means fitting a variance components model or
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null model with no explanatory variables/covariates to assess the initial variation in
the model and then gradually adding each covariate to the model one at a time.
Luke (2004) suggests starting with the level 1 explanatory variables before going on
and including level 2 and possibly level 3 explanatory variables. In doing so, it is
hoped that the covariates will reduce the deviance in the model which will go some
way towards explaining the observed data. This is slightly different to the technique
utilised in this work, which I will now explain.
The model building for this part of the analysis was essentially conducted in four
stages:
Stage 1
Legal covariates; Offence, Plea, Numoff, and Prior were added
Stage 2
Additional legal covariates; Court, Dir, and Weap were added
Stage 3
Extra-legal covariates; Sex, Age, Eth, Emp, Acc, Inc, Drugs, and interactions
Sex*Eth, and Sex*Age were added
Stage 4
Third level; Probation Trust was added
The first stage sees the main legal covariates added to the model (the same three
legal variables that were used in the previous analysis to estimate the severity scale,
and discussed in Chapter 6) as well as the offence covariate, stage two extended this
model by adding three additional legal covariates, stage three incorporated the extra-
legal covariates relating to the characteristics of the offender including two interactions
and finally, stage four extended the model to account for a third level. Each of these
stages and the corresponding tables will be discussed in turn.
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To note, once again maximum likelihood estimation was used to assess model
fit and provide the model deviance (minus twice the log-likelihood ratio of the model
compared to the saturated model). To test whether the additional covariates improved
model fit, the reduction in deviance and the degrees of freedom for each of the nested
models was used to provide a p-value, which suggested whether there was sufficient
evidence at the 1% level to reject or not reject the additional parameters in the model.
The first stage of the model building process is displayed in Table 8.2. The first
model fitted was the variance components or null model. This model provided an
estimate of the initial variance in sentence severity between offenders, which will be
discussed in the following results chapter. From here, the main legal covariates were
added to the model.
Arguably the most important variable to be controlled for in this type of analysis
is the type of offence that the offender was sentenced for. As can be seen from Table
8.2, by controlling for this covariate alone, the deviance was reduced by 11,636 on
98 degrees of freedom. This yielded a p-value of <0.0001, which indicated there was
sufficient evidence to suggest this additional parameter should remain in the model.
This model now becomes known as the base model, and the additional legal covariates
are added to this model.
The deviance of Models 2-4 were compared to the base model (Model 1). The
covariates relating to the offender’s plea and the number of offences they were be-
ing sentenced for at the sentencing occasion were highly significant, indicating they
should be included in the model. The covariate indicating prior court appearances was
not significant, suggesting there was insufficient evidence to include this additional
covariate. It may be a little surprising to see that this covariate was not statistically
significant when the sentencing legislation states prior offending as an aggravating fac-
tor. However, the prior court appearance only acts as an indicator of prior offending
and is not a direct measure.
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Combinations of the legal covariates were then fitted. Plea was then added to
the model controlling for Numoff (Model 3) and this became Model 5. The deviance
from Model 5 was then compared to that of Model 3. As a final check to see whether
having controlled for plea and number of offences, prior court appearance should
now be included: Prior was added to create model 6 and compared with the previous
model (Model 5). This additional parameter reduced the deviance by 1.86 on 1 degree
of freedom. The resultant p-value (p=0.1726) was not significant and therefore this
covariate was not included in the model. Model 5 provided the best model fit and
will be discussed in the following results chapter (Chapter 9).
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Table 8.2: Stage one multilevel model building (legal covariates): Goodness of fit results I
Model Covariates Deviance Difference Difference in p-value
in deviance degrees of freedom
0 Null 64,504.78
1 Base (Offence type) 52869.20 11,636 98 <0.0001
2 Base, Plea 52,804.20 65 1 <0.0001
3 Base, Number of offences (Numoff) 52,770.19 99.00 1 <0.0001
4 Base, Prior court appearance (Prior) 52,867.19 2.01 1 0.1566
5 Base, Numoff, Plea 52,702.01 68.19 1 <0.0001
6 Base, Numoff, Plea, Prior 52,700.15 1.86 1 0.1726
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Table 8.3: Stage two multilevel model building (testing for additional legal covariates): Goodness of fit results II
Model Covariates Deviance Difference in Difference in p-value
deviance degrees of freedom
5 Base, Numoff, Plea 52,702.01
7 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court type (Court) 50,310.37 2391.60 1 <0.0001
8 Base, Numoff, Plea, Weapon (Weap) 52,689.35 12.65 1 0.0004
9 Base, Numoff, Plea, Direct victim (Dir) 52,685.60 16.41 1 <0.0001
10 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Dir 50,305.71 4.66 1 0.0308
11 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Weap 50,310.34 0.03 1 0.8536
12 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Dir, Weap 50,05.63 0.08 1 0.7711
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The second stage of the analysis built on the analysis conducted in stage one.
Stage two began with the best model (Model 5) from Table 8.2, hence it is repeated
in Table 8.3. At this stage I attempted to control for three additional legal covariates;
the type of court the offender was sentenced in, whether the offence involved the use
of a weapon and whether there was a direct victim.
Model 7 controlled for the type of court the offender was sentenced in, which
reduced the deviance by 2,391.6 on 1 degree of freedom (compared to Model 5).
This yielded a highly significant p-value (p-value <0.0001) which suggested there was
sufficient evidence to include this additional covariate in the model. Furthermore,
Models 8 and 9 also yielded significant p-values (p-value <0.001), suggesting there
was also evidence to keep ‘Weap’ and ‘Dir’ in the model. Combinations of the three
covariates were then also fitted (Models 10-12). Model 9 controlled for court and
direct victim variables, which reduced the deviance in the model by 4.66 on 1 degree
of freedom (compared with model 7). The resultant p-value was 0.0308 and not
significant at the 1% level, therefore ‘dir’ should not be included in the model. Model
11 controlled for use of a weapon as well as court, adding this variable reduced the
deviance by less than 1 on 1 degree of freedom (compared with Model 7). The
result was not significant (p-value 0.8536) indicating there was not enough evidence
to include ‘weap’. Just as a precaution Model 12 then included both these variables
- direct victim and use of a weapon - and reduced model deviance by less than 1 on
1 degree of freedom (compared with Model 10). Again the non-significant p-value
of 0.7711 indicated there was insufficient evidence to warrant the inclusion of these
additional variables. Therefore once we control for the type of court the offender was
sentenced in, the additional covariates do not improve the model enough to warrant
their inclusion in the model.
On reflection this result is not a complete surprise as we would anticipate offences
which involve the use of a weapon and/or involve a direct victim will automatically
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increase the seriousness of the offence. In which case, the offender would likely be
sent to the Crown court for sentencing, and therefore by controlling for the type of
court the offender was sentenced, this is enough to adequately explain what we are
witnessing in the data.
Highlighted in bold, Model 7, controlling for offence type, the number of offences
the offender was sentenced for, offence plea and type of court the offender was sen-
tenced in proves to be the optimal model fit. The results from this model are reported
in the following chapter.
The third stage in the model fitting process attempted to control for the extra-
legal covariates of the case. The additional seven covariates were added individually
to the model and compared with the nested model (Model 7) to assess their respective
deviance, as shown in the first half of Table 8.4.
In the second half of Table 8.4 combinations of the covariates were then added to
the model in descending order of their deviance. For example, from the first part of
Table 8.4 we can see Model 16 - offender’s employment status - reduced the deviance
by 44.99 on 4 degrees of freedom compared with Model 8 (p-value <0.0001) and so this
was the first covariate to be included. This was followed by income, accommodation
status and so on to produce the models in the second part of Table 8.4. As each
additional covariate was added to the model, the deviance was compared with the
previous nested model. The last model to be fitted (Model 26) attempted to control
for effect of drug misuse on sentence severity. Comparing this model (Model 26) to
Model 24 saw a reduction in deviance of 3.66 on 1 degree resulting in a p-value of
0.5580, indicating there was not enough evidence to suggest this covariate should be
included in the model.
Consequently, from the third stage of this multilevel analysis, Model 24 is the
optimal model controlling for; offence type, the number of offences the offender was
sentenced for, offence plea and type of court the offender was sentenced in, the employ-
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ment, accommodation and income status of the offender, the offender’s sex, ethnicity
and age. One small caveat needs to be mentioned in relation to the inclusion of age in
the final model. At the beginning of this section it was stipulated that only covariates
that were significant at the 1% level of significance would be included in the models.
Table 8.4 shows that including age in the model reduces the model deviance by 12.42
on 4 degrees of freedom, and the resulting p-value was 0.0145. Therefore age was only
just not significant at the 1% level. However, as will become clear in the following
chapter, there are significant differences in the effects of age on sentence severity and
therefore it was decided this covariate should remain in the model.
Two further models were fitted as an extension of Model 24 to test for interaction
effects and can be seen at the bottom of Table 8.4. The first model (Model 24a) added
an interaction term between sex and ethnicity. Comparing the goodness of fit with
Model 24 reduced the deviance by 1.23 on 5 degrees of freedom. This yielded a p-value
of 0.942, indicating the additional parameter did not improve the model. The second
model (Model 24b) added an interaction term between sex and age. Comparing the
goodness of fit with Model 24 reduced the model deviance by 2.91 on 4 degrees of
freedom. The p-value of 0.574 indicated the additional parameter (interaction between
sex and age) did not significantly improve model fit. Therefore Model 24 remains the
optimal model. The results from Model 24 are reported in the following chapter
The last stage of this multilevel analysis extended the optimal two level model
(Model 24) to three levels - offence (level 1), offender (level 2), Probation Trust (level
3) to fit Model 27. This additional model is shown in Table 8.5. Adding this extra
‘random effect’ reduced the deviance by 2.6 on 1 degree of freedom (compared to
Model 24), which resulted in a p-value of 0.8931. There was consequently insufficient
evidence to warrant the inclusion of this additional parameter.
This result indicates there is little evidence of sentencing variation at the Probation
Trust level, which is a positive outcome for the criminal justice system. Of course, this
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does not rule out the fact that there may be variation within, as well as, between courts
within the Probation Trust which cancels itself out - some courts may sentence some
offenders more severely whilst others sentence offenders less severely, and therefore
this disguises any disparate sentencing. This was observed in Hood’s (1992) study
which looked at disparity based on the ethnicity of offenders in the West-Midlands.
Although, this is not something that can be tested within this research due to court
level information being unavailable.
Model 24 remains the optimal model.
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Table 8.4: Stage three multilevel model building (extra-legal covariates): Goodness of fit results III
Model Covariates Deviance Difference in Difference in p-value
deviance degrees of freedom
7 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court 50,310.37
13 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Sex 50,287.23 23.15 1 <0.0001
14 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Ethnicity (Eth) 50,291.46 18.92 5 0.0020
15 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Age(cat) 50,302.87 7.51 4 0.1114
16 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Employment (Emp) 50,265.39 44.99 4 <0.0001
17 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Accommodation (Acc) 50,269.58 40.79 3 <0.0001
18 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Income (Inc) 50,269.48 40.87 4 <0.0001
19 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Drug misuse (Drugs) 50,303.21 7.16 1 0.0075
16 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp 50,265.39
20 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc 50,232.41 32.98 3 <0.0001
21 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc 50,190.00 42.40 4 <0.0001
22 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex 50,169.53 20.47 1 <0.0001
23 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex, Eth 50,152.79 16.75 5 <0.01
24 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex, Eth, Age 50,140.36 12.42 4 0.0145
25 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex, Eth, Drugs 50,150.78 2.01 1 0.1560
26 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex, Eth, Age, Drugs 50,136.70 3.66 1 0.5580
24a Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex, Eth, Age, Sex*Eth 50,139.13 1.23 5 0.942
24b Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex, Eth, Age, Sex*Age 50,137.45 2.91 4 0.574
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Table 8.5: Stage four multilevel model building (extending the model to three levels): Goodness of fit results IIII
Model Covariates Deviance Difference in Difference in p-value
deviance degrees of freedom
24 Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex, Eth, Age 50,140.36
27
Three levels (Probation Trust):
Base, Numoff, Plea, Court, Emp, Acc, Inc, Sex, Eth, Age 50,137.76 2.60 1 0.8931
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8.6.1 Confidence intervals
Once the models were fitted, 95% likelihood-based confidence intervals were computed
for each of the levels within each of the categorical covariates and for the random ef-
fects or variance parameters. This was to establish whether there were any statistically
significant differences between the reference category and the additional levels of the
covariate, and to assess the accuracy of the variance estimates. For example, as I will
illustrate in Chapter 9, the results reveal there is sufficient evidence at the 5% level
to suggest that offenders who pleaded guilty (reference category) were sentenced less
severely than offenders who plead not guilty, when controlling for a variety of legal
and non-legal characteristics. Confidence intervals were estimated using the profile
likelihood and confint Bates et al. (2014) commands in R.
The lme4 package does not provide p-values associated with the parameter esti-
mates from the model output. The authors admit to not knowing how to calculate
exact values, as well as being unsure how best to approximate the degrees of freedom
in a mixed model framework (Chang, L, 2010). It is argued “simple formulas for the
degrees of freedom for inferences based on t or F -distributions do not apply in such
cases. In fact, the pivotal quantities for such hypothesis tests do not even have t or
F -distributions in such cases so trying to determine the “correct” value of degrees
of freedom to apply is meaningless” (Baayen et al., 2008, p. 396). For example, the
MIXED procedure in SAS offers 6 different calculations of degrees of freedom which
lead to different p-values but none of them are “correct” (ibid). Therefore the au-
thors have chosen to abstain from providing p-values until they have developed a more
accurate method to do this (Chang, L, 2010).
8.6.2 Log-multiplicative effects on sentence severity
Modelling the natural logarithm of the dependent variable results in a multilevel
multiple linear regression with covariates that have a linear relationship with the de-
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pendent variable on a log scale. The resulting parameter estimates can be interpreted
on a log scale additively or alternatively the exponent of the parameter estimate will
be interpreted multiplicatively. Aitkin et al. (2009, p. 125) explain that although a
“model is fitted on a log scale, we usually want to interpret the model on the original
scale: if fitted values from the model are transformed by exp(fitted(model.object)) to
the original scale, these are fitted values for the median response, not for the mean”.
Therefore, here I took the exponent of each parameter estimate and interpreted these
multiplicatively. For example, if we take a result of 1.15, this would suggest that an
offender is sentenced 15% more severely than the baseline or reference category. This
then allows me to assess the effect that each parameter has on sentence severity in
terms of the change in percent that each parameter has compared to the reference
or baseline category. If for example, a not guilty plea is shown to significantly effect
sentence severity (which will be confirmed by the 95% confidence intervals for the
estimate), the result may indicate that an offender who pleaded not guilty is sen-
tenced 10% more severely than a like-situated offender who pleaded guilty. Had the
exponent of this estimate not been taken, the results would be interpreted in terms of
the difference in days. This is not sensible due to the vast distribution of sentences.
8.7 Concluding remarks
This chapter has discussed the statistical method of multilevel modelling and in par-
ticular the random intercept model, and how it is used to measure sentencing disparity
for this doctoral research. This research differs from the previous studies conducted
in the area because the scale was derived from statistically modelling real sentencing
data obtained from the courts to create a sentence severity scale.
To conduct this analysis the log-transformed final scores - equivalent days in cus-
tody - obtained from the extended Goodman RC association analysis were used. The
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transformation was then used as the dependent variable with a number of legal and
extra-legal independent variables in the multilevel model. A random intercept model
was fitted to the data using the R statistics package. The stages of the model fitting
were then reported in this chapter.
The following chapter - Chapter 9 - provides the results of the multilevel modelling
analysis. Chapter 10 then facilitates a discussion surrounding these results and how
they fit in to the wider context of sentencing disparity.
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Chapter 9
Results of multilevel modelling
9.1 Introduction
This chapter will report the results from the multilevel modelling analysis conducted
in the R statistics package using lme4 as described in the previous chapter. I will
first report the null or variance components model then go on to report the additional
random intercept models that were explained in the previous chapter.
9.2 Variance components model
Table 9.1 displays the results from the fitted variance components Null Model. There
are no covariates in this model - just the intercept parameter. Table 9.1 displays the
estimated intercept coefficient and the 95% confidence intervals below this in brackets
(column 2), and multiplicative effect of the coefficient (column 3).
The intercept provides an estimate for the average sentence (severity) score for
the offenders in the model. By calculating the multiplicative effect of the intercept
coefficient (4.699) (as discussed in section 8.6), this provided us with the average
number of days in custody within the sample, which in this case was approximately
110 days. Although this information is good to know it does not assess whether or
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not there is any sentencing disparity.
Table 9.1: Null Model
Parameter Coefficient Multiplicative effect Model deviance
(CI* 95%)
Intercept 4.699 109.84 64, 504.78
(4.6826, 4.7155)
*Likelihood-based Confidence Intervals (CI 95%)
Table 9.2: Null Model - random effects
Random effects Variance Confidence intervals
σ2 (95%)
σ2u Level-two variance 0.8965 0.8839, 0.9094
σ2e Level-one variance 0.5003 0.4944, 0.5062
In section 8.2.1 I explained that the variance components model usually provides
a starting point for any multilevel analysis. This allows the researcher to ascertain
the initial variance within the data (before any explanatory variables are added to the
model) using the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). Table 9.2 displays the random
effects from the null model, which are used to calculate the ICC. The confidence
intervals for the estimate is also shown to demonstrate the accuracy of the estimates.
In this case the ICC was calculated at 0.6418 using the formula σ
2
u
(σ2u+σ
2
e)
, there-
fore 64% of the sentencing variation occurs between offenders. This is a very high
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result indicating that there is considerable variation between offenders (level-2 units).
However, this is not a surprising result as we know from Chapter 5 that there are
99 different offence categories ranging from murder and manslaughter to drunk and
disorderly and public order offences, and consequently 35 sentence categories ranging
from conditional discharges to prison sentences of over 10 years. Therefore, without
taking at least the offence type into account - not to mention the other legal factors
of the case - we would expect to see this result.
The remainder of this chapter will now discuss the additional models fitted using
the random intercept model, which controls for explanatory variables in an attempt
to account for this sentencing variation between offenders.
9.3 Random intercept models
This section will report on the three models which were explained in Section 8.6 as
being the optimal models. The first model (Model 5) contains the legal variables
explicitly referred to in the sentencing legislation which should be taken into con-
sideration when sentencing offenders in a court of law. The second model that is
discussed here is Model 7, which controlled for the type of court that the offender was
sentenced in, as well as the legal characteristics of the case. The third model (Model
21) builds on the previous model, taking into consideration a number of extra-legal
characteristics of the offender. These three models will be discussed in turn. The
results from each of the three models are displayed in the relevant tables within each
section. Any result which is different and consequently statistically significant (at the
5% level) from the reference category is highlighted in italics, based on the confidence
intervals obtained from the profile and confint commands in R, as also discussed in
Chapter 8.
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9.3.1 Model 5 - controlling for the legal characteristics of the
offence
Before any investigation into sentencing disparity can be conducted it is imperative to
control for the legal characteristics of the case. The principle of proportionality places
great emphasis on the severity of the sentence being proportional to the seriousness
of the offence. The type of offence that the offender is being sentenced for must be
taken into consideration in any analysis into sentencing variation. On top of this, as
discussed in Chapter 2, sentencing legislation sets out a legal framework within which
judges and magistrates must work. Offender plea is one legal factor which judges
should take into consideration when sentencing offenders: a discount for a guilty plea is
recommended. Relevant previous convictions should also be taken into consideration
as an aggravating factor thereby adding to the seriousness of the offending behaviour.
Unfortunately this information is not available in this data and therefore an indicator
of previous offending was used in its place, that is, prior court appearance, although
this was not found to improve the accuracy of the model. In addition, where the
offender is being sentenced for multiple offences, sentencing legislation states that
judges should apply the principle of totality. This means that judges should sentence
proportionately, taking into account all the offences so not to apply an excessive
sentence, which is common in certain states of the U.S, such as a 100 year prison
term. It must be made clear here that it was not possible to account for every legal
factor (i.e. all aggravating and mitigating factors listed in the legislation) due to the
availability of information in the data used in this research.
In Section 8.6 I pointed out that the variable relating to prior court appearance
did not significantly improve the model fit, and so it was not included in the optimal
model. Although this is a surprising result, as research by Ulmer and Johnson (2004)
and Britt (2009) for example, found previous offending to be highly significant. In
this research it is likely that the covariate used to indicate prior offending was not
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an accurate measure of prior offending. Had the number of previous convictions been
available in the data, this would have been included in the model.
Three covariates were included in Model 5 - offence type, offence plea, and the
number of offences that the offender was being sentenced for - and the results are
displayed in Table 9.3. The first column of Table 9.3 displays the covariates included
in the model, column two is the parameter or category level within the covariate,
column three provides the estimate, and column four displays the multiplicative effect
of the estimate for each parameter.
The results provided in Table 9.3 and subsequent tables relate to the average
sentence an offender is sentenced to for the offence of burglary in a dwelling and
where the offender was sentenced for a one or two offences and pleaded guilty to the
offence. These estimates are the reference or baseline categories. As can be seen
from Table 9.3, the average sentence an offender received for an offender sentenced
for burglary in a dwelling (sentenced for less than two offences and pleaded guilty to
this offence) was approximately 329 days in custody.
One point to mention, in Table 9.3 and subsequent tables in this chapter, the
parameters relating to the offence type have not been included, only the estimate for
burglary in a dwelling. This because there are 99 offence parameters and therefore
too many to display in this format.
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Table 9.3: Model 5 results
Covariate Parameter/level Coefficient Multiplicative effect Model deviance
(CI 95%)
Intercept 8.3013 52,702.01
(4.6826, 4.7155)
Offences Burglary in a dwelling -2.5069 328.46
(-4.0089, -1.0049)
Number of offences <2 offences (reference)
>3 offences 0.1460 1.1572
(0.1177, 0.1742)
Plea Guilty (reference)
Not guilty 0.1778 1.1946
(0.1356, 0.2199)
*Note - parameters in italics are significantly different from the reference category based on the 95% likelihood-based CI
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The results from this model (Model 5) reveal offenders sentenced for three or
more offences are sentenced on average 16% (1.1572) more severely than like-situated
offenders that were sentenced for two or fewer offences. This result is statistically
significant as can be seen from the 95% confidence intervals displayed below the
estimate in brackets and which do not include 1. It would appear reasonable and also
proportionate that offenders who are sentenced for multiple offences are sentenced
more severely than offenders sentenced for fewer than two offences and this would be
in line with the principle of totality.
Offenders who pleaded not guilty but are then found guilty of an offence, will
not benefit from the guilty plea discount, As a result, offenders can expect to be
sentenced 19% (1.1946) more severely than a like-situated offender pleading guilty to
their offence, when controlling for the offence type, the number of offences they are
being sentenced for and their offence plea.
Table 9.4: Model 5 - random effects
Random effects Variance Confidence intervals
σ2 (95%)
σ2u Level-two variance 0.6239 0.6138, 0.6342
σ2e Level-one variance 0.4433 0.4381, 0.4487
Recall previously the ICC for the variance components Null Model was 64%. Table
9.4 provides the estimates for the random effects for Model 5. The ICC for Model 5
- controlling for the type of offence, the number of offences being sentenced and the
offence plea - is reduced to 0.5846 or 58%. Therefore these three variables included in
Model 5 account for around 6% of the sentencing variation between offenders. This
sentencing variation is still incredibly high and therefore needs further investigation.
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9.3.2 Model 7 - controlling for the legal characteristics of the
offence and the court effect
As discussed in Chapter 2, sentencing legislation under the Powers of the Criminal
Court (Sentencing) Act 2000 limits the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ courts.
Therefore we would expect to see a substantial difference in the sentences issued by
the Crown and magistrates’ courts. Model 7 controls for this, as well as offence type,
number of offences the offender was being sentenced for and offence plea.
Table 9.5 provides the parameter estimate for Model 7 which shows that for the
offence of burglary in a dwelling the average sentence is approximately 408 days,
which is higher than that reported in Model 5. This is due to the fact we are now
controlling for the type of court the offence was sentenced in. The Crown Court is now
the reference category for Model 7 and subsequent models. Controlling for the type of
court the offence was sentenced in indicates the increased level of offence seriousness
and this will reflect the characteristics of the offence, i.e the value of the goods stolen
during the burglary.
On the contrary, and as we would have expected, offenders sentenced in the mag-
istrates’ courts are sentenced less severely than an offender in the Crown Court. The
model predicts that offenders sentenced in the magistrates’ court rather than the
Crown Court would be sentenced 51% less severely. This is a bigger reduction that
would have perhaps been anticipated but this may be down to the fact that there are
additional factors that we have not been able to account for due to the availability of
that information.
Controlling for the type of court the offender was sentenced in, also alters the other
parameter estimates in the model. As can be seen from Table 9.5, offenders sentenced
for more than three offences would expect to see a 13% (1.1272) increase in the
severity of their sentence, as opposed to being sentenced for one or two offences. This
is lower than previously estimated in Model 5, where the estimate was 16%. There
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could be various reasons for this, one reason being, as we know offences sentenced at
the Crown Court are more serious than those offences sentenced at the magistrates’
court, therefore once the seriousness of the offences (where there are multiple offences)
reaches a certain threshold, so too does the sentence severity. A way in which judges
may then deal with this is after a certain point they begin to constrain the overall
severity of the sentence to ensure they are issuing a proportionate sentence within the
realms of totality. Of course there may be other explanations for this result, which I
have not been able to control for in this research.
Model 7 also controlled for offence plea, as did model 5. The effect of entering a
not guilty plea and being found guilty still has a positive, significant effect on sentence
severity. Having controlled for the additional parameter (type of court) this effect is
slightly less. Offenders pleading not guilty as opposed to guilty can expect a sentence
in the region of 14% more severe. This is slightly less that estimated in the previous
model.
The random effects estimates are displayed in Table 9.6. The ICC for Model 7
is now 0.5658, which means there is still 56.58% variation at the offender level after
controlling for offence type, number of offences being sentenced, plea and the type of
court the offender was sentenced in. This combination of variables only explain 8%
of the variation in sentencing.
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Table 9.5: Model 7 results
Covariate Parameter/level Coefficient Multiplicative effect Model deviance
(CI 95%)
Intercept 8.3450 50,310.37
(6.9387, 9.7512)
Offences Burglary in a dwelling -2.3328 408.38
(-3.7400, -0.9256)
Number of offences <2 offences (reference)
>3 offences 0.1198 1.1272
(0.0935, 0.1460)
Plea Guilty (reference)
Not guilty 0.1345 1.1440
(0.0946, 0.1745)
Court Crown (reference)
Magistrates’ -0.6956 0.4988
(-0.7226, 0.6686)
*Note - parameters in italics are significantly different from the reference category based on the 95% likelihood-based CI
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Table 9.6: Model 7 - random effects
Random effects Variance Confidence intervals
σ2 (95%)
σ2u Level-two variance 0.5687 0.5593, 0.5783
σ2e Level-one variance 0.4365 0.4314, 0.4417
9.3.3 Model 24 - also controlling for the extra-legal charac-
teristics of the offender
Model 24 extended the previous models, by controlling for numerous extra-legal vari-
ables which according to various sentencing legislation should not be taken into consid-
eration when sentencing offenders but are included in the actuarial risk of recidivism
calculation carried out by the OASys assessment. The results are shown in Table 9.7.
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Table 9.7: Model 24 results
Covariate Parameter/level Coefficient Multiplicative effect Model deviance
(CI 95%)
Intercept 8.1703 50,140.36
(6.7688, 9.5719)
Offence (See Appendix F) Burglary in a dwelling -2.3446 338.90
(-3.7466, -0.9425)
Number of offences <2 offences (reference)
>3 offences 0.1165 1.1235
(0.0905, 0.1428)
Plea Guilty (reference)
Not guilty 0.1357 1.1553
(0.0958, 0.1758)
Court Crown (reference)
Magistrates’ -0.6913 0.5005
Continued on next page
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Table 9.7-continued from previous page
Covariate Parameter/level Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(-0.7180, -0.6639)
Employment status Employed full/part-time (reference)
Temp/Casual work 0.0885 1.0925
(0.0135, 0.1637)
Education/Training 0.0761 1.0791
(-0.0201, 0.1725)
Unemployed 0.1707 1.1862
(0.1211, 0.2214)
Unavailable for work 0.1279 1.1364
(0.0696, 0.1830)
Accommodation status Permanent (reference)
Probation Housing -0.0823 0.9210
(-0.1462, -0.0190)
Transient/Short-term -0.0051 0.9949
(-0.0368, 0.0271)
Continued on next page
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Table 9.7-continued from previous page
Covariate Parameter/level Coefficient Multiplicative effect
No fixed abode 0.1038 1.1094
(0.0546, 0.1522)
Income status Wages (reference)
Pension/Maintenance -0.1413 0.8682
(-0.2729, -0.0091)
State benefits -0.1102 0.8956
(-0.1591, -0.0620)
No income -0.0292 0.9713
(-0.0953, 0.0310)
Other 0.0426 1.07435
(-0.0318, 0.1184)
Sex Female (reference)
Male 0.0852 1.0890
(0.0491, 0.1208)
Ethnicity White UK & Irish (reference)
Continued on next page
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Table 9.7-continued from previous page
Covariate Parameter/level Coefficient Multiplicative effect
White other -0.0772 0.9257
(-0.1362, -0.0178)
Mixed -0.0075 0.9925
(-0.0738, 0.0595)
Asian -0.0203 0.9799
(-0.0723, 0.0230)
Black 0.0439 1.0449
(0.0010, 0.0869)
Other 0.1214 1.1291
(0.0061, 0.2383)
Age 21-24 (reference)
25-29 0.0396 1.0404
(0.0056, 0.0731)
30-40 0.0496 1.0508
(0.0180, 0.0808)
Continued on next page
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Table 9.7-continued from previous page
Covariate Parameter/level Coefficient Multiplicative effect
41-54 0.0486 1.0498
(0.0121, 0.0849)
55+ 0.0819 1.0853
(0.0087, 0.1565)
*Note - parameters in italics are significantly different from the reference category based on the 95% likelihood based CI
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Model 24 now controls for 10 variables: 4 legal covariates and 6 extra-legal covari-
ates. Using the random intercept model equation in Section 8.2.2 and the estimates
from the multilevel model shown in Table 9.7 and Appendix F (offence category esti-
mates), we can estimate the expected sentence of an offender convicted of burglary in
a dwelling (major offence code 28) in the Crown Court (reference category), at this
sentencing occasion they were sentenced for one or two offences (reference category)
and pleaded guilty (reference category) to their offence. At the time of sentencing
the offender was in full-time employment (reference category), and therefore relying
on their own income (reference category) through working, and lived in permanent
accommodation (reference category). The offender was female (reference category)
with White British or Irish ethnicity (reference category) and aged between 21 and 24
(reference category). The average sentence for burglary in a dwelling controlling for
the legal and extra-legal covariates in Model 24 was therefore estimated at 339 days
in custody.
Alternatively we can estimate the average number of days in custody for any of the
offence categories using the coefficients shown in Appendix F. For example, we could
estimate the average sentence for the offence of common assault to be 110 days (8.3450
(intercept) - 3.4663 (coefficient for common assault)) controlling for the same legal
and extra-legal covariates in Model 24. This sentence is consistent with the sentencing
guidelines for common assault set by Sentencing Council (2011), and which ranges
between a fine and conditional discharge at the lowest level of seriousness (category
3) to, a medium level community order (category 2), and for the most serious offence,
a community order or custodial sentence (top range of 26 weeks in custody) (category
1). In terms of disparity, the same (multiplicative) effects apply. For example, if this
offender also plead not guilty they would get a sentence 16% (1.1553 multiplicative
effect) higher which is approximately an additional week in custody. If the offender
were also unemployed at sentencing they would also expect to receive a sentence just
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under 20% (1.1862 multiplicative effect) more severe. In terms of days, that equates
to approximately 10 additional days in custody.
The effects of the legal covariates after controlling for the extra-legal characteristics
of the offender do not appear to change much from those estimated in Model 7.
As can be seen from Table 9.7, a not guilty plea compared to a guilty plea will
see an increase in the severity of the sentence by approximately 16%. We already
know that offenders will receive a discount on their sentence for pleading guilty, and
therefore this result is commensurate with the sentencing legislation.
Offenders charged with multiple offences (three or more) are sentenced just over
12% more severely than offenders who are sentenced for one or two offences. This
is similar to the estimate from the previous model. These results indicate that the
principle of totality is being adhered to by the courts.
These results would suggest that once the relevant legal factors are taken into
consideration there is agreement between what the guidelines suggest and what is
happening in the courts. In some way these findings support the work of Pina-
Sa´nchez and Linacre (2013) who found there to be ‘consistency’ in the sentencing of
assault cases. Although as I have highlighted previously, the work by Pina-Sa´nchez
and Linacre (2013) fails to investigate sentencing disparity by not considering the
extra-legal characteristics of the case.
That being said, Model 24 also controlled for numerous extra-legal characteristics
of the offender. I will discuss these results in turn.
Employment status
Employment status appears to be one of the biggest contributors in explaining sen-
tencing disparity. The result of the multilevel modelling provides significant evidence
to suggest that when controlling for the additional covariates in the model, offenders
who are unemployed prior to sentencing are predicted to get a sentence that is almost
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19% more severe than a like situated offender that was in full-time employment prior
to sentencing. This result is highly significant. This is consistent with the research
conducted by Flood-Page and Mackie (1998), Moxon (1988) and Crow and Simon
(1989): all three studies reported that unemployed offenders were less likely to be
fined and more likely to receive a more severe sentence.
Additionally, those who were unavailable for work prior to sentencing were also
sentenced approximately 14% more severely than those who were employed prior to
sentencing, and this result is significant. Being unavailable for work may be viewed
similarly to being unemployed, and therefore it is the lack of being in paid employed
that is the deciding factor. Although interestingly, offenders in causal or tempo-
rary employment prior to sentencing were also sentenced more severely than those in
employment - 9% more severely (the result is also significant). Even though these
offenders may have some work, or go through periods of employment, this does not
appear to be seen as any kind of mitigation. Previous research tends to model em-
ployment as a binary outcome - employed/unemployed - and does not differentiate
between the types of employment status, and so it is not possible to compare results.
Finally, offenders who were in education (whether full-time or part-time) prior to
sentencing appear to be sentenced more severely than those in employment but this
difference is not statistically significant.
Accommodation status
Living in permanent accommodation is the baseline or reference category for this
covariate. The results of the multilevel modelling suggest that offenders recorded as
having no fixed abode are sentenced just under 11% more severely than the reference
category.
In spite of this, offenders that reported as living in probation or supported hous-
ing are sentenced 8% less severely than those in permanent accommodation, whilst
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controlling for the other variables in the model.
There appears to be no significant difference in the sentence severity for those living
in transient or short-term accommodation as opposed to permanent accommodation.
Income status
Income status is generally linked with employment but there are some interesting and
conflicting results. Namely, those offenders who were reliant on state benefit prior
to sentencing are sentenced 10% less severely than offenders who are reliant on their
own or partner’s wage. This seems to contradict the previous results which suggest
unemployed offenders are sentenced more severely than those in employment. Those
offenders who were in receipt of a pension or maintenance were also sentenced less
severely, some 13% less severely, and this was also a significant result. There were
some differences between those claiming they had no income, as well as those who said
they had other means of income, but these categories were not significantly different
from the baseline category.
Sex
The results of this analysis suggested that whilst controlling for offence type and the
additional legal and extra-legal covariates included in Model 24, men are sentenced
approximately 9% more severely than like-situated women offenders. This finding is
also consistent with previous research, which has generally found that higher pro-
portions of men are sentenced to immediate custody (Albonetti, 1997), and where
women offenders do receive a custodial sentence, they are usually shorter in length
(Albonetti, 1997); (Stacey and Spohn, 2006). Using the new scale, we can now be
confident in concluding that men are sentenced more severely than women across the
full distribution of sentences, controlling for offence type and the legal characteristics
of the case.
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Ethnicity
In this instance, the baseline or reference category refers to the ‘White British and
Irish’ ethnic group. Comparing sentence severity with the ‘White other’ group reveals
this group are sentenced 7% (0.9257) less severely than the reference group. Consis-
tent with previous research (e.g. Hood, 1992), black offenders were sentenced 5% more
severely than the ‘White British and Irish’ offender group. This result is statistically
significant (p=<0.001). The group classified as ‘Other’ shows some significant differ-
ences in sentence severity. This group are sentenced just under 13% more severely
than the ‘White British and Irish’ group. There was very little significant difference
in sentence severity between the reference category and the Asian and Mixed ethnic
categories.
Age
The results from the multilevel modelling suggest that age plays a significant role in
sentencing disparity: as offenders get older they are sentenced more severely. offenders
aged 25-29 can be expected to be sentenced 4% more severely, offenders in the age
categories 30-40 and 41-54 can be expected to be sentenced 5% more severely and
those over the age of 55 are sentenced just under 9% more severely.
ICC
The random effects estimates for Model 24 are displayed in Table 9.8, and are used
to calculate the ICC.
Table 9.8: Model 24 - random effects
Random effects Variance Confidence intervals
σ2 2.5%, 97.5%
234
σ2u Level-two variance 0.5646 0.5551, 0.5742
σ2e Level-one variance 0.4362 0.4311, 0.4414
The ICC for Model 24 is 0.5641 or 56%, which means that even after controlling for
the legal characteristics of the case and a number of extra-legal characteristics of the
offender, there is still considerable variation in sentencing. The covariates included in
this model only account for almost 9% of the sentencing variation between offenders
compared with the Null Model. There is a considerable amount of sentencing variation
that cannot be explained by the covariates included in this model and further research
into this needs to be conducted to adequately address this disparity.
9.3.4 Non-significant covariates
A number of aggravating factors were included in the analysis but did not appear to
have a significant effect in modelling sentence severity. At the offence level, the use
of a weapon did not appear to significantly affect sentence severity. It is possible this
factor is already accounted for in the type of offence in which the offender is being
sentenced for and therefore not necessary to have an additional variable for this but
it is a surprising result.
Similarly, having a direct victim did not add to the accuracy of the model. Again
this is surprising as these two factors would increase the seriousness of the offence.
This again leads me to question the accuracy of the data, as it is possible this infor-
mation has not been recorded correctly in OASys.
At the offender level drug misuse was not found to be a significant factor affecting
sentence severity. This is consistent with research by Spohn and Belenko (2013), who
found that neither the offender’s history of drug use nor their use of drugs at the time
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they committed their offence influenced the sentencing decision.
9.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter has provided the result from the multilevel modelling which investigated
sentencing disparity using the new measure of sentence severity - the sentence severity
scale. The following chapter will interpret these results and provide a full discussion on
what these results suggest and the implications these results may have on sentencing
policy.
236
Chapter 10
Discussion and conclusions
10.1 Introduction
This doctoral research set out to achieve two broad aims. The first of these was to
create a more accurate measure of sentence severity which incorporated the full distri-
bution of sentences issued to offenders in the criminal courts of England and Wales for
a variety of offences. An extended form of the Goodman RC Association analysis was
used to measure the association between the offence and sentence categories using
real sentencing data obtained from the Police National Computer (PNC) following
sentencing. This enabled the construction of a scale while controlling for three legal
variables of plea, previous history of offending and number of offences the offender
was being sentenced for. The second aim was to use this measure of sentence severity
to assess disparity in sentencing using data from the Offending Assessment System
(OASys), which was matched to the PNC data. This provided data on the offenders
socio-demographic characteristics, as well as other information relating to their of-
fences and perceived risk of recidivism and risk of harm through actuarial assessment.
Assessing disparity in sentencing involved using multilevel modelling by way of the
nested nature of the data, to assess sentencing variation at the offence and offender
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level. Variation at the offender level after controlling for the legal characteristics of
the case would imply sentencing disparity - as discussed in Chapter 8 and 9.
The results of the multilevel modelling reported in the previous chapter (Chapter
9) identified some sentencing disparity relating to a number of extra-legal factors.
Consistent with previous research by Albonetti (1997), Johnson (2006), and Mustard
(2001) for example, there is evidence to suggest women are sentenced less severely
than ‘like-situated’ male offenders even after controlling for the type of offence they
were sentenced for, as well as additional legal factors such as plea, the total number
of offences they were sentenced for (taking totality into consideration), and the type
of court they were sentenced in. Ethnicity was another area in which this research
identified subtle disparities, with Black offenders being sentenced more severely than
‘like-situated’ White British and Irish offenders. Again this is consistent with previous
research carried out in the field, for example by Hood (1992), Mustard (2001), and
Woodredge (2010). Using the new measure of sentence severity (extended Goodman
RC association analysis), we can be more confident that disparity is prevalent across
the full distribution of sentences meted out by the courts in England and Wales.
This research went a step further by also controlling for a number of extra-legal
factors deemed to be legally irrelevant when sentencing offenders. However, these
factors form the basis of the risk assessment undertaken by the Probation Service prior
to sentencing. This information is included in the pre-sentence report which is given to
the judge as an decision-making aid. Again this research found evidence of significant
disparity relating to the employment status of the offender. Unemployed offenders
are sentenced more severely than offenders who are employed prior to sentencing.
Those with no fixed abode are sentenced more severely than those living in permanent
accommodation prior to sentencing 23 . Additionally, when we consider the income
23Offenders that have no fixed abode, are less likely to be granted bail and therefore are more
likely to be held on remand. Offenders held on remand prior to sentencing are then more likely to
be sentenced more severely due to fact they were not originally granted bail.
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status of offenders or where their income comes from, the research found that offenders
who are in receipt of benefits are sentenced less severely than those offenders who were
earning a wage through employment prior to sentencing.
Although this research has identified some degree of sentencing disparity, it is
acknowledged that only a limited number of variables - both legal and extra-legal,
were used in the multilevel model analysis. Furthermore, we were unable to fully
account for the offenders’ history of offending which plays a key role in determining
sentences. If additional data had been available, such as number of previous offences,
it is likely that more of the variability at the offender level would have been explained.
That being said, the results from this research and levels of disparity are consistent
with previous research that was able to control for additional legal variables such as
the offender’s previous convictions.
This chapter then discusses the contributions that this empirical research has
brought to the area of sentencing in terms of developing a measure of sentence severity
which encompasses the full distribution of sentences issued by the courts in England
and Wales, and in turn allows sentences to be measured in terms of their severity, as
well as how different sentences compare with each other. In developing this severity
scale, it was then possible to assess sentencing disparity and identify which extra-legal
factors are causing judges to sentence offenders more or less severely than others when
controlling for additional legal and extra-legal covariates in the model. This chapter
then goes on to discuss the implications of the results found in this research and how
it might be best to utilise these results to achieving a more just sentencing framework.
The final section outlines the possibilities of future work and how with more detailed
data, it would be possible to refine not only the sentencing severity scale but also the
analysis into sentencing disparity.
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10.2 Methodological advances
Chapter 4 discussed the previous ways in which sentence severity has been measured
and the problems associated with these methods. For example, it was discussed that
by considering both the ‘in-out method’ and the length of custodial sentence method
bias was introduced into these samples by excluding a wealth of information (Sebba,
1978). By only concentrating on sentencing at one end of the severity scale, namely
imprisonment, this excludes the non-custodial sentences which are more commonly
used and, are just as important when considering sentence severity and with that,
disparity (Merrall et al., 2010).
A third way of measuring sentence severity is to use a single severity scale which
includes the full distribution of sentences given to offenders in the courts in England
and Wales. Again in Chapter 4 I explained the previous methods of constructing
these types of scales, and again highlighted their shortcomings in respect to them
being highly subjective, based on perceptions of severity, and also using vignette
style approaches based on hypothetical examples or instances in which to determine
opinions of severity instead of using real examples.
This research has been able to overcome these problems by opting to use a form
of statistical modelling - Goodman Row Column Association analysis - to model real
sentencing data obtained from the courts in England and Wales. By organising the
data into a two-way table, this method models the association between the offence
and resultant sentence categories, as discussed in Chapter 6. The Goodman RC
model uses the relationship between these two categories to create a scale measuring
one dimension of sentencing - severity. I then extended this model to allow for the
control of additional legal factors - plea, prior court appearance and totality - to more
accurately reflect the factors that judges must take into consideration when sentencing
offenders. This corrects for the imbalance or the affect that these variables have on
sentence severity.
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In doing so, this research creates a sentence severity scale which places sentences
into a rank order based on their magnitude in terms of sentence severity in comparison
to the other sentence categories. To avoid the scale appearing arbitrary (McDavid
and Stipak, 1981), linear interpolation was used to anchor the scale. From here it was
then possible to measure disparity over the entire spectrum of sentences.
The same legal covariates used to create the scale are then also included in the
multilevel modelling analysis. The extended Goodman RC analysis uses these co-
variates (plea, prior court appearance and number of offences the offender is being
sentenced for) to control for the imbalance these factors have on sentence severity
to formulate the scale. The multilevel analysis then allows us to identify the effects
that the different legal factors can then have on sentence severity whilst controlling
for other characteristics of the offence and the offender. For example, we are able
to estimate the effect of pleading not guilty compared to pleading guilty in terms of
the difference in the sentence. With offenders who plead not guilty in general serving
longer or more severe sentences.
There are a number of potential uses for this work; firstly the sentence severity
scale could be used as an aid to judges to identify sentences that are of equivalent
severity and also to identify alternatives to some custodial sentences. This idea of
interchangeable sentences is discussed in the following section. Additionally, the scale
could be used, as it has been in this research, to access sentencing disparity. With
the availability of more covariates - both legal and extra-legal - it may be possible
to control for more of the unexplained variability in the multilevel models which will
contribute to explaining what is happening within the courts of England and Wales.
The following section goes on to discuss the idea of interchangeable sentences.
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10.3 Interchangeability of sentences
The idea of the interchangeability of sentences has been “relatively under-conceptualised”
(Marinos, 2005, p. 441) and yet judges, to a certain extent, use sentences interchange-
ably, especially in borderline cases (Jacobson and Hough, 2007). Interchangeable
sentences allow for alternative or substitute sanctions to be used in place of another
sentence of equivalent severity. Von Hirsch et al. (1989) argue this permits consid-
erable flexibility to use non-custodial sentences in place of other non-custodial and
custodial sentences. This is particularly beneficial where sentences can be given in
place of, for example shorter prison sentences. There are a number of benefits of
being able to use sentences interchangeably, not to mention the possibility of using
alternatives to custody, which may alleviate the numbers being sent to prison and
also reduce costs to the tax payer. The results from the extended Goodman RC Asso-
ciation analysis demonstrate that certain sentences can be considered as alternatives
or as equivalent in terms of their levels of severity.
The results for the extended Goodman RC association analysis and linear interpo-
lation demonstrated the equivalent sentence severity scores for each of the sentences
categories (see Table 7.2) and following on from that, in Section 7.3.2 I suggested
that sentences that are of equivalent severity can be interchangeable. In Section 7.3.2
I provided two examples of sentences which have equivalent sentence severity scores
and therefore these sentences can be considered as interchangeable. The first exam-
ple relates to a community order of less than 12 months (δs = -4.028) being roughly
equivalent to a suspended sentence order of greater than one month and less than or
equal to 2 months (δs = -4.007). Following the linear interpolation to anchor these
scores in line with the custodial sentences, these two sentences are the equivalent to
approximately 65 and 66 days in custody respectively.
Likewise the conditional discharge of less than or equal to one year category (δs
= -4.115) equates to 63 days in custody following linear interpolation. The score for
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immediate custody between 1 and 2 months (based on the modal number of days in
the category) is 54 days.
Another example indicates, the sentence category for greater than three and less
than or equal to four years immediate custody (δs = 2.886) is relatively close to a
community order of greater than two years and less than or equal to three years
(δs = 2.821). In days they equate to 1362 and 1335 respectively (following linear
interpolation for the community order category), which again are quite similar.
Previous research by Marinos (2005) specifically investigated ‘penal equivalents’ or
the interchangeability of sentences; namely whether the public viewed it as acceptable
to substitute fines and community orders with imprisonment for a variety of offences -
small scale theft, assault, and sexual assault. In doing so, the author argues for going
beyond a focus of severity by examining how different sanctions are appropriate and
vary by the nature of the offence and offender - whether the offender is an adult or a
youth.
The results revealed that respondents were more likely to support the interchange-
ability of a fine or community order for a 30-day custodial sentence for the theft offence
than the assault or sexual assault offences for the adult offenders. Additionally, com-
munity orders were significantly more likely to be supported as a substitution for
a prison sentence than the fine, again particularly for adult offenders. Marinos ar-
gues that the support for substituting sentences varies by the offence type and this
illustrates a “qualitative dimension of punishment” (Marinos, 2005, p. 446). Fur-
thermore Marinos argues the results suggest the public perceive there to be difference
between the two intermediate sanctions (community orders and fines) in terms of their
characteristics and qualities, and this affects the nature of their support. Therefore,
sanctions are not seen as equally interchangeable because of this.
I would argue, that it is not surprisingly that there is more support for the alter-
native sentences for the theft offence than there is for the assault and sexual assault
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offences. I would argue that this result would suggest that although in exchange for a
30-day custodial sentence, neither a fine nor a community sentence is deemed to be se-
vere enough and given that, it may be argued that in fact a 30-day custodial sentence
is also not severe enough for an assault or sexual assault offence. Taking this view,
it is unlikely that the public would then support either of the alternative sentences
which may be seen as less severe than a longer custodial sentence, which is deemed
more appropriate for an assault or sexual assault offence. Marinos acknowledges that
the public identify different characteristics and qualities with the two non-custodial
sentences, and this affects their support for the interchangeability of sentences, but
fails to acknowledge that one of the characteristics or qualities, may in fact be their
perception of the severity of those sentences.
Furthermore, this particular study fails to take into consideration retribution as
a purpose of punishment and concluded that the results suggest that the support for
interchangeability is not related to perceptions about severity, instead people have
broader perceptions about punishment. It would seem that Marinos (2005) refuses to
acknowledge a retributive approach to sentencing exists, and instead focuses purely on
a more utilitarian approach to sentencing. Indeed most of the discussions in relation
to this type of research frames itself in either of the two camps. There seems to be less
acceptance of a more hybrid type of approach that is currently adopted in England
and Wales.
Additionally, one further argument for the use of interchangeable/alternative sen-
tencing is the evidence that suggests offenders recidivate significantly less after com-
munity service sentences than after imprisonment (Ministry of Justice, 2013a); (Wer-
mink et al., 2010). Therefore it could be argued that using alternatives to impris-
onment (where appropriate) that are of equivalent severity based on the new scale,
could improve the likelihood or rate in which offenders reoffend.
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10.4 Disparity
The results obtained from this research into disparity are consistent with previous
research which found significant differences in the sentencing of offenders. Following
the methodological problems that this research has sought to overcome (by incorpo-
rating custodial and non-custodial sentences into a single scale of sentence severity by
extending the Goodman RC Association model), this research indicates that disparity
occurs across all types of sentences e.g discharges, fines, community orders etc. and
not just in relation to custodial sentences. Although it was only possible to control for
a very small number of the legal and extra-legal variables that are likely to impact on
decisions, it does identify some disparities in sentence severity relating the offender’s
employment status as well as their living arrangements. There was some disparity
which may as a result of the extra-legal characteristics of the offender - these will be
discussed in turn - but there is still a considerable amount of sentencing variation
that could not be explained by the model. This suggests there are additional factors
affecting decision-making that need to be explored and included in future research.
However, by adopting a new way of modelling the full range of sentences we can begin
to explore disparity across the distribution of sentencing and not just for those being
sent to prison. Therefore by using the new sentence severity scale, this research can
be seen to more accurately reflect sentencing and what is really happening in the
courts in England and Wales. However, it is recognised that I have only controlled
for a small number of the factors in the multilevel analysis that may ultimately affect
sentencing decisions.
The results from this research indicate that there is some sentencing disparity
which may lead to discrimination. Some of this is likely to be explained by the extra-
legal factors of the offender, such as their gender, ethnicity, age, employment status,
income status and accommodation status.
This research has identified some disparity in the sentencing of male and female
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offenders once we control for the legal characteristics of the case. This disparity is
apparent across the entire distribution of sentences meted out by the courts in England
and Wales. Women receive sentences which are on average 9% less severe.
Hedderman and Gelsthorpe (1997) argue that women tend to play minor roles in
offences and are therefore sentenced accordingly. I was able to control for the major
offence type yet the disparity remained, with women being sentenced more leniently
than like-situated male offenders. Although, it is recognised that this disparity could
have been somewhat reduced if we had been able to also control for the offenders
previous convictions. However, this result is consistent with the research conducted
by for example, Spohn (2009) and Albonetti (1997), who both found significant differ-
ences in sentence severity between male and female offenders, even when the offence
type and other legal characteristics were controlled for, for example previous convic-
tions. It is important to consider that even though the offence type was controlled
for, it was not possible to determine (from the information available) whether the
female offenders did play lesser roles within the offence. For example, we do not know
the specific details of the offence or whether the judge considered the offence to be a
category 1, 2 or 3 offence in terms of the harm and culpability caused by the offender
which also indicates the seriousness of the offence. Additionally, there is insufficient
information relating to the mitigating and aggravating factors associated with the
offence. More detailed information relating to the factors that were considered in
making sentencing decisions would allow for better modelling of the data. Here data
from the Crown Court Survey would be useful as the judge is required to state the
significant aggravating and mitigating factors which led to their decision.
The aim of this research is not to enter into the discussion about whether women
should or should not be sentenced more leniently than men. However, it is necessary
to highlight the different perspectives surrounding the sentencing of female offenders.
Many feminists would tend to disagree with the ‘Conceptual framework for achieving
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justice’ model (see Section 3.2.1 Figure 3.1) which would suggest that disparate sen-
tencing would likely result in discrimination and ultimately injustice. Instead they
would argue that justice can never be achieved due to the injustice women already
suffer within society (for example Corston (2007); Daly (1994)) and therefore an alter-
native model of justice is necessary (see Figure 3.2). This perhaps raises the question,
can we really compare male and female offending? Any research into sentencing dis-
parity perhaps needs to consider male and female sentencing separately.
Consistent with previous research looking at racial disparities, this research also
found there to be significant differences between the sentencing of White British and
Irish offenders and Black offenders: Black offenders are sentenced on average just over
4% more severely than like-situated White British and Irish offenders. By controlling
for the additional legal covariates, we can begin to argue that black offenders are being
discriminated against during sentencing. We can also rule out that Black offenders are
being sentenced more severely due to the greater number of Black offenders pleading
not guilty as this has been controlled for in the model, although that is not to say this
is another way in which Black offenders may be indirectly discriminated against at the
sentencing stage (Spohn, 2009). Again this result is consistent with previous research.
Hood (1992) also found that Black offenders were sentenced 5% more severely that
White offenders. These results (parameter estimates) may seem quite small but they
are statistically significantly different. This approximately equates to an additional 18
days in custody (almost three weeks) for a one year custodial sentence or an additional
55 days (almost two months) in custody for a three year custodial sentence. Therefore
this is not a small effect.
Few studies on ethnic disparity in sentencing have looked at other ethnic groups,
the focus tends to be on Black and Asian offenders in the UK (e.g. Hood (1992);
Phillips and Brown (1998)), and Black and Hispanic offenders in the US (e.g. John-
son (2006); Albonetti (1997); Engen and Gainey (2000)), compared to the White
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indigenous category. In this study, it was found that the White other offenders are
sentenced 7% less severely than the White British and Irish offenders, where as the
‘Other’ offender group are sentenced 13% more severely than the White British and
Irish offenders. I am unable to offer an explanation for this result. There was however,
a large amount of sentencing variation at the offender level that was not explained by
the optimal model - Model 24. This may reduce the size of these effects, if other fac-
tors impacting on sentence severity are being masked. However, further investigation
needs to be conducted to try and explain why there is such wide sentencing disparity.
Previous research has suggested that Asian offenders are also sentenced dispro-
portionately compared to the White British offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2011).
Although this research did not find this, it is important to treat this result with cau-
tion. Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) suggests using such broad categories may mask
ethnic disparities. For example there may be differences in the way Indian, Pakistani
and Bangladeshi offenders are sentenced, and by grouping these offenders together
masks the true outcomes. Hood’s (1992) earlier research highlighted the potential
ways in which disparity may be disguised, and this can be applied to any situation.
Therefore future work may benefit from using narrower categories for ethnicity.
The age of the offender at sentencing does not feature heavily in research into sen-
tencing disparity: it remains a rather under-conceptualised factor (Mueller-Johnson
and Dhami, 2009). Although, a hand-full of studies do control for age within their
models, for example Johnston and Alozie (2001), Johnson (2006), Steffensmeier et al.
(1995), and Wheeler et al. (1982). In this doctoral research it was found that sentence
severity increases with the age of the offender even after controlling for the offence
type and other legal factors. For example, those in the 25-29 category are sentenced
4% more severely than the 21-24 (reference) group, by the time the offender is over the
age of 55 years, this doubles, so the 55+ group are sentenced almost 9% more severely
than the youngest group. However, this result is not consistent with previous research
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that has controlled for age, which have generally reported a small negative linear ef-
fect, with older offenders tending to be sentenced more leniently (e.g. (Johnston and
Alozie, 2001); Woodredge (2010)). This ties in with widely held assumption that
older offenders are sentenced more leniently based on the notion that older offenders
are more able to reform themselves but also because they carry less dangerousness
and risk (Steffensmeier et al., 1995). Although Steffensmeier et al. (1995) would sug-
gest that the effect is actually curve-linear, with younger and older offenders being
sentenced more leniently.
It is important to be wary of the age result found within this research, firstly
because it is inconsistent with previous research, but also because we were not able to
control for previous offending. It is possibly that age is masking previous offending, as
we may observe a linear relationship between age and number of offences - as offenders
get older they will likely acquire more offences/convictions. This could explain why
there appears to be significant differences between offenders of different ages.
From the results of this research, it would seem that anything less than being in
permanent employment increases the severity of a given sentence. This result is con-
sistent with previous studies that have explored the relationship between employment
status and sentencing, such as research by Jacobson and Hough (2007); Flood-Page
and Mackie (1998); and Moxon (1988). Therefore having steady employment may
be seen as a factor which may mitigate the severity of a sentence (Ashworth, 2010b).
However, Ashworth (2010b) recognises that to mitigate on the grounds of employment
can be seen as discriminating against those who are unemployed.
To add to this, unless this factor is specified in the sentencing legislation or guide-
lines, some judges may consider employment to be a mitigating factor, where as other
judges may rule it out altogether. For example, the potential loss of employment
following a custodial sentence, may cause the judge to use this as a grounds for miti-
gation (Easton and Piper, 2008). Loss of employment is also more likely to be taken
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into consideration if it impacts on third parties such a employees (ibid). Additionally,
judges may apply different weight to employment status. Again there is also no in-
formation relating to how employment status should be dealt with, which potentially
leads to disparate sentencing. Unless there is also parity in the approach, the end
result may just be more disparate sentencing.
Research suggests that those with no-fixed-abode may be more of a risk of recidi-
vism than those living in permanent housing following incarceration (Social Exclusion
Unit, 2002). The Social Exclusion Unit (2002) report that having stable accommoda-
tion can reduce reoffending by over 20%. Not only that, having no fixed abode also
makes it more difficult to find a job and earn money legitimately (ibid).
Accommodation status may be taken into consideration when granting the of-
fender bail, along with a number of other socio-demographic information, such as
their marital status, family ties, and whether they are in employment (and for how
long) (Dyer, 2013). Although the legislation (Bail Act 1976) does state that those
with no fixed abode are not automatically prohibited bail, in practice is does cause
significant difficulties (Dyer, 2013). This may also apply at the sentencing stage, as
those who have no fixed abode are viewed as having greater risk of recidivism and
therefore they are sentenced more severely which would explain the results found in
this research.
The Prison Reform Trust (2013) state that a lack of accommodation can also
severely hinder the likelihood of former prisoners finding suitable employment - almost
one quarter of employers would not consider hiring a homeless person. Getting ex-
prisoners into stable housing can act as an effective gateway to resettlement (Prison
Reform Trust, 2013). This may explain why offenders who are in probation/supported
housing prior to sentencing are being sentenced less severely. Judges may see this as
offenders trying to improve their situation and therefore punish them less severely.
Whereas, those with no fixed abode, remain too high a risk and therefore sentence
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them more severely. This then becomes a vicious cycle that exacerbates offenders’
problems and offending.
The Social Exclusion Unit (2002) report that the a high proportion of offenders
sentenced to prison were in receipt of benefits. Similarly, a high proportion of offenders
in this research were also in receipt of benefits prior to sentencing. However, those
in receipt of benefits were sentenced less severely than those who were earning a
wage. This result would appear to be inconsistent with the previous result, in which
unemployed offenders are sentenced almost a fifth (18.62%) more severely than those
in employment. However, this result may be connected to the offenders means to pay.
For example, Flood-Page and Mackie (1998) found that unemployed offenders were
less likely to receive a fine, but were three times more likely to receive a conditional
discharge. In interviews with magistrates, 7 out of the 12 said they sometimes used a
conditional discharge where they felt the offender could not afford a fine (Flood-Page
and Mackie, 1998). One judge was quoted as saying:
“We are more often than not forced rather then led on the decision to
fine or discharge by means of the defendant. You can’t get blood out of
a stone so, even if a fine was the most appropriate sentence, we have to
resort to a conditional discharge” (Flood-Page and Mackie, 1998, p. 49)
Although fines are now means tested, this type of mentality could still be operating
within the courts. It may be that some judges are taking pity on offenders who do
not have sufficient resources. However, further work would need to be conducted to
investigate whether this is the likely cause.
As far as I am aware, to date, there are no UK based studies which consider the
income status of the offender as a factor determining sentence severity and disparity.
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10.5 Risk
Although it is recognised that offenders are not a homogeneous group, a range of
problems/needs are more commonly observed amongst this group than in the general
population (Ministry of Justice, 2013b). These factors are understood to be associated
with an increased risk of offending: the purpose of risk assessment then is to predict
future criminality using an explicit set of factors (see Section 5.2.1 Figure 5.1) that
correlate with reoffending, and to classify offenders into specific groups based on
their likelihood of reconviction (Kleiman et al., 2007). As explained in Chapter 5,
these ‘criminogenic needs’/factors are recorded in the OASys pre-sentence assessment,
including; employment status, income status, accommodation status, relationships,
drug and alcohol misuse, attitudes, lifestyle and associations, and emotional well-
being. These factors then contribute towards the general reoffending predictor (OPG)
score, and which along with the pre-sentence report, is given to the judge prior to
sentencing. Judges then have to make decisions based on all the information they
have.
This research indicates that certain offenders or rather, offenders with certain
characteristics are being sentenced more severely than others due to their extra-legal
characteristics. One explanation for this is the increased risk offenders with these
characteristics possess and therefore they are sentenced more severely.
The argument surrounding the risk debate generally depends on one’s perspective
on the purposes of punishment (Silver and Chow-Martin, 2002). In Chapter 2 by
way of the sentencing schema diagram (see Figure 2.1 in Section 2.2.1), I explained
that generally speaking there two main types of sentencing focus; a consequentual-
ist or forward looking focus and a non-consequentualist or backward looking focus
(Francis et al., 2001). The retributivist sentencing approach can be thought of as
non-consequentualist, and this position adopts a backward looking focus that uses
proportionality as the means for punishing offenders. This approach views future risk
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as irrelevant (Kleiman et al., 2007): consideration of the premise of risk may in fact
lead to discrimination (Ashworth, 2010b). On the other hand, the consequentualist
or forward-looking utilitarian approach would justify punishment as a means of pro-
tecting the public and preventing future crime and so rely on risk as a method of
predicting the likelihood of further criminality (ibid).
The justice system in England in Wales adopts a hybrid sentencing approach which
places emphasis on proportionate sentencing based on the seriousness of the offence by
assessing the harm and culpability caused or could potentially have been caused by the
offence (retributivism)(Sentencing Guidelines Council, 2004), and also encompasses
deterrence, protecting the public, rehabilitation, and reparation, as principles which
also need to be considered when making sentencing decisions (Criminal Justice Act
2003). These additional principles are partly achieved through the use of actuarial
risk assessment to predict the risk of recidivism but also the risk the offender may pose
towards others. As explained in Chapter 2, for more serious offences (offences which
pass the community order threshold) this information is provided to the courts in the
form of pre-sentence reports which are then used by judges to aid the decision-making
process.
Previous research from the US. has suggested that judges are guided by three focal
concerns when making sentencing decisions; the offender’s blameworthiness; protec-
tion of the community; and practical implications of sentencing decisions (Steffens-
meier and Demuth, 2000). The offenders blameworthiness is associated with the
offence and their role in the offence, their history of offending, and whether they have
themselves been a victim (which tends to mitigate the perceived blameworthiness)
(Steffensmeier and Demuth, 2000). Protection in the community focuses on the need
to incapacitate the offender on assessment of potential future behaviour, based on
the legal characteristics of the present case (whether they are being sentenced for a
serious/dangerous offence), their criminal history and perhaps on the characteristics
253
of the offenders such as education, employment, or community ties (ibid). Organisa-
tional constrains and practical consequence include the suitability of the offender for
a particular offence and the disruption of ties to children and other family members
(ibid). Additionally, judges are also likely to be concerned about the repercussions of
recidivism on the court in the public’s eyes and on their own careers (ibid). Steffens-
meier and Demuth (2000) also suggest that due to the complex interplay and nature
of these concerns, judges may rely on attributes linked to the offender’s gender, race,
social class and other social positions. This illustrates that judges use a host of factors
to reach their decision when sentencing offenders which corresponds with Johnson’s
(2005) point that sentencing does not occur within a social vacuum. Similar factors
are also likely to impact on sentences
This focus on risk may explain why we are seeing these disparities between of-
fenders who are being sentenced for similar offences. For example, previous research
has shown that those who are unemployed prior to sentencing are at greater risk of
recidivism (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002). This could be a justification for sentencing
more severely even though it goes against the principle of equality before the law.
However, the same justification cannot be used to explain why there is sentencing
disparity based on the ethnicity of the offender. It is therefore reasonable to argue
that discrimination is present where an offender’s ethnicity is effecting sentencing
decisions.
Further research would need to delve into the relationship between risk and dis-
parity to begin to unpick how the two interplay. However, to reduce the possibility
of disparity occurring, sentencing legislation and guidelines need to be more specific
about which factors should be taken into consideration when sentencing offenders
(Ashworth, 2010a) but also just how much weight they should also carry (Roberts,
2011a). If these were to be made clearer, there may be less room for disparity to
occur.
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10.6 A two stage sentencing process
Proponents of the utilitarian approach to sentencing, such as Morris and Tonry (1990)
and Kolber (2009), may be critical of a unidimensional severity scale, insisting that
this type of scale fails to take into consideration the effects that different sentences may
have on individual offenders. They may also suggest that this type of scale fails to take
into consideration the ‘punitive bite’ of the different types of sentence. However, this
is not the case. The new sentence severity scale demonstrates the interchangeability
of sentences which then allows us to identify sentences which are equivalent in terms
of their severity.
Steffensmeier et al. (1993) explain that sentencing can be seen as a two-stage pro-
cess, which firstly involves the decision as to whether or not to imprison, and secondly,
if incarceration is appropriate, then a decision about the length of the sentence must
be made. We can adapt this idea, so that once the adequate level of severity is de-
termined (which ties in with Steffensmeier et al.’s (1993) idea of deciding whether a
custodial sentence is appropriate, except it includes all sentences not just custodial
sentences), it is then be possible to substitute sentences to take into consideration
possible factors that will determine the suitability of a given sentence. These may
include parental responsibilities or where for example a custodial sentence will result
in others being unemployed if the offender employs staff. This would then tie in with
Steffensmeier et al.’s (1993) decision on the appropriate length of sentence. This could
be possible if it were to be made explicit in the sentencing legislation which factors
should be taken into consideration. This is the case in Minnesota, where for example
the sentencing legislation explicitly excludes employment status from the decision-
making process or more specifically, as a factor to depart from the guideline sentence
(Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, 2013). Equality before the law states
that employment status should not be taken into consideration at the sentencing stage
(Warner, 2012), but as this research suggests, as well as previous research by Jacobson
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and Hough (2007), Flood-Page and Mackie (1998), and Moxon (1988) for example,
being unemployed as opposed to employed, increases the severity of the sentence by
almost a fifth (18.6%).
10.7 Consideration for blind sentencing
Sentencing disparity has a number of implications, namely that certain types of of-
fenders are being discriminated against which in turn leads to injustice if we use the
framework/pathway for achieving justice as discussed in Section 3.2.1. Is it possible
to ever limit this disparity?
The 12 foot tall gold leaf statue which stands on top of the dome at the Old Bailey
in London is the depiction of Lady Justice. Her modern representation is typically
blindfolded and seen with scales in her right hand and a sword in her left. Lady
Justice is said to be the figurative representation of the moral force in judicial systems
symbolising fair and equal justice. Aas (2005) explains that the blindfold, scales and
sword indicate justice being served regardless of skin colour, social status etc. in those
who appear before the courts. However, she points out that the blindfold does appear
absent at times which possibly represents what she describes as a profound duality in
the nature of Western penal law. She goes on to say, on one hand there is a demand
that punishment should be equal for all and that justice should be blind. On the
other hand, one should know the ones that are being punished (ibid).
Could this notion of the Lady Justice be used in the courts? One extreme way
around this would be for a judge to not be made aware of any extra-legal factors of the
offender and therefore they could be said to be ‘going in blind’. Sentencing decisions
could then be made purely on the basis of the legal factors related to the case. In
doing so, their decisions are agreed upon without the offender ever appearing in court.
Similar practice occurs in Rio de Janeiro, whereby decisions are made on paper before
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the offender attends court (Humphreys et al., 2014). The name of the offender can
sometimes indicate their race or ethnicity and therefore judges may make decisions
based on this extra-legal factor. There may then also be an argument to omit this
information altogether. Therefore, I propose that judges should not be aware of any
extra-legal characteristics of the offender, only the characteristics of the offence and
the case which includes any aggravating and mitigating factors. This way, even if
unconscious bias of the judge exists they will not be able to base their judgements on
these factors.
10.8 Limitations of this work
This section will discuss the main limitations of this work and the following section
will then discuss how this research could be improved through future work.
10.8.1 Data availability and quality
There were a number of issues surrounding the availability of data and data qual-
ity issues in the PNC and missing data in the OASys assessment. In Section 5.2.2
I explained that the complex nature of some of the newer sentences (for example,
community orders and suspended sentence orders) are not adequately captured in
the PNC. As well as the length of time the offender is subjected to these types of
sentences, these sentences have a number of different elements or requirements which
ultimately determine their severity. However, these requirements are not recorded in
the PNC and therefore only the length of these sentences were available as an indi-
cation of their severity. More detailed information on these types of sentences would
allow finer degradation of these types of sentences which would consequently improve
the accuracy of the extended Goodman RC association analysis and ultimately the
sentence severity scale. The Crown Court Survey for example records not only the
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type and length of the sentence, but for suspended sentence orders and community
orders it also records the types of requirements attached to the orders. However this
data is not yet available at the individual level which is required to conduct this
research.
By extending the Goodman RC association model, this research was able to control
for the imbalance that legal factors can have on sentence severity, making a sentence
more or less severe. Only three legal factors (offence plea, number of offences the
offender was sentenced for, and whether the offender had previously appeared in
court) were included in the extended Goodman analysis. As I explained in Section
6.5, I provisionally wanted to control for the statutory aggravating and mitigating
factors such as, previous convictions, whether the offence was committed when the
offender was on bail, whether the offence was aggravated in relation to race, religion,
disability or sexual orientation of the victim, whether the offence involved a terrorist
connection, and plea, which is considered a mitigating factor. However, a lot of
data relating to the aggravating factors were not adequately recorded in the OASys
assessment and were therefore essentially missing.
In light of this, two additional covariates were created. The first covariate was an
indicator of prior offending due to the lack of information relating to the offenders’
previous convictions. Prior court appearance was therefore used to indicate previous
involvement in the court system. As explained in Section 2.3.1, previous convictions
have a cumulative effect on sentence severity. This new variable is admittedly a
very poor indicator of an offenders’ previous convictions as it masks the true extent
that prior convictions have on sentence severity. Future work would therefore greatly
benefit from having a more accurate measure of offenders’ conviction histories. The
second variable that was created relates to the principle of totality (see Section 2.5.2).
This covariate therefore identified cases where the offender was sentenced for multi-
ple offences. Again the Crown Court Survey records both of these factors and also
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asks judges to record any other aggravating or mitigating factors that they took into
consideration sentencing the offender.
In the second part of this research multilevel modelling was used to measure sen-
tencing disparity. Here a number of legal and extra-legal factors were included in the
model to identify if and where disparity occurred - either at the offence or offender
level. The same legal variables that were controlled for in the extended Goodman
RC analysis were also included in the multilevel modelling analysis. As explained in
Section 10.8.1, by including these variables at this stage allowed me to control for the
imbalance that these factors have on sentence severity. Therefore, by also including
for them in the multilevel modelling, it was then possible to identify how sentences
altered. It was possible to identify change in sentence severity, for example, how much
more severe is a not guilty plea as opposed to guilty plea.
As discussed in Section 10.8.1, the lack of prior conviction information is a limi-
tation to this work as previous convictions increase the seriousness of offences. Prior
court appearance was used as an indicator of this, but this did not improve the mul-
tilevel model fit and therefore was not included in the optimal model. If previous
conviction history data had been available it would have been included in this anal-
ysis and it is anticipated that it would have been highly statistically significant. It
is also likely that by including this variable it would have explained far more of the
variability at the offender level.
In a similar vein, due to the amount of missing data in the OASys assessment only
14 covariates were tested in the multilevel model (offence, plea, number of offences,
prior court appearance, court, weapon, direct victim, sex, ethnicity, age, employment
status, accommodation status and income status). If more data had been available in
terms of more aggravating and mitigating factors and additional extra-legal factors,
including information relating to the OASys risk factors (see Section 5.5.1), then these
would have been included in the model. Potentially far more of the variation at the
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offender level would have therefore been explained.
Related to the issue of data availability is the amount of missing data also identi-
fied in the data. In fact the missing data proved to be one of the biggest limitations
in conducting this research. Variables such as the court the offender was sentenced
in was completely missing and it is believed this was a conscious measure to ensure
the data was completely anonymous. Other variables such as the offenders ethnic-
ity, accommodation status and income status had a lot of missing information. As
explained in Section 8.4.1 this data was treated as Missing Completely at Random
(MCAR) as it is thought that the data is missing because those carrying out the
assessments failed to complete the information. Assessments now are fully electronic
and the person completing the assessment cannot skip sections without completing
all the fields. This will therefore ensure complete assessments without the missing
data encountered in this research.
10.8.2 Extensions of analysis
The optimal multilevel model (Model 24) used in this research had two levels - level 1
offences and level 2 offenders. An extension of the model would have been to extend
the model to account for a third level - Probation trust. This was tested but did
not improve the model fit and so was not included in the model. This is potentially
because there was too much sentencing variation at this aggregate level and therefore
a more refined measure would have been better. As just discussed in Section 10.8.1,
court information was removed from the data in a bid to ensure the offenders in the
same remained anonymous. It is my belief that if this covariate had been available to
use as a third level in the multilevel model, it would have improved the model fit and
therefore would have been included in the analysis. For example, in the famous study
by Hood (1992), he found there to be significant sentencing variation within courts.
This disparity would have been masked if the analysis had not considered the court
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level effects. However, in this research the availability of the data prohibited this line
of analysis.
Another possible extension to the random intercept multilevel model would have
been to also vary the slopes of the model as well as the intercepts as illustrated in
Figure 8.1 diagram (b). This type of model is called a random coefficient model. Had
the three level model with Probation Trust been the preferred model, then it would
have made sense to have gone on and extended the random intercept model. By doing
this, we could have identified if for example the affects of the extra-legal offender
characteristics varied by Probation trust. As the two level model turned out to be
the optimal modal, a random coefficient model would not have been suitable because
there are 13,495 offenders at level 2 opposed to 35 probation trust areas. Therefore
the random coefficient model would have been overly complicated and would not have
made a lot of sense.
10.9 Future work
This research has shown that it is possible to model the association between offences
and sentences to create a measure of sentence severity. This work can be seen as the
first step to potentially creating a severity scale in which all sentences are arranged on
a continuum. Future work would benefit from using more detailed sentence categories,
for example more detailed information relating to the type and length of requirements
attached to community orders and suspended sentence orders. This would allow
further refinement of the sentence severity scale to more accurately measure sentence
severity.
Data from the Crown Court Sentencing Survey could provide this if it were to
be made available at the offender level. At present the data from the Crown Court
Survey is aggregated, and at this level of aggregation, it does not permit the statistical
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modelling necessary to conduct similar analysis. Additionally, if the data were to be
disaggregated and matched with OASys data, further research would benefit from
more detailed sentence categories and legal characteristics, as well as a more detailed
list of extra-legal factors obtained from the probations data. Initial contact has been
made with the Sentencing Council about the possibility of securing access to this
data. However, at present the Sentencing Council are only considering the possibility
of making this data more readily available.
Future work would also benefit from incorporating additional sentences into the
measure of sentence severity where offenders receive more than one type or combina-
tion of sentence. In Section 5.2.2, it was explained that due to the problems identified
with the way sentences were recorded in the PNC, the decision was made to only use
the first sentence recorded in the data as it was understood to be the most accurate.
If this information was recorded differently (or obtained through another means), this
would also add to the accuracy of any future sentence severity scale. However, this
research already goes beyond the previous attempts at measuring sentence severity
by including all offences that offenders were sentenced for, rather than only focusing
on the primary offence, as has been done in previous research.
Additionally, future work into disparity would also need to make sure there was
sufficient information relating to the offender’s prior history of offending, including the
number of previous convictions, as well as, the previous sentences they have served.
On top of this, any future analysis would also benefit from more complete data.
Since receiving the data for this research the Probation Service have implemented
new quality control measures which should ultimately improve the quality of the
information recorded.
In spite of these suggestions for future work, this research stands alone as a com-
petent and informative piece of research. Therefore we can be more confident that the
results of this research, based on statistical modelling of real data (both the extended
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Goodman RC Association and multilevel modelling analyses) evidence sentencing dis-
parity within the courts of England and Wales. This research offers some indication
that sentencing disparity and discrimination is present within sentencing in England
and Wales, which must not go unnoticed. Future work using data such as the Crown
Court Survey data could potentially overcome these limitations and improve this re-
search.
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Appendix A
Aggravating and mitigating factors
The Sentencing Guidelines Council (2004) provide a non-exhaustive list of the aggra-
vating and mitigating factors
Aggravating factors: factors indicating higher culpability
• Offence committed whilst on bail for other offences
• Failure to respond to previous sentences
• Offence was racially or religiously aggravated
• Offence motivated by, or demonstrating, hostility to the victim based on his or
her sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation)
• Offence motivated by, or demonstrating, hostility based on the victims disability
(or presumed disability)
• Previous conviction(s), particularly where a pattern of repeat offending is dis-
closed
• Planning of an offence
• An intention to commit more serious harm than actually resulted from the
offence
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• Offenders operating in groups or gangs
• ‘Professional’ offending
• Commission of the offence for financial gain (where this is not inherent in the
offence itself)
• High level of profit from the offence
• An attempt to conceal or dispose of evidence
• Failure to respond to warnings or concerns expressed by others about the of-
fenders behaviour
• Offence committed whilst on licence
• Offence motivated by hostility towards a minority group, or a member or mem-
bers of it
• Deliberate targeting of vulnerable victim(s)
• Commission of an offence while under the influence of alcohol or drugs
• Use of a weapon to frighten or injure victim
• Deliberate and gratuitous violence or damage to property, over and above what
is needed to carry out the offence
• Abuse of power
• Abuse of a position of trust
Factors indicating a more than usually serious degree of harm:
• Multiple victims
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• An especially serious physical or psychological effect on the victim, even if un-
intended
• A sustained assault or repeated assaults on the same victim
• Victim is particularly vulnerable
• Location of the offence (for example, in an isolated place)
• Offence is committed against those working in the public sector or providing a
service to the public
• Presence of others e.g. relatives, especially children or partner of the victim
• Additional degradation of the victim (e.g. taking photographs of a victim as
part of a sexual offence)
• In property offences, high value (including sentimental value) of property to
the victim, or substantial consequential loss (e.g. where the theft of equipment
causes serious disruption to a victims life or business)
Mitigating factors: factors indicating lower culpability:
• A greater degree of provocation than normally expected
• Mental illness or disability
• Youth or age, where it affects the responsibility of the individual defendant
• The fact that the offender played only a minor role in the offence
Offender mitigation
• Genuine remorse
• Admissions to police in interview
• Ready co-operation with authorities
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Appendix B
Community order requirements
a. unpaid work requirement
An unpaid work requirement requires an offender to perform unpaid work for a
number of hours - not less than 40 and not more than 300 - specified in the order.
This is usually to be completed within 12 months but the requirement stays in
place until the hours are completed. The offender does not have to consent to
the making of the unpaid work requirement but the requirement is subject to
availability (Richardson, 2011).
b. activity requirement
An activity requirement requires the offender to present themselves to a person or
a place specified on such days, or to participate in activities specified in the order
on the number of days. The aggregate number of days the offender must present
themselves or participate in activities is 60 days and once again this requirement
is subject to availability (Richardson, 2011).
c. programme requirement
A programme requirement requires the offender to take part in an accredited pro-
gramme at a place or places specified on a number of days specified, or participate
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in a number of activities specified in the order for the days specified in the order.
The programme will have to have been recommended as being suitable for the
offender by probation and that spaces are available. There are no restrictions on
the number of days in which they must participate (Richardson, 2011).
d. prohibited activity requirement
A prohibited activity requirement requires the offender refrains from participat-
ing in activities or on days or periods specified in the order. This requirement
can only be included after consultation with probation. The prohibited activ-
ity requirement can include requirements relating to possessing, carrying or using
firearms (Richardson, 2011).
e. curfew requirement
A curfew requirement requires the offender to remain, for periods and at places
specified in the order. Periods may be between 2-12 hours in any day and the re-
quirement can specify different places or different periods for different days. Curfew
requirements must start on the day the order is made and must fall within 6 months
of the order being made. The court must consider information about the places
and periods specified in the order (Richardson, 2011).
f. exclusion requirement
An exclusion requirement prohibits the offender from entering areas or places spec-
ified in the order, during times or periods also specified in the order (Richardson,
2011)
g. residence requirement
The court must consider the home surroundings of the offender and may provide
for the offender to reside at a place other than that specified. Only with the
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recommendation of probation can a hostel or other institution be specified as their
place of residence (Richardson. 2011; Thomas, 2008).
h. mental health treatment requirement
A court may impose this requirement only if it is satisfied with the evidence that
has been provided by a medical practitioner, and the offender is susceptible to
treatment but does not warrant detention under a hospital order. The offender
must express their willingness to comply with the requirement (Richardson, 2011).
i. drug rehabilitation requirement
For a court to impose a drug rehabilitation requirement, they have to be satisfied
that the offender is dependent on drugs or has a propensity to misuse drugs; and
that their dependency or propensity can be treated. The treatment and testing
period must be at least six months but the nature of the treatment is not specified
in the order. Once more, this requirement needs to be recommended by probation
and the offender must express their willingness to comply with the requirement
(Richardson, 2011).
j. alcohol treatment requirement
To impose an alcohol treatment requirement, the court has to be satisfied that
the offender is dependent on alcohol; and that this dependency requires, and may
be susceptible to treatment. The treatment must not be less than six months
(Richardson, 2011).
k. supervision requirement
A supervision requirement requires the offender to addend appointments with a re-
sponsible officer and is to help promote offender rehabilitation (Richardson, 2011).
l. attendance centre requirement
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An attendance centre requirement is only available for offenders aged under 25.
An offender will attend an attendance centre for a total of between 12-36 hours
which will be worked around commitments like school or work (Richardson, 2011).
m. electronic monitoring requirement
Where a court makes a community order imposing a curfew requirement or exclu-
sion requirement, the court must also impose an electronic monitoring requirement
as defined in the Criminal Justice Act 2000, unless it is prevented from doing so
or the circumstances of the case make it inappropriate (Richardson. 2011). The
Act also states that a court may not impose an electronic monitoring requirement
unless the court has been notified by the Secretary of the State that electronic mon-
itoring arrangements are in place in that area and are satisfied that the necessary
provisions can be made under those arrangements.
Furthermore, by imposing an unpaid work requirement, an activity requirement,
a programme requirement, a prohibited activity requirement, a residence require-
ment, a mental health treatment requirement, a drug rehabilitation requirement, an
alcohol treatment requirement, a supervision requirement or an attendance centre
requirement the court can also impose an electronic monitoring requirement unless
prevented by the Criminal Justice Act 2000 from doing so (Richardson, 2011).
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Appendix C
Layout of dataset for Goodman RC
and extended Goodman RC
analysis
Figure C.1 shows an example of the raw data displayed in R prior to the Goodman
RC and extended Goodman RC association analyses: each line in the data relates
to one offence. The first 11 offences in the dataset are displayed here and show the
offences type, the sentence that was received for this offence, the offence plea that
was entered for this offence, whether the offender had a prior court appearance and
the number of offences the offender was being sentenced for. In the example shown
here, the first three offences relating to the offence of Obscene publications relate
to the same offender. For each offence the offender received an immediate custodial
sentence of between two and three years, they entered a gulity plea for all three of
their offences, had no prior court appearances and were sentenced for three of more
offences indicated by the variable Numoff. The fourth offence in this example relates
to a shoplifting offence and in this case the offender received a community order of
less than twelve months. Lines five and six in this example relate to child neglect
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offences and the resulting sentence for these offences were fully suspended sentences
of between nine and twelve months. Offence seven is burglary in a dwelling and this
offender received an immediate custodial sentence of between six and nine months.
The last three offences in this example are various driving related offences relating to
one offender and the sentences were immediate custodial sentences of varying lengths.
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Appendix D
Layout of dataset for multilevel
modelling
Figure D.1 shows an example of the raw data displayed in R following the ex-
tended Goodman RC association analysis and prior to the multilevel modelling anal-
ysis. This example of the layout of the raw data is similar to that shown in Ap-
pendix C Figure C.1 but now also displays the extended Goodman analysis raw score
(Raw score), the equivalent number of days in custody (obtained through linear inter-
polation)(Equivdays), the log of the equivalent number of days in custody (Logdays),
and the other variables used in the multilevel modelling analysis, such as type of court
the offender was sentenced in, their age group and their ethnicity. Again each line
relates to one offence and these are the same offences that are shown in Figure C.1,
except we now have additional information relating to the offender. For example, lines
five and six relate to two offences of child neglect and the sentence for this was a fully
suspended sentences of between nine and twelve months. From the information dis-
played in the dataset, we can see that the offender was sentenced in the magistrates’
court in the Probation Trust of London. The offender was a White British female,
and this offender was unavailable for work at the time of sentencing and reliant on
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state benefits. The offender lived in permanent housing, and was aged between 30 and
40 years old. Finally we know the offender did not use a weapon during the offence
but there was a direct victim. Finally we also know that the offender was misusing
drugs at the time of her offence.
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Appendix E
Multilevel modelling offences
The 99 offence categories from Model 24 are shown below. The offence of murder is
the reference category which is why the coefficient and multiplicative effect is 0.00
and 1.000. The other offence categories are then listed below the reference category.
Table E.1: Multilevel modelling offences
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
Murder (reference category) 0.00 1.0000
(-,-)
Attempted murder -1.657636 0.1906
(-3.24, -0.08)
Threats, Conspiracy or Incitement to -2.751341 0.0638
murder (-4.16, -1.34)
Manslaughter -1.442210 0.2364
(-2.86, -0.02)
Wounding and other acts endangering -1.661499 0.1899
life (-3.07, -0.26)
Continued on next page
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Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
Malicious wounding and other like -3.066134 0.0466
offences (-4.47, -1.66)
Cruelty to or neglect of children -3.104493 0.0448
(-4.51, -1.70)
Abduction of a child -2.095258 0.1230
(-3.56, -0.63)
Buggery or attempted buggery* -1.572239 0.2076
(-3.02, -0.12)
Indecent assault on a male -2.181715 0.1128
(-3.59, -0.77)
Indecency between males* -2.905657 0.0547
(-4.34, -1.48)
Rape of male or female -1.122453 0.3255
(-2.53, 0.28)
Indecent assault on a female -2.152085 0.1162
(-3.55, -0.75)
Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl -1.803819 0.1647
under 13 (-3.21, -0.40)
Unlawful sexual intercourse with girl -2.051623 0.1285
under 16 (-3.46, -0.65)
Incest with girl under 13 years old -2.069645 0.1262
(-3.49, -0.64)
Procuration of males and females -2.418245 0.0891
Continued on next page
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Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
(-3.93, -0.91)
Burglary in a dwelling -2.344578 0.0959
(-3.75, -0.94)
Aggravated burglary in a dwelling -1.346778 0.2601
(including attempts) (-2.78, 0.09)
Burglary other than a dwelling -3.106236 0.0448
(-4.51, -1.70)
Going equipped for stealing -3.543753 0.0289
(-4.95, -2.14)
Robbery and assaults with intent to rob -1.808225 0.1639
(-3.21, -0.41)
Blackmail -2.487347 0.0831
(-3.93, -1.04)
Kidnapping -1.846456 0.1578
(-3.26, -0.44)
Aggravated taking of a vehicle -2.963377 0.0516
(-4.37, -1.56)
Concealing -3.227058 0.0397
(-4.63, -1.82)
Stealing from another person -3.348745 0.0351
(-4.75, -1.94)
Stealing in a dwelling other than from -3.334129 0.0356
automatic machines and meters (-4.74, -1.92)
Continued on next page
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Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
Stealing by an employee -3.229936 0.0396
(-4.64, -1.82)
Unlawfully taking away or opening a -2.622229 0.0726
mail bag (-4.11, -1.14)
Abstracting electricity -3.709321 0.0245
(-5.13, -2.28)
Stealing pedal cycles -3.800126 0.0224
(-5.22, -2.38)
Stealing from vehicles -3.431051 0.0324
(-4.84, -2.03)
Stealing from shops and stalls -3.634850 0.0264
(shoplifting) (-5.04, -2.23)
Stealing from automatic machines -3.614099 0.0269
(-5.05, -2.18)
Theft of motor vehicle -2.970288 0.0513
(-4.38, -1.56)
Other stealing and unauthorised takings -3.373628 0.0343
(-4.78, -1.97)
Frauds by agents, trustees, company -1.983610 0.1376
directors etc. (-3.59, -0.38)
False accounting -3.241391 0.0391
(-4.66, -1.82)
Other frauds -3.261729 0.0383
Continued on next page
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Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
(-4.66, -1.86)
Receiving/handling stolen goods -3.273109 0.0379
(-4.68, -1.87)
Bankruptcy -2.880239 0.0561
(-4.36, -1.40)
Arson -2.436147 0.0875
(-3.85, -1.03)
Other criminal damage endangering life -2.052242 0.1284
(-3.54, -0.57)
Other criminal damage -3.714285 0.0244
(-5.12, -2.31)
Threat or possession with intent to commit -3.194524 0.0410
criminal damage (-4.61, -1.78)
Forgery of prescription -3.443108 0.0320
(-5.05, -1.84)
Other Forgery -3.088323 0.0456
(-4.49, -1.68)
Public Order Act 1986 Sec 2 -2.443852 0.0868
Violent Disorder (-3.87, -1.02)
Other offences (against the State and -3.200686 0.0407
Public Order) (-4.60, -1.80)
Perjury -3.590329 0.0276
(-5.16, -2.02)
Continued on next page
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Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
Intending to facilitate prison escape -3.255067 0.0386
(-4.75, -1.76)
Child prostitution -1.743845 0.1748
(-3.30, -0.19)
Abuse of trust - Sexual offences -2.623002 0.0726
(-4.06, -1.18)
Gross indecency with a child -2.571078 0.0765
(-3.98, -1.17)
Immigration Act including people -2.812441 0.0601
trafficking (-4.26, -1.36)
Attempting to pervert the course of -3.326293 0.0359
justice (-4.73, -1.92)
Absconding from lawful custody -3.535287 0.0292
(-4.97, -2.11)
Firearms offences -2.933616 0.0532
(-4.34, -1.53)
Offences against laws relating to -3.129509 0.0437
Customs, Excise and Inland Revenue (-4.68, -1.58)
Bail offences -4.098861 0.0166
(-5.50, -2.70)
Trade Descriptions and similar offences -3.189278 0.0412
(-4.61, -1.77)
Obscene publications -2.841431 0.0583
Continued on next page
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Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
(-4.24, -1.44)
Sexual Offences Act 2003 including -2.624689 0.0725
grooming and other sexual acts (-4.03, -1.22)
Misuse of Drugs Act -3.176108 4.99
.0417 (-4.58, -1.77)
Permitting premises to be uses for -3.370170 0.0344
unlawful (drug-related) purposes (-4.79, -1.95)
Other indictable offences -3.510796 0.0299
(-4.92, -2.10)
Assault on a constable -3.607455 0.0271
(-5.01, -2.21)
Common and other types of assault -3.466341 0.0312
(-4.87, -2.06)
Cruelty to animals, ill treatment, neglect -3.417375 0.0328
etc. (-4.83, -2.00)
Offences in relation to dogs Dangerous -2.934109 0.0532
Dogs Act 1991 (-4.47, -1.40)
Preventing child from receiving information -3.475661 0.0309
(-4.93, -2.02)
Firearms Act 1968 -3.510114 0.0299
(-4.95, -2.07)
Offences against Public Order -3.599987 0.0273
(-5.00, -2.20)
Continued on next page
303
Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
Interference with a motor vehicle -3.602765 0.0272
(-5.01, -2.19)
Stealing and unauthorised takings -3.604700 0.0272
(-5.01, -2.20)
Aggravated vehicle taking -3.177177 0.0417
(-4.59, -1.77)
Drunk and disorderly -3.836318 0.0216
(-5.25, -2.43)
Licensing Act offences -4.707037 0.0090
(-6.48, -2.93)
Criminal Damage -3.684377 0.0251
(-5.09, -2.28)
Benefit offences -3.492830 0.0304
(-4.91, -2.08)
Offences relating to Police regulations -4.252614 0.0142
(-5.75, -2.76)
Public health - By-laws -3.908706 0.0201
(-5.44, -2.38)
Transport offences -3.251573 0.0387
(-5.03, -1.48)
Pick-lock related offences -3.769305 0.0231
(-5.23, -2.31)
Misuse of drug related offences -3.851218 0.0213
Continued on next page
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Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
(-5.26, -2.44)
Other offences excluding motoring offences -3.468924 0.0312
(-4.87, -2.07)
Improper use of public electronic -3.453308 0.0316
communications network (-4.87, -2.04)
Dangerous Driving -2.995642 0.0500
(-4.40, -1.59)
Driving or attempting to drive after -3.506415 0.0300
consuming alcohol or drugs (-4.91, -2.10)
Careless driving -3.847321 0.0213
(-5.27, -2.43)
Accident offence -3.684747 0.0251
(-5.09, -2.28)
Driving license offences -3.483969 0.0307
(-4.89, -2.08)
Vehicle insurance offences -3.657077 0.0258
(-5.06, -2.25)
Vehicle Test Offences -3.753196 0.0234
(-5.20, -2.30)
Fraud, Forgery associated with vehicle or -3.809534 0.0222
driving records (-5.30, -2.32)
Speed limit offences -3.696433 0.0248
(-5.23, -2.16)
Continued on next page
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Table E.1-continued from previous page
Offence type Coefficient Multiplicative effect
(95% CI)
Road traffic offence, neglect, directions etc. -3.727891 0.0240
(-5.17, -2.28)
*These offences have now been re-classified as male rape
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Appendix F
Sample code
A sample of the R code used to create the extended Goodman RC association model
and optimal multilevel model (Model24) is shown below along with commentary ex-
plaining the syntax. Each new line of code is indicated by a > symbol and the
commentary follows after the # symbol.
Extended Goodman RC association sample code
>library(foreign) # allows files to be imported from SPSS
>upgradecase=read.spss("LONG1.sav",to.data.frame=T) # upload SPSS file into
R
>upgtable=xtabs(∼ SENTENCE+OFFENCE+SENT+ PLEAGRP+CONV+NUMOFF2,data=upgradecase)
# create table 99x35x12
>upgradefreq=as.data.frame(upgtable) # convert table into frequency form
>library(gnm) # allows the gnm package to be used
>ExtRC=gnm(Freq SENTENCE+OFFENCE+Mult((SENTENCE+PLEAGRP+CONV+
NUMOFF2),OFFENCE)+PLEAGRP+NUMOFF2+CONV,family=poisson, data=upgradefreq)
# fits extended Goodman RC model
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Multilevel modelling sample code
>library(foreign) # allows files to be imported from SPSS
>DATA=read.spss("New SPSS 2.sav",to.data.frame=T) # upload SPSS file into
R
>DATA=na.omit(DATA) # omit missing data to carry out a complete case analysis
>library(lme4) # allows the lme4 package to be used
>Model24 =lmer(Logdays ∼ OFFrecode+PLEAGRP+NUMOFF2+COURT+EMP+
ACC+INCOME+SEX+ETHNICITY+AGE+(1|SentOcc),data=DATA, REML=FALSE)
# fits optimal multilevel model, estimates chosen using maximum likelihood
>print(Model24, correlation=FALSE) # prints output
>Model24CI=profile(Model24) # calculates grid of profile likelihood values around
maximum likelihood estimates
>CI.fit24=confint(Model24CI) # extracts confidence intervals from profile likeli-
hoods
>print(CI.fit24) # print confidence intervals
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